Branch v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am.

Decision Date25 January 1929
Docket NumberNo. 108.,108.
PartiesBRANCH v. INDEMNITY INS. CO. OFNORTH AMERICA.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

On the Merits, Feb. 13, 1929.

Appeal from Circuit Court of Baltimore City; Eugene O'Dunne, Judge.

Suit by the Indemnity Insurance Company of North America against Annie Branch. From an order overruling a demurrer to the bill, and enjoining defendant from proceeding to enforce award of compensation until decision on appeal, defendant appeals. Reversed and rendered.

Argued before BOND, C. J., and URNER, ADKINS, OFFUTT, DIGGES, PARKE, and SLOAN, JJ.

Roszel C. Thomsen and Walter L. Clark, both of Baltimore (David Friedman, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellant.

Arthur W. Machen, Jr., and John Henry Lewin, both of Baltimore (Armstrong, Machen & Allen, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

PER CURIAM. The court being of the opinion, for reasons to be hereafter stated, that the provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1924, art. 101) against a stay pending appeal is valid and effective, and is applicable to the award involved in this proceeding, it is adjudged, ordered, and decreed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland that the decree of the circuit court of Baltimore city in this case is hereby reversed, with costs, and the bill of complaint dismissed.

On the Merits.

URNER, J. Pending an appeal by the employer and the insurer from an award by the State Industrial Accident Commission, a suit was brought by the claimant against the insurer for the amount of the weekly installments of the awarded compensation which had then accrued. A bill in equity was filed by the insurer for an injunction against the prosecution of any suit on the award until the determination of the appeal by which it was resisted. The present appeal is from an order overruling a demurrer to the bill, and, upon waiver of the right to answer, enjoining the defendant from proceeding to enforce the award of compensation until the appeal therefrom should be decided, and requiring the insurer to pay to the clerk of the equity court the sum of $1,000, to be disbursed under its order in accordance with the result of that appeal.

The principal question for decision is whether the provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Code, art. 101, § 56), that appeals from orders of the State Industrial Accident Commission "shall not be a stay," is valid. It is provided by the same section that "any employer, employee, beneficiary or person feeling aggrieved by any decision of the commission affecting his interests" may have its action reviewed by appeal to the circuit court for the county, or the common-law courts of Baltimore City having jurisdiction over the place where the accident occurred or over the person appealing, and the court "shall determine whether the commission has justly considered all the facts concerning injury, whether it has exceeded the powers granted it by the Article, whether it has misconstrued the law and facts applicable in the case decided," and, if the court "shall determine that the commission has acted within its powers and has correctly construed the law and facts, the decision of the commission shall be confirmed, otherwise it shall be reversed or modified." There are provisions that upon motion by either party to the appeal any question of fact involved in the case shall be submitted to a jury, and that the proceedings shall be "informal and summary," but "full opportunity to be heard shall be had before judgment is pronounced."

It was held in Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 265,101 A. 710, that, since the act provided for jury trials on appeal, its validity could not be denied on the theory that it disregarded the requirement of the Maryland Constitution (article 15, § 6) that the "right of trial by jury of all issues of fact in civil proceedings in the several courts of law in this state, where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five dollars, shall be inviolably preserved," and the provision of section 40 of article 3, prohibiting the passage of any law authorizing private property to be taken for public use without just compensation as agreed by the parties or awarded by a jury. The opinion in that case referred to Frazier & Son v. Leas, 127 Md. 572, 96 A. 764, where the court said that it was the evident intent of the act to secure to the party appealing the benefit of the constitutional provision just quoted. It is contended that, while the right to a jury trial is definitely recognized by the Workmen's Compensation Act, the practical value of that right would be seriously and unconstitutionally impaired for employers and insurers appealing from awards of compensation, if, because of the unqualified declaration in the act that an appeal shall not be a stay, they may be forced to pay the awards before their appeals are tried and determined.

As the statute actually provided for jury trials, it was not necessary to consider and determine, in either of the cases cited, whether the act would be invalid in the absence of such a provision. An application by an injured workman, or his dependents, under the act, could not properly be classified as a civil proceeding in a court of law, within the meaning of the quoted section of the state Constitution. It was the expressed purpose of the statute that such claims should be "withdrawn from private controversy," and that "sure and certain relief for workmen injured in extrahazardous employments and their families and dependents" should be thereby provided for, "regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy. * * *" Acts 1914, c. 800. The legislation to that end was enacted in the declared exercise of the police power of the state. In acting upon claims for compensation, the State Industrial Accident Commission is not "bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of * * * procedure, * * * but may make the investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit" of the act. Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1924, art. 101, § 10.

Compensation to meritorious claimants must be awarded in accordance with the statutory schedules. In Solvuca v. Ryan & Reilly Co., 131 Md. 284, 101 A. 710, the court said that the commission is an administrative body, and while it is required to exercise judgment and discretion, and to apply the law to the facts, it is not vested with judicial power in a constitutional sense. The procedure on appeal from decisions of the commission is directed to be "informal and summary," and the function of the jury trying the issues of fact on appeal does not include the duty or right to fix the amount of the allowable compensation. Schiller v. B. & O. R. R. Co., Md. 235, 112 A....

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26 cases
  • Attorney General v. Johnson
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • April 5, 1978
    ...legislature would not have been required to provide a jury trial in any event. And indeed our predecessors in Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 156 Md. 482, 489, 144 A. 696, 698 (1929), said: "Unless we were disposed to disregard the trend of our own decisions, and those of other courts in anal......
  • County Council for Montgomery County v. Investors Funding Corp.
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • December 4, 1973
    ...procedure affecting the rights of private employers and employees (the Workmen's Compensation Act) approved by us in Branch v. Indemnity Insurance Co. supra. Fourth, the fact that the administrative procedure created by Chapter 93A permits the agency to adjudicate some matters formerly deci......
  • Owens Corning v. Bauman
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • February 1, 1999
    ... ... See id. at 372, 601 A.2d 102 (citing Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 156 Md. 482, 486, 144 A. 696 (1929)). 15 ...         Applying ... ...
  • Owens-Corning v. Walatka
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 1, 1998
    ...to a jury trial and the legislature's power to make substantive law, the Court quoted from its 1929 decision in Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 156 Md. 482, 486, 144 A. 696 (1929), which held that "where the Legislature authorizes a jury trial to determine the facts with regard to liability, ......
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