Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Academy

Decision Date25 January 2000
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 99-K-1481.,Civ.A. 99-K-1481.
Citation81 F.Supp.2d 1090
PartiesJody BRAMMER-HOELTER, Laura Kilduff, Melissa Perry, Amy Sulzbach, Shelley Crews, and Bonnie Gould, Plaintiffs, v. TWIN PEAKS CHARTER ACADEMY, St. Vrain Valley School District REIJ, Brian Cox, and Dorothy Marlatt, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Colorado

John R. Olsen, Olsen & Brown, LLC, Niwot, CO, for plaintiffs.

Patrick B. Mooney, Christopher Gdowski, Julie C. Tolleson, Semple, Miller & Mooney, P.C., Denver, CO, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KANE, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiffs Jody Brammer-Hoelter, Laura Kilduff, Melissa Perry, Amy Sulzbach, Shelley Crews, and Bonnie Gould, former employees of Defendants Twin Peaks Charter Academy ("School") and St. Vrain Valley School District RE-IJ ("School District"), bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the School, the School District, Brian Cox (former chairman of the Board of Directors of the School) and Dorothy Marlatt (former administrator of the School) to remedy alleged infringement of their rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as pendent state claims for infringement of their rights of due process, free speech and association under Article II, § 10 of the Colorado Constitution, breach of contract and estoppel, misrepresentation, defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Defendants move to dismiss Claims 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 against the School and the School District, all claims against Brian Cox, and Claims 2 through 11 against Dorothy Marlatt. In addition, Defendants request an award of attorney fees in connection with the filing of the motion.

I. Allegations in the Complaint.

Plaintiffs are all former employees of Twin Peaks Charter Academy, an organized public school, where they were employed on renewable year-to-year contracts. They allege they received performance evaluations from Defendants during the 1997-1998 school year that rated them as good to excellent teachers. When Plaintiffs came up for their performance evaluations for the 1998-1999 school year, however, all, except for Plaintiff Brammer-Hoelter, were seriously and negatively criticized in certain categories despite no deterioration in their performance. These performance reviews were prepared by Defendant Marlatt, a former administrator of Twin Peaks Charter Academy.

Plaintiffs maintain, between the time of their first performance evaluation during the school year 1997-1998, and the school year 1998-1999, they asserted their free speech, free association, and grievance rights. Over the course of months, on their own time, Plaintiffs spoke among themselves and with others regarding matters of public concern involving the operation of the School. Plaintiffs and other teachers articulated grievances concerning the operation of the School, including school-imposed and Marlatt-imposed limitations on free-speech, teaching techniques and performance, and suggestions on ways to improve the teaching and performance of the students. All teachers were forbidden to participate in discussions regarding these and other topics of public interest and concern.

At the invitation of the Board of Directors of the School ("Board"), in a series of meetings at the end of 1998, Plaintiffs and other teachers expressed their grievances and were promised that they would be properly processed and there would be no retaliation. Plaintiffs submitted grievances, in writing and orally, to the Board of which Mr. Cox was the chairman. The Board did not fully process their grievances pursuant to the due process procedures outlined in the "Employee Information Packet" distributed by Defendants to the teachers.

In voicing their grievances, Plaintiffs assert, they were exercising their rights of free speech and free association under the Constitution. As a result of this exercise, Defendants retaliated against them (with the exception of Brammer-Hoelter) by falsely and unfairly downgrading and criticizing them in their 1998-1999 performance evaluations. In particular, Plaintiffs assert their supervisor, Marlatt, treated them as persona non grata and intended to take further action against them, recommending that their contracts of employment not be renewed.

On March 1, 1999, Plaintiffs submitted their written resignations, giving notice of the termination of their employment to the Board of Directors. They assert, in order for the resignations to be effective, the Board was required to accept or take action upon the resignations, but did not do so. Shortly thereafter, Marlatt resigned. On March 5, 1999, Plaintiffs, while still employed and teaching at the School, allegedly rescinded their resignations in a letter to the Board. On March 14, 1999, however, Plaintiffs received letters from the School administrator advising they were forbidden to return to the School property, and, if they did so, they would be treated as trespassers. Plaintiffs maintain these letters constituted involuntary terminations of their employment, without just cause.

Thereafter Plaintiffs filed grievances relating to their terminations but were told by the Board that the processing of their grievances was conditioned upon their participating in exit interviews. Plaintiffs maintain their grievances and attempts to apply for re-employment were ignored.

According to Plaintiffs, after their termination, the School's administrators and other agents published allegedly defamatory statements regarding Plaintiffs in the Longmont Times-Call, suggesting they had caused "unfortunate problems" at the School and publicizing their termination with the implication that there was "just cause" as required by their contracts for termination. In addition, agents of the School sent allegedly defamatory letters to parents of the School's students, suggesting Plaintiffs had resigned (without mentioning the rescission of their resignations), had caused the need for replacements, and had damaged the quality of the School's education program. Plaintiffs maintain the letters, published statements, performance evaluations, and other communications by the School or its agents were part of a conspiracy among Defendants to damage Plaintiffs, causing a loss of ability to be employed as teachers, loss of income, and damage to their personal and professional reputations.

II. Applicable Legal Standard

"[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure erect a powerful presumption against rejecting pleadings for failure to state a claim." Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1359 (10th Cir.1989). In considering whether dismissal is proper under Rule 12(b)(6), all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir.1999). Only when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims which would entitle him to relief, should a Rule 12(b)(6) motion be granted. Id.

III. Merits
A. Third Claim for Relief for Breach of Plaintiffs' Liberty Interest/Reputational Due Process Rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution (against all Defendants).

Defendants move to dismiss the third claim for relief stated against all Defendants for "breach of the plaintiffs' liberty interest/reputational due process rights pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution." (Compl. ¶ 118.) They contend the Complaint fails to meet the requirement that a plaintiff must allege information which is false and stigmatizing.

A public employee enjoys two protected liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause: (1) An interest in his good name, reputation, honor and integrity, and (2) an interest in other employment opportunities. Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1571 (10th Cir.1989). Due process requires that an employee whose liberty interest is threatened be accorded notice and a hearing. Hicks v. Watonga 942 F.2d 737, 746 (10th Cir.1991). In order to show deprivation of a liberty interest under section 1983, Plaintiffs must show the government published false and stigmatizing information about them in connection with the adverse action taken against them. Id.1 As a matter of law, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim in this regard.

Plaintiffs base their liberty interest/reputational due process claim on the following statements by Defendants. On March 6, 1999, Cox and the Board sent a letter to the parents and school staff stating that it was unfortunate that the plaintiffs had decided to resign. The letter also stated it was the "goal of the Board of Directors to ensure that the positive atmosphere of Twin Peaks Charter Academy is maintained", and the "Board of Directors will continue to work in the best interests of students, parents and staff. The Board of Directors continues to follow the established school charter, polices [sic] and procedures." (Compl. ¶ 85.) On March 10, 1999, Ms. Elaine Moretz, a consultant to the School, sent a letter to the parents and school staff announcing Plaintiffs' replacements, stating a "team of crisis counselors is on standby" and the school would be closed early on the following Friday "for departing teachers to pack" after which time everyone would "continue the quality education program in place at Twin Peaks." (Compl. ¶ 81.)

Plaintiffs also base this claim on two published statements in the Longmont Times-Call. In the first article, School administrator, Mr. Ivan Adams stated, "there have been some very unfortunate problems" during the academic year. (Compl.¶ 73.) In the second article, School administrator, Peter Samaranayake stated his aim was to "bring back the school to some normalcy." (Compl.¶ 78.) Plaintiffs contend these statements referred directly or...

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