Branch v. Gorman
| Decision Date | 27 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 11-2155 (RHK/JJG) |
| Parties | Mary D. Branch, Plaintiff, v. Officer Timothy Gorman, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
A.L. Brown, Capitol City Law Group, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota, Joshua R. Williams, Law Office of Joshua R. Williams, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Plaintiff.
Timothy S. Skarda, Minneapolis City Attorney's Office, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for Defendants.
This case arises out of Plaintiff Mary Branch's arrest by Minneapolis police officers on September 3, 2007, for violating Minnesota's "open-container" law. Branch alleges that the officers - Defendants Timothy Gorman and Christopher Garbisch -lacked probable cause to arrest her and, hence, violated her Fourth Amendment (and state-law) rights; she also asserts related claims against the City of Minneapolis (the "City"). Defendants now move for summary judgment on all of Branch's claims, and Branch cross-moves for partial summary judgment as to liability. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion will be granted in part and Branch's Motion will be denied.
On September 3, 2007, at approximately 12:30 a.m., Branch was a passenger in a car driven by her husband, David Johnson, in Minneapolis. (Branch Dep. at 16-19.) Garbisch, who was patrolling in the area, checked the vehicle's license plate and discovered that Johnson had an outstanding warrant. (Garbisch Dep. at 25; Skarda Aff. (Doc. No. 16) Ex. 1 at 2.) He pulled the vehicle over as other officers (including Gorman) arrived to assist. (Garbisch Dep. at 15; Dashcam Video.)1 After confirming Johnson's identity, Garbisch arrested him on the outstanding warrant and placed him in the back of his squad car. (Garbisch Dep. at 27; Branch Dep. at 20-22; Dashcam Video.)
It is not entirely clear what happened next. The Dashcam Video shows that two officers approached the car, one on either side. According to Branch, the officer on the driver's side was Gorman, who allegedly told her through the rolled-down window, "Nigger, your black ass is going to jail." (Branch Dep. at 21; Branch Decl. (Doc. No. 53) ¶ 2.) On the Dashcam Video, however, it does not appear the driver-side officer was speaking to Branch.2 Nor does the video reveal that officers took any action to place her under arrest at that time.
In any event, a few seconds later Branch opened her door; on the Dashcam Video, the officer on the passenger side of the vehicle then appears to give her some instructions.Branch claims this officer was Gorman and that he told her to exit the vehicle. (Branch Dep. at 22.) But she also testified that Gorman was on the driver's side of the car, and it is clear from the Dashcam Video that a different officer was speaking to her from the passenger side. Regardless, "thinking [she] was going to be released and go home," Branch exited the car, closed the door, walked around the vehicle, and got into the driver's seat. (Branch Dep. at 22; Dashcam Video.) Several officers then approached and removed her from the car, sitting her down on the curb. (Branch Dep. at 22; Dashcam Video.)
At about the time Branch was removed from the car, an unknown officer opened the passenger-side door and retrieved a small metal flask from inside the vehicle. (Dashcam Video; Garbisch Dep. at 35.) The record is unclear (1) which officer first spotted the flask and (2) precisely where it was located. (See Garbisch Dep. at 37-38.) Yet, it is undisputed that the flask was either completely under the passenger seat where Branch had been sitting (id. at 17, 21, 37-38; Branch Decl. (Doc. No. 13) Ex. A at 3; Skarda Aff. (Doc. No. 16) Ex. 1), partially under that seat with its end exposed (Garbisch Dep. at 40-41), or on the floor in front of the passenger seat, near where Branch's feet had been located (id. at 48-49). Branch denies knowing that the flask was in the car or drinking on the night in question. (Branch Dep. at 32.)3 She did, however, ask the officers "three [or] four" times if she could use the bathroom while sitting on the curb; they refused. (Id. at 28-29.)
The record also is unclear what happened once the flask was removed from the car. According to Branch, the officers opened the flask, shook it, and proclaimed it empty. (Id. at 30-31.) Garbisch testified that he opened the flask's cap but could not see through its narrow opening. (Garbisch Dep. at 22.) He detected a strong odor of alcohol, however, suggesting to him that at least some amount of alcohol was in the flask. (Id. at 22-23.) The Dashcam Video does not show any of this, although at times the flask is out of view or blocked from the camera.
Ultimately, Garbisch arrested Branch for violating Minnesota's open-container law, Minn. Stat. § 169A.35, subd. 3, making it unlawful "for a person to have in possession, while in a private motor vehicle . . . any bottle or receptacle containing an alcoholic beverage . . . that has been opened." (Id. at 47.) She was transported to the Hennepin County jail, booked, and released; the charge against her was later dropped. (Doc. No. 16, Ex. 3.)
On September 11, 2007, Branch filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Minneapolis Department of Civil Rights, asserting that there existed no basis for her arrest because the flask was (i) not in her possession and (ii) empty on the night in question. She contended instead that she had been arrested on account of her race. In its October 16, 2007 response to the Charge, the police department denied any civil-rights violation. It asserted that there was a valid basis for Branch's arrest because although "[t]he flask appeared to contain no liquid," it "had a strong odor of alcohol." The Department of Civil Rights dismissed the Charge on December 22, 2010. (Doc. No. 18, Ex. C.)
Branch commenced the instant action on July 29, 2011, against Garbisch and Gorman, in their individual and official capacities, and the City. Her Complaint asserts four claims: (1) unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Count I); (2) false arrest and false imprisonment under Minnesota law (Count II); (3) civil conspiracy to deprive her of her civil rights (Count III); and (4) violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn. Stat. § 363A.01 et seq., by discriminating against her "based on her race and disability in the area of public services" (Count IV). The Complaint does not clearly specify which Defendants are implicated in which Counts.
On October 17, 2011, Branch moved for partial summary judgment as to liability on Counts I and II, arguing that "the undisputed facts demonstrate that Gorman and Garbisch violated her Fourth Amendment rights and falsely imprisoned her by arresting her absent probable cause." (Doc. No. 12 at 1.) The Court denied the Motion, noting that it was unclear what the officers knew at the time Branch was arrested. See Branch v. Gorman, Civ. No. 11-2155, 2011 WL 6740286, at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 21, 2011).
With discovery now complete, Branch has renewed her Motion for summary judgment as to Defendants' liability. Defendants, in turn, have cross-moved for summary judgment on all of Branch's claims. In response to that Motion, Branch has conceded the dismissal of her "Monell claim,4 official capacity claims, the civil conspiracy claims, and the [MHRA] claims based on disability." (Pl. Mem. in Opp'n at 2 n.1.) She has alsoconceded dismissal of her race-based MHRA claim (Count IV) to the extent it is asserted against Garbisch, and Counts I and II insofar as they are asserted against Gorman. (Id.) What appear to remain for resolution, therefore, are the following claims: Count I (Fourth Amendment) and Count II (false arrest/imprisonment) against Garbisch in his individual capacity; and Count IV (race-based MHRA violation) against Gorman. At this juncture, Branch does not press any claims against the City.5
The parties' Motions have been fully briefed, and the Court held a hearing on the Motions on September 19, 2012. They are now ripe for disposition.
Summary judgment is proper if, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing that the material facts in the case are undisputed. Id. at 322; Whisenhunt v. Sw. Bell Tel., 573 F.3d 565, 568 (8th Cir. 2009). The Court must view the evidence, and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Weitz Co., LLC v. Lloyd's of London, 574 F.3d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 2009); Carraher v. Target Corp., 503 F.3d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must show through the presentation of admissible evidence that specific facts exist creating a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. LibertyLobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986); Wingate v. Gage Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 34, 528 F.3d 1074, 1078-79 (8th Cir. 2008).
Where, as here, the Court confronts cross-motions for summary judgment, this approach is only slightly modified. When considering Branch's Motion, the Court views the record in the light most favorable to Defendants, and when considering Defendants' Motion, the Court views the record in the light most favorable to Branch. "Either way, summary judgment is proper if the record demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Seaworth v. Messerli, Civ. No. 09-3437, 2010 WL 3613821, at *3 (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2010) (Kyle, J.), aff'd, No. 10-3532, 2011 WL 873121 (8th Cir. Mar. 15, 2011).
The Court's analysis begins (and ends) with the lone federal claim remaining in this case: Garbisch's alleged violation of Branch's Fourth Amendment rights when he arrested her without probable...
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