Branch v. Cassady (In re Re)
| Decision Date | 13 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | WD77788 |
| Parties | IN RE: WILLIAM L. BRANCH, Petitioner, v. JAY CASSADY, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SUPERINTENDENT, JEFFERSON CITY CORRECTIONAL CENTER, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Before Writ Division: Mark D. Pfeiffer, Presiding Judge, and Karen King Mitchell and Cynthia L. Martin, Judges
William L. Branch ("Branch") has petitioned this court for:
[A] Writ of Habeas Corpus vacating his conviction for the offense of first degree murder and his sentence of life without possibility of probation or parole (hereinafter "LWOP"), under Section 565.020, RSMo, because Section 565.020 RSMo is unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders. [Branch] moves that this Court remand his case for a remedy and proceedings consistent with Miller v. Alabama/Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012).1
We conclude that the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Miller v. Alabama/Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) (hereinafter, "Miller/Jackson"), which held that a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole ("LWOP") for juvenile homicide offenders is unconstitutional, applies retroactively to cases on collateral review, including the present case; accordingly, Branch is entitled to habeas relief. Thus, we remand this case to the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri, for resentencing in accordance with this opinion on Branch's conviction for the offense of first-degree murder. In all other respects, the judgment shall not be disturbed.
Factual and Procedural History
In February 2000, Branch pled guilty to murder in the first degree and robbery in the first degree in the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri ("circuit court"), for the murder and robbery of Michael A. Alfaro. Branch committed the offenses when he was seventeen years old. Pursuant to section 565.020, RSMo 1994, the circuit court sentenced Branch to a mandatory sentence of LWOP on the murder count; the circuit court sentenced Branch to a concurrent sentence of life imprisonment on the robbery count.
Branch filed a pro se Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief on May 2, 2000, which he dismissed on July 28, 2000, before an amended motion was filed.
Branch filed his first petition for habeas corpus in the Circuit Court of Texas County, the county in which he was then incarcerated. That petition was denied by the court on July 24, 2014. Branch subsequently filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court.
Standard of Review
We independently consider Branch's successive habeas petition as an original writ filed pursuant to the authority of Rule 91 and Rule 84.22, and subject to the procedure in Rule 84.24. Ferguson v. Dormire, 413 S.W.3d 40, 51 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013).
"[A] writ of habeas corpus may be issued when a person is restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the state or federal government." Id. at 52 (internal quotation omitted). "Habeas proceedings are limited to determining the facial validity of a petitioner's confinement." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
"Habeas proceedings are not intended to correct procedural defaults as to post-conviction remedies." Id. (internal quotation omitted). "[H]abeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal or post-conviction proceedings." Id. (internal quotation omitted). If a defendant fails to raise a challenge to his conviction on direct appeal or in a timely post-conviction proceeding, the defendant is said to have procedurally defaulted on those claims and is barred from raising those claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless:
Id. at 52-53 (internal quotations omitted). Branch bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. Id. at 53.
"[H]abeas review guards against unauthorized sentences," including a claim that a "sentence exceeds the sentence that is legally authorized."4 State ex rel. Taylor v. Steele, 341 S.W.3d 634, 639 (Mo. banc 2011) (citing State ex rel. Zinna v. Steele, 301 S.W.3d 510, 516-17 (Mo. banc 2010) (providing that a claim that the sentence exceeded what was permitted by law is a claim cognizable in a habeas proceeding even if the argument was raised, or should have been raised, in an earlier proceeding)). And, notably, in the context of our Missouri Supreme Court's retroactive application of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) (), our Missouri Supreme Court stated:
In sentencing Mr. Whitfield to death without a jury finding of factors 1, 2, and 3 against defendant, the court below imposed a sentence in excess of that permitted by law. "If a court imposes a sentence that is in excess of that authorized by law, habeas corpus is a proper remedy." State ex rel. Osowski v. Purkett, 908 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Mo. banc 1995), citing, State ex rel. Dutton v. Sevier, 336 Mo. 1236, 83 S.W.2d 581, 582-83 (1935). In such a case, the rules regarding preservation of error by raising the error on direct appeal or in authorized post-conviction motions do not apply, for "those waivers do not affect his objection that the sentence exceeds the maximum allowed by law." Id. Such an error is jurisdictional, and cannot be waived. See e.g. Merriweather v. Grandison, 904 S.W.2d 485, 489 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995).
State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 269 n.19 (Mo. banc 2003) (emphasis added).5
Analysis
The Miller v. Alabama/Jackson v. Hobbs Decision
The combined cases of Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs both involved fourteen-year-old defendants convicted of murder and sentenced to LWOP. The sentencers had no sentencing discretion. In Miller/Jackson, Miller came before the Supreme Court on direct review, while Jackson's case was before the Court on collateral review, after his petition for habeas corpus had been denied.
The Supreme Court held that "the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders" when the sentencer has not considered an "offender's youth and attendant characteristics." Miller/Jackson, 132 S.Ct. at 2469, 2471. Accordingly, "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments.'" Id. at 2460.
While the Supreme Court's decision was rooted in the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Miller/Jackson court also built its decision around the Supreme Court's prior jurisprudence, reasoning that "the confluence of . . . two linesof precedent leads to the conclusion that mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment." 132 S.Ct. at 2464.
In the first strand of cases (proportionate punishment), the Supreme Court has "adopted categorical bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty." Id. at 2463. This strand includes Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), holding that imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded defendants violates the Eighth Amendment; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), holding that the Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment for juvenile offenders; and Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 (2010), holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a sentence of LWOP for a juvenile offender who commits a non-homicide crime. The Supreme Court reasoned that "the characteristics of youth, and the way they weaken rationales for punishment, can render a life-without-parole sentence disproportionate." Miller/Jackson, 132 S.Ct. at 2465-66. "By removing youth from the balance—by subjecting a juvenile to the same life-without-parole sentence applicable to an adult—these [mandatory sentencing schemes] prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law's harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile offender." Id. at 2466. The Court noted that in Graham, it likened LWOP sentences imposed on juveniles to the death penalty. Id.
In the second strand of cases (individualized sentencing), the Supreme Court has "prohibited mandatory imposition of capital punishment, requiring that sentencing authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before sentencing him to death." Miller/Jackson, 132 S.Ct. at 2463-64. This strand includes Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); and Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987). This line of casesrequires that "capital defendants have an opportunity to advance, and the judge or jury a chance to assess, any mitigating factors, so that the death penalty is reserved only for the most culpable defendants committing the most serious offenses." Miller/Jackson, 132 S.Ct. at 2467. One of these factors is the "mitigating qualities of youth." Id. (internal quotation omitted). "[Y]outh matters for purposes of meting out the law's most serious punishments." Id. at 2471. Miller/Jackson instructs the sentencer to take into account an offender's age, age-related factors, and other surrounding circumstances:
Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his chronological age and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity,...
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