Brammer v. Housing Authority of Birmingham Dist.

Decision Date28 March 1940
Docket Number6 Div. 625.
Citation195 So. 256,239 Ala. 280
PartiesBRAMMER ET AL. v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF BIRMINGHAM DIST. ET AL.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Leigh M. Clark, Judge.

Bill in equity by C. L. Brammer and others against Housing Authority of the Birmingham District (organized and doing business in conformity with Acts 1935, P. 126 et seq.) and the City of Birmingham, to enjoin and restrain respondents from erecting locating, maintaining or operating a low cost housing unit for negroes in the Brown's Hill Section of the City of Birmingham. From a decree sustaining a demurrer to the bill complainants appeal.

Affirmed.

Horace C. Wilkinson and Sidney W. Smyer, both of Birmingham, for appellants.

Clarence Mullins, Harvey Deramus, John S. Foster, and W. J. Wynn, all of Birmingham, for appellees.

Hamiltons & Foreman, of Mobile, Knox, Liles, Jones & Blackmon and R. E Jones, all of Anniston, and T. E. Martin, of Montgomery, amici curiae.

ANDERSON Chief Justice.

The bill of complaint in this cause seeks to test the validity of what is termed the "Housing Authority Law." Acts 1935, Pg. 126, as amended Acts 1935, Pg. 947, Acts 1939, Pg. 219, also Acts 1935, Pg. 85. These statutes were enacted for the purpose of enabling the State and its agencies and subdivisions of taking advantage of the aid offered by the Federal Government in providing a better quality of homes for a class of citizens of moderate means and thereby improving living quarters and eradicating what is termed "slum districts" or quarters.

The appellants attack the main Act of 1935, Pages 126 to 143, inclusive, upon the ground that it violates Section 45 of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, in that both by the title and the body it contains two separate and independent subjects, citing and relying chiefly on the often cited and frequently explained case of Ballentyne v. Wickersham, 75 Ala. 533.

As we understand, the title and main or chief subject of the act is the "Housing Authority Act" and think that the other things and authority thereby conferred or provided are germane or cognate to the title subject. If the object or subject is stated generally in the title and the law embraces matter relevant and pertinent thereto and said title is not used in a restrictive sense, the details incident to the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the act will not render it obnoxious to Section 45. State v. Price, 50 Ala. 568; State ex rel. Bragg v. Rogers et al., 107 Ala. 444, 19 So. 909, 32 L.R.A. 520; Alabama State Bridge Corporation v. Smith, 217 Ala. 311, 116 So. 695; Rogers v. Garlington, 234 Ala. 13, 173 So. 372; Jefferson County v. City of Birmingham, 235 Ala. 199, 178 So. 226; Harris v. State ex rel. Williams, 228 Ala. 100, 151 So. 858; Mitchell, Judge v. State ex rel. Florence Dispensary and Powers v. Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Florence, 134 Ala. 392, 32 So. 687; Dearborn v. Johnson, 234 Ala. 84, 173 So. 864.

Nor do we regard the act as an unauthorized delegation of legislative powers. The act is unlike the one condemned in the case of Mitchell, Judge v. Florence, etc., supra. It is well supported by Franklin v. State, 232 Ala. 637, 169 So. 295; Yeilding v. State, 232 Ala. 292, 167 So. 580; Ex parte City of Birmingham, 199 Ala. 9, 74 So. 51; and State v. McCarty, 5 Ala.App. 212, 59 So. 543.

Appellants contend that the Housing Authority Act does not confine the right of eminent domain to a "public use" as distinguished from a general or public benefit and, regardless of the rulings in other states, Alabama has held that the words "public use" are not synonymous with public benefit, relying largely upon the case of Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311. True, as pointed out in 18 Am.Juris Prudence, Pg. 665, there is a division among the authorities upon this question, many holding that these words, "public use," as used in the organic law relating to eminent domain, should receive an elastic or liberal interpretation, while others hold they should be given a literal or narrow meaning. We think the weight of authority favors the elastic or liberal meaning, including our early case of Aldridge v. Tuscumbia, C. & D. R. R. Co., 2 Stew. & P. 199, 23 Am.Dec. 307, wherein public use and public benefit were held to be synonymous. This case was not only reaffirmed after able argument in the case of Davis v. Tuscumbia, C. & D. R. R. Co., 4 Stew. & P., 421, but has been approvingly cited in Jones v. New Orleans & S. R. R. Co., 70 Ala. 227. See, also, Reporter's note to Davis case.

We do not understand the Sadler case, supra, as overruling the Aldridge case as the opinion cites said case without criticism. Nor do we understand the Sadler case as being in actual conflict with the Aldridge case, as the real holding in the former and its companion that the taking for the road was for a private one and the ad quod damnum proceedings for the mill dam did not disclose that it was not to be for a private use or purpose, and the act was unconstitutional because it authorized the taking of the land for a private use and did not apply to mill dams for public use or benefit. It is needless, however, to attempt to distinguish or reconcile these cases for, if we concede that the narrow meaning should prevail, the great weight of authority holds that the result and purpose to be accomplished under the act in question was for a public use. New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153, 105 A.L.R. 905; Stockus et al. v. Boston Housing Authority, Mass., 24 N.E.2d 333; In re Opinions of the Justices, 235 Ala. 485, 179 So. 535. See, also, Mt. Vernon Cotton Co. v. Alabama Power Co., 240 U.S. 30, 36 S.Ct. 234, 60 L.Ed. 507; Tallassee Falls Mfg. Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 186 Ala. 622, 65 So. 287.

The acts involved gave the Housing Board or Authority the power to select the locus in quo and in the absence of a charge that their action was arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent their action will not be disturbed....

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30 cases
  • Blankenship v. City of Decatur
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • November 5, 1959
    ...holds that the result and purpose to be accomplished under the act in question was for a public use.' Brammer v. Housing Authority of Birmingham Dist., 239 Ala. 280, 195 So. 256, 258. That case was concerned with the validity of the act which later was codified as Tit. 25, §§ 5-30, Code 194......
  • Newberry v. City of Andalusia
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • March 10, 1952
    ...Rogers v. Garlington, 234 Ala. 13, 173 So. 372; Atkinson v. City of Gadsden, 238 Ala. 556, 192 So. 510; Brammer v. Housing Authority of Birmingham District, 239 Ala. 280, 195 So. 256; In re Opinion of the Justices, 249 Ala. 180, 30 So.2d 715. The title to the bill merely describes various m......
  • City of Birmingham v. Scogin
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • November 5, 1959
    ...action of a government agency acting within its authority will not be controlled or revised by injunction. Brammer v. Housing Authority of Birmingham Dist., 239 Ala. 280, 195 So. 256; Goodwin v. State Board of Administration, 212 Ala. 453, 102 So. 718; Lehmann v. State Board of Public Accou......
  • Johnston v. Alabama Public Service Commission
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • June 30, 1971
    ...v. Mississippi Power Company, 280 Ala. 368, 194 So.2d 527 (1967). On the other hand, the case of Brammer v. Housing Authority of Birmingham Dist., 239 Ala. 280, 195 So. 256 (1940), illustrates a more liberal construction of public use. In Brammer, this court upheld the validity of the Housi......
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