Brand v. City of Wentzville
| Docket Number | 4:20-cv-01758-SRC |
| Decision Date | 28 February 2022 |
| Parties | REGINA LYNN BRAND, Plaintiff(s), v. CITY OF WENTZVILLE, et al., Defendant(s). |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
On December 10, 2020, Regina Brand sued the City of Wentzville the city's Chief of Police Kurt Frisz, and Detective Sean Rosner, alleging that their investigation-or lack thereof- of an alleged sexual assault deprived Brand of her constitutional rights. After Chivas Johnson allegedly raped Brand on August 15, 2015, Brand claims to have endured shocking behavior on the part of the authorities. She alleges that Detective Rosner took unlawful actions against her while failing to adequately investigate the circumstances of the assault or forward the case to the county prosecutor. And then, when Brand turned to Chief Frisz and the City of Wentzville, she claims they too failed to address her complaints. Critically however, no dispute exists that all but one of the alleged deprivations occurred more than five years before Brand filed suit, meaning that the statute of limitations prevents the Court from considering those claims. And the one claim that the statute of limitations may not bar, the access-to-courts claim against Chief Frisz, fails to state a claim.
On December 10, 2020, Brand filed this lawsuit on the Court's form “Complaint for a Civil Case” and without a lawyer. Doc. 1. The original complaint named the Wentzville Police Department, Chief Kurt Frisz, Detective Sean Rosner, Sergeant David Schoolcraft, and Detective Craig Schulte as defendants. Id. On review of the complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court granted Brand's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, dismissed her complaint without prejudice with leave to amend, and appointed limited-scope counsel for the purpose of assisting Brand in drafting an amended complaint. Docs. 4, 6. At that time, the Court specifically noted that “Plaintiff's case appears time-barred.” Doc. 4 at p. 6.
With the assistance of court-appointed counsel, Brand filed her amended complaint which levied three section 1983 claims against Detective Rosner, Chief Frisz, and the City of Wentzville. Doc. 8. Count 1 of the amended complaint alleges that Defendants Rosner and City of Wentzville violated Brand's Fourth Amendment rights when Rosner recorded the August 18, 2015, sexual-assault forensic examination. Doc. 8 at ¶¶ 115-34. Count 2 alleges that all Defendants violated Brand's due process right of access to courts, id. at ¶¶ 135-47, and count 3 alleges that the City of Wentzville failed to train its police officers to prevent gender bias which, Brand argues, resulted in Johnson sexually assaulting Brand a second time, id. at ¶¶ 148-54.
The Defendants moved to dismiss Brand's claims on various grounds, including that the statute of limitations bars Brand's claims, and the Court held a hearing on the motions. Docs. 20, 32, 38. During the hearing, Brand argued that she was unable to file her suit within the five years because of her medical issues. Doc. 44 at p. 19. At the Court's request, Brand then submitted medical records and police reports. Docs. 40, 41. Because the Court intended to consider those materials, the Court converted the City of Wentzville and Chief Frisz's motion and partially converted Detective Rosner's motion, to the extent he sought dismissal based on the statute-of-limitations, to motions for summary judgment. Doc. 42 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d)). The Court gave notice of the conversion to the parties, permitted additional briefing, and requested that the parties address whether a mental-incapacitation tolling statute affected the case in any way. Doc. 42 (citing Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.170). The Court finds that, at the hearing and throughout this litigation, Brand articulated her positions well and capably represented herself.
Only for the purposes of the motions for summary judgment, the parties do not dispute the following facts as alleged in Brand's complaint. Except as otherwise noted, the Court finds the following facts as undisputed only for the purpose of resolving the statute-of-limitations defenses raised in the motions for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ().
Brand alleges that a man named Chivas Johnson raped her on August 18, 2015. Doc. 8 at ¶ 2. After Brand called 9-1-1, police arrested Johnson, id. at ¶¶ 11, 14, and Detective Rosner interviewed Brand, id. at ¶¶ 16-17. That same day, Detective Rosner took Brand to a hospital where a nurse conducted a sexual-assault forensic examination. Id. at ¶¶ 19-21, 24; Doc. 44 at p. 23:1-3. Detective Rosner remained in the room and audio-recorded the exam. Doc. 8 at ¶¶ 21, 25-42. Although Brand alleged in her complaint that Detective Rosner “record[ed] Brand without her knowledge, ” id. at ¶ 28, Brand acknowledged at a hearing and under oath that she “knew the detective recorded the exam because [she] saw the recorder in the room . . . And [she] asked him about it, ” Doc. 44 at p. 22:13-21. She further confirmed that she was “aware that [Rosner] was recording [the exam] right then and there on the spot.” Id. at p. 22:22-25. The next day, Brand obtained an order of protection against Johnson. Doc. 8 at ¶ 44.
Detective Rosner eventually concluded that “he could find ‘no probable cause to charge Johnson with rape or any crimes, '” and stated that “no semen was located at the scene or on Brand's body or clothing, ” despite not yet having received the results of the sexual-assault forensic examination. Doc. 8 at ¶¶ 45-47; Doc. 40 at pp. 5-6. Detective Rosner also indicated that “the case would be ‘forwarded to the St. Charles County Prosecuting Attorney's Office for further review, '” even though “the case was never forwarded to the prosecuting attorney.” Doc. 8 at ¶ 48; Doc. 40 at p. 6. After receiving the results of the sexual-assault forensic examination, Detective Rosner supplemented his report and stated that the “evidence only shows that Brand and Johnson engaged in intercourse and is not to be considered evidence of rape.” Doc. 8 at ¶ 50; Doc. 40 at p. 29.
After Detective Rosner completed his investigation, Brand claims that Johnson called her and taunted her about “being let go.” Doc. 8 at ¶ 52. Brand called Detective Rosner to complain, but Detective Rosner responded by claiming Brand lied and threatening her with arrest for violating a restraining order “if she had any contact with Johnson.” Id. at ¶¶ 55-56. Fearful of Detective Rosner's threat, Brand dropped her order of protection against Johnson. Id. at ¶ 57.
On November 12, 2015, Johnson again assaulted Brand, this time in Wellston, Missouri. Id. at ¶ 58. Brand claims that Wellston police initially investigated this second assault but dropped the investigation once “Johnson showed them the results of the first investigation.” Id. at ¶ 59.
On November 16, 2015, “Brand picked up the police report regarding the initial sexual assault that took place [on] August 18, 2015, from the Wentzville Police Department.” Id. at ¶ 62. She claims that the police report “indicated the case was ‘Exceptionally Cleared, '” id. At ¶ 63, and that police departments only “exceptionally clear” cases “when there is probable cause to arrest and charge Johnson, but there is some extraneous reason that law enforcement cannot do so, ” id. at ¶ 66. After reading Rosner's report, Brand became upset with Rosner and the City of Wentzville's handling of the investigation, so, while still at the police department, she filed a complaint. Id. at ¶¶ 71-72. That same day, Brand went to the St. Charles County Prosecutor's office and asked about the status of the case, “[h]owever, the Prosecuting Attorney's office stated to Brand it had never received the report or any information regarding the case despite Defendant Rosner's statement in the police report.” Id. at ¶¶ 74-76.
On November 17, 2015, Brand sent an email to police department officials, as well as the St. Charles County Prosecutor and the Mayor of Wentzville. Id. at ¶¶ 87-89; Doc. 48-5. Brand alleges that none of the people to whom she complained took any action regarding her complaints. Doc. 8 at ¶ 92. Finally, Brand includes additional allegations from a lawsuit involving a former chief of the Wentzville police department that she contends “demonstrate a continuing widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional conduct.” Id. at ¶¶ 93-113.
Because Brand presented the Court with matters outside the pleadings at the Court's request, the Court-with due notice to the parties and to the extent noted in the Court's order Doc. 42-treats the Defendants' motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment as provided for in Rule 56. McAuley v. Federal Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 2007); Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts. AgriStor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732, 734 (8th Cir. 1987). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing both the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to...
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