Branch v. Gordon's Transports, Inc.

• Decision Date: 28 January 1964
• Docket Number: No. 8206,8206
• Citation: 375 S.W.2d 418
• Parties: Almeda BRANCH, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. GORDON'S TRANSPORTS, INC., a corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 418

375 S.W.2d 418

Almeda BRANCH, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. GORDON'S TRANSPORTS, INC., a corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 8206.

Springfield Court of Appeals, Missouri.

Jan. 28, 1964.

Motion for Rehearing or for Transfer to Supreme Court Denied

Feb. 24, 1964.

William L. Mason, Jr., Robert T. Smith, St. Louis, Dalton & Treasure, John Hall Dalton, James C. Bullard, Kennett, for defendant-appellant.

Ward & Reeves, Eugene E. Reeves, Caruthersville, for plaintiff-respondent.

HOGAN, Judge.

This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in a collision between motor vehicles. A jury found for the plaintiff and assessed her damages at $8,500.00. The defendant has appealed, assigning error to the giving of plaintiff's verdict-directing instruction and contending that the damages awarded are excessive.

The collision occurred in or near the intersection of U. S. Highway No. 61 and County Route E (which is referred to as the Cooter road) in Pemiscot County on December 4, 1961, at about 5:15 P.M. At the place in question, Highway 61 runs generally north and south; it is a 24-foot concrete slab with shoulders 10 feet wide at this point. It is intersected at right angles by Route E, 22 feet wide, which fans out to form a Y-shaped intersection on either side of Highway 61. Highway 61 is level and straight in that vicinity, and the intersection is clearly visible, ordinarily, at least 500 feet to the south.

At the time of the accident, it was dark and it was raining. The plaintiff was traveling northward in her own automobile, which was being driven by her husband. Some distance behind her, also traveling northward, was the defendant's trailer truck. The plaintiff, her husband and two friends had been shopping in a nearby community and were returning to Cooter. As the plaintiff's automobile was turning right, with the 'back wheels * * * a foot or a foot and a half on the highway, or that much off,' according to the driver, and 'plum off of the highway,' according to the plaintiff, the tractor or cab of the defendant's truck collided violently with the right rear of the plaintiff's automobile. Neither the plaintiff nor her husband saw the truck prior to the collision, but afterward the 'truck was sitting in the road over into the Cooter road jackknifed.' The plaintiff claims that she sustained a soft-tissue whiplash injury as a result of the accident.

The defendant's driver testified that he had seen the Branch vehicle between one-quarter and one-half mile before he came to the intersection. The truck, according to the driver, was being operated northward behind the Branch vehicle at a slow rate of speed, about 20 miles an hour, and 'three or four cars' were approaching in the southbound (west) land. When the truck had come within 70 or 80 feet of the Branch vehicle, and as the Branch vehicle was being turned to the right, or east, an oncoming car 'just darted' out of the southbound lane into the northbound, or east, lane in which the truck was being driven. The driver applied his brakes; the truck 'just automatically jackknifed,' and went over to 'the right side of the road.' Because he 'was riding backwards' just before the collision, the driver was unable to say where the third vehicle went. The testimony of a highway patrolman tended to prove that the defendant's truck had skidded diagonally to the northeast 'in a jackknifed position' and had 'slid into' the plaintiff's car. There were, in his words, 'tire marks and skids off of the highway on the shoulder * * * in the mud.' The truck had come to rest with the tractor pointing generally in an easterly direction in the north traffic lane of Route E, with the rear of the trailer pointing south or somewhat southeast. Other evidence will be noted in the course of the opinion.

The defendant's first and principal complaint here is that the trial court erred in giving the plaintiff's verdict-directing instruction for the reason that the instruction ignores or excludes from the jury's consideration the undisputed evidence that the defendant's vehicle had jackknifed and skidded out of control at the time of collision. Such a submission in this case, as the defendant's argument runs, is prejudicial because it fails to hypothesize for the jury's consideration the possibility of an accidental, or at least non-negligent, cause of the collision, which the defendant maintains the plaintiff's evidence shows. The plaintiff seeks to avoid a consideration of this point on the merits by maintaining it was not properly preserved for review in the defendant's motion for new trial, and she further maintains that, in any event, the instruction was properly given.

The case was tried and submitted, as counsel concede here, upon the theory that the defendant's negligence could be inferred from the circumstances by application of the so-called 'rear-end collision rule.' This 'rule' is that ordinarily if one person has his vehicle in a portion of the highway where he should have it or is entitled to have it in view of the course in which he is proceeding, and some other person traveling behind him in the same direction overtakes him and permits his vehicle to run into the rear of the one ahead, the proof of a collision under such circumstances makes out a prima facie case of specific negligence against such other person in charge of the overtaking vehicle. State ex rel. Spears v. McCullen, 357 Mo. 686, 690-692, 210 S.W.2d 68, 70-71; Jones v. Central States Oil Co., 350 Mo. 91, 102, 164 S.W.2d 914, 920; Glowczwski v. Foster, Mo.App., 359 S.W.2d 406, 408-409; Doggendorf v. St. Louis Pub. Sv. Co., Mo.App., 333 S.W.2d 302, 305; Hughes v. St. Louis Pub. Sv. Co., Mo.App., 251 S.W.2d 360, 362. The plaintiff submitted her case upon a single verdict-directing instruction which, after hypothesizing the respective positions of the two vehicles, and requiring a finding that plaintiff was a passenger in her own automobile and that it was 'in the process' of making a right turn, then predicated a verdict for the plaintiff upon a finding that '[the driver] thereafter allowed the tractor-trailer unit that he was operating to run into and collide with the rear end of the said Buick automobile * * * and that in allowing the tractor-trailer to collide with the rear end of the Buick automobile * * * [the driver] failed to exercise the highest degree of care and was thereby negligent * * *.' The language used, at least in submitting negligence, is very similar to that found in Instruction 1 in State ex rel. Spears v. McCullen, supra, 357 Mo. at 690, 210 S.W.2d at 70.

One of the arguments advanced here by the defendant is that the 'rear-end collision rule' is wholly inapplicable to this case, and that plaintiff's verdict-directing instruction is erroneous for that reason. We do not consider it necessary for the purpose of this appeal to examine the limits and underlying theory of the 'rear-end collision rule.' That is not the real issue here. Rather, the precise question before us is whether upon the facts the plaintiff's mode of submission prejudicially assumed that the defendant's driver was in control of the truck, and erroneously excluded the possibility of a non-negligent cause of the accident through an insufficient hypothesis of the facts. In our view, this question must be examined in light of those cases which hold that if, in the process of making a prima facie case or in proving conduct which would ordinarily constitute negligence per se, the plaintiff adduces evidence which tends to show an accidental or non-negligent cause, or a matter which would exonerate the defendant, then the plaintiff's verdict-directing instruction may not ignore the evidence which tends to excuse the defendant, but must hypothesize the possibly non-negligent causes or exculpatory facts and require the jury to find that the defendant's conduct was in fact negligent. Otherwise, the verdict-directing instruction is said to be erroneous as ignoring the real issue, or excluding it from the jury's consideration. Doyle v. Wilmesherrer, Mo., 358 S.W.2d 837, 841; Kitchen v. Wilson, Mo., 335 S.W.2d 38, 45; Evans v. Colombo, Mo., 319 S.W.2d 549, 552-553; Karch v. Stewart, Mo., 315 S.W.2d 131, 137; Kitchen v. Pratt, Mo.App., 324 S.W.2d 144, 148. See Richardson et al., Legal Excuse and Unavoidable Accident, 4 Mo. Bar C.L.E. Series, Sect. 12.7, pp. 168-72.

We set to one side the plaintiff's contention that the point under discussion is not sufficiently preserved for review. The assignments made in defendant's motion for new trial and specifically directed to Instruction 1 are that it 'assumes matters not in evidence, and assumes controverted facts,' and that it 'failed to hypothesize the necessary facts essential to plaintiff's recovery.' We agree that in ordinary circumstances such assignments fall short of the particularity required by Rule 79.03, V.A.M.R., and would, in most cases, be insufficient. Ayres v. Keith, Mo., 355 S.W.2d, 914, 917[1, 2]. However, the rule pertaining to instructions which the defendant seeks to invoke is somewhat difficult to express in substantive terms, and counsel has couched his assignments in the very language of the case upon which he relies principally in this court, Evans v. Colombo, supra, 319 S.W.2d at 552. It is...