Brand v. Mazda Motor Corp.
| Citation | 978 F.Supp. 1382 |
| Decision Date | 19 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-4139-SAC.,95-4139-SAC. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
| Parties | Thomas J. BRAND, individually and as the Administrator of the Estate of Ann M. Brand, deceased, Plaintiff, v. MAZDA MOTOR CORPORATION, and Mazda Motor of America, Inc., Defendants. |
Paul D. Post, Topeka, KS, for Plaintiff.
W. Russell Welsh, Douglas S. Laird, Stephen M. Gorny, Polsinelli, White, Vardeman & Shalton, Kansas City, MO, for Defendants.
The case comes before the court on the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the plaintiff's failure to warn claims (Dk. 133); the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the plaintiff's punitive damages claim (Dk. 135); the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the plaintiff's breach of express warranty claim (Dk. 137); and the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim alleging a violation of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard ("FMVSS") 209 (Dk. 183).1
The action arises from a car accident in which the plaintiff's wife, Ann Brand, was killed when the 1991 Mazda Protege she was operating collided with another car crossing the intersection of Highway 24 and Goldwater Road in Topeka, Kansas. The plaintiff alleges that his wife would have survived the accident if the front-seat occupant restraint system had not been defective. The restraint system used in the 1991 Mazda Protege had automatic torso belts, knee bolsters,2 and manual lap belts.
The plaintiff alleges that the defendants negligently designed, manufactured, assembled, inspected, and tested the occupant restraint system in the 1991 Mazda Protege; that this occupant restraint system was unreasonably dangerous as a result of a design defect and failure to warn; that the restraint system breached both express and implied warranties, and that the defendant negligently failed to warn. The plaintiff also seeks punitive damages based on the following allegations: (1) that the defendants were aware or should have been aware of the "high incidence of non-use of the manual lap belts;" (2) that the defendants had learned "that wearing the passive shoulder harness alone (without the manual lap belt) was an increased risk to vehicle occupants;" and (3) that the defendants' failure to warn about this increased risk under the circumstances was "willful and wanton."
A court grants a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if a genuine issue of material fact does not exist and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court is to determine "whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will ... preclude summary judgment." Id. There are no genuine issues for trial if the record taken as a whole would not persuade a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "[T]here are cases where the evidence is so weak that the case does not raise a genuine issue of fact." Burnette v. Dow Chemical Co., 849 F.2d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir.1988).
The initial burden is with the movant to "point to those portions of the record that demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact given the relevant substantive law." Thomas v. Wichita Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1013, 113 S.Ct. 635, 121 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992). If this burden is met, the nonmovant must "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to elements essential to" the nonmovant's claim or position. Martin v. Nannie and Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1414 (10th Cir.1993) (citations omitted). The nonmovant's burden is more than a simple showing of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1356; it requires "`present[ing] sufficient evidence in specific, factual form for a jury to return a verdict in that party's favor.'" Thomas v. International Business Machines, 48 F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Bacchus Industries, Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir.1991)). The court views the evidence of record and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. A party relying on only conclusory allegations cannot defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. White v. York Intern. Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 363 (10th Cir. 1995).
More than a "disfavored procedural shortcut," summary judgment is an important procedure Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554-55, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). At the same time, a summary judgment motion does not empower a court to act as the jury and determine witness credibility, weigh the evidence, or choose between competing inferences. Windon Third Oil and Gas v. Federal Deposit Ins., 805 F.2d 342, 346 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947, 107 S.Ct. 1605, 94 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987).
1. On or about June 28, 1991, the plaintiff Thomas Brand and/or his wife, Ann Brand, purchased a 1991 Mazda Protege from Gary Hardy Mazda in Topeka, Kansas.
2. Ann Brand made the decision to purchase the Mazda Protege. The window sticker on this Mazda said the car was equipped with a "motorized front passive restraint system."
3. The 1991 Mazda Protege was equipped with a driver-side occupant protection system that consisted of an automatic torso (or shoulder) belt and a knee bolster. The system was supplemented with a manual lap belt.
4. The owner's manual identified the separate manual lap belt and warned that "to provide sufficient restraint, always fasten the lap belt." Ann Brand knew that the occupant protection system in the Mazda Protege was supplemented with manual lap belts.
5. Thomas Brand testified that Ann always fastened the supplemental manual lap belts and that he could not remember a time when she did not use them. Thomas also testified that Ann insisted that he use the lap belts too. Thomas said that Ann believed in using lap belts "for safety."
6. Around 7:00 p.m. on June 3, 1993, Ann Brand was driving the 1991 Mazda Protege on the eastbound lane of Highway 24 in Topeka, Kansas. At the intersection of Highway 24 and Goldwater, a car operated by Robert Longyear crossed in front of Brand's Mazda causing a collision. At the time of the accident, Ann Brand had failed to fasten the supplemental manual lap belt. Ann Brand died as a result of this collision.
7. Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 ("Safety Act") for the purpose of "reduc[ing] traffic accidents and deaths and injuries resulting from traffic accidents." 49 U.S.C. § 30101.4 The Safety Act requires the Secretary of Transportation to "prescribe motor vehicle safety standards" that are "practicable [and] meet the need for motor vehicle safety." 49 U.S.C. § 30111(a). The Secretary delegated this authority to the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration ("NHTSA") which promulgated Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards ("FMVSS" or "safety standards").
8. Occupant crash protection is covered at FMVSS 208. As amended in 1984, FMVSS 208 required, in part, "automatic protection systems" to be introduced in the front seats of passenger cars and to be phased in over a four-year period (model years 1987-1990). While it did not specify the particular type of occupant protection system that had to be installed, FMVSS 208 at S4.1.2.1 did require of the "frontal/angular automatic protection system" that:
(a) ... each front outboard designated seating position meet the frontal crash protection requirements of S5.1 by means that require no action by vehicle occupants;
(b) ...; and
(c) [the vehicle] Either (1) Meet the lateral crash protection requirements of S5.2 and the rollover crash protection requirements of S5.3 by means that require no action by vehicle occupants; or (2) At each front outboard designated seating position have a Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly that conforms to Standard No. 209 and S7.1 and S7.3 and that meets the requirements of S5.1 with front test dummies as required by S5.1, restrained by the Type 1 or Type 2 seat belt assembly (or the pelvic portion of any Type 2 seat belt assembly which has a detachable upper torso belt) in addition to the means that require no action by the vehicle occupant.
49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1991). Thus, a system is "automatic" if it "meet[s] the frontal crash protection requirements ... by means that require no action by vehicle occupants." Id.
9. The design of the occupant protection system comprised of motorized torso belts and knee bolsters and found in the 1991 Mazda Protege is "automatic" within the terms of FMVSS 208, S4.1.2. and meets those requirements.5 The presence of supplemental manual lap belts does not change or preclude the "automatic" classification of the occupant protection system under FMVSS 208.
10. In cars with automatic torso belts and manual lap belts, FMVSS 208 required both visual and audible warnings about the need to fasten the lap belt. Mazda Motor Corporation met these warning requirements of FMVSS 208 in the manufacturing of Ann Brand's 1991 Mazda Protege. The car warned Ann Brand to fasten the lap belt in each of the following ways: a dash icon light, an audible warning when the lap belt was not...
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