Brandenberg v. Meridian Senior Living, LLC
| Docket Number | 20-cv-03198 |
| Decision Date | 01 September 2023 |
| Parties | SHARON BRADENBERG, on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, known and unknown, Plaintiffs, v. MERIDIAN SENIOR LIVING, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Before the Court is Plaintiff Sharon Bradenberg's Unopposed Motion to Lift Stay (d/e 39). Also before the Court are Defendant Meridian Senior Living's Motions for Reconsideration of the Court's Denial of Meridian's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Class Action Complaint (d/e 23), to Transfer Case to the Southern District of Illinois (d/e 27), and for Leave to File a Reply Brief (d/e 30). Lastly before the Court is a Motion to Intervene filed by proposed Intervenor Plaintiff Roxann Hall (d/e 21).
Because the pending decisions which formed the basis of the stay have now been resolved, the Motion to Lift Stay is GRANTED. But because the legal conclusions in each of those decisions confirm this Court's prior rationales for denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and because Defendant Meridian has not carried its burden to show why reconsideration is necessary, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. Further, the transfer of this case to the Southern District of Illinois would be against the interest of justice, so the Motion to Transfer is also DENIED. Finally because proposed Intervenor Roxann Hall has not shown her request to intervene is timely or that she has a sufficient unprotected interest in this litigation, her Motion to Intervene is DENIED.
This case involves novel legal questions about a novel state law: Illinois' Biometric Information Privacy Act, or “BIPA.” See 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. Plaintiff Sharon Bradenberg alleges her employer, Meridian Senior Living, LLC, violated that law when Meridian allegedly transmitted her scanned fingerprint to Meridian's timekeeping vendor without Bradenberg's consent. Bradenberg also alleges that Meridian violated the law when Meridian collected, stored, disseminated, or used her fingerprints or other personal identifying information without consent.[1]
Bradenberg filed a class action complaint articulating these allegations in the Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon County, Illinois on June 10, 2020. Meridian removed the case to this Court on August 3, 2020 pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) and under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. Meridian then moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing, as relevant to the Motion for Reconsideration, that Bradenberg's claims were untimely and that Bradenberg assumed the risk of a breach of BIPA by Meridian. The Court rejected each of Meridian's arguments, agreeing with Bradenberg in holding (1) BIPA claims are subject to the five-year statute of limitations articulated in 735 ILCS 5/13-205 and (2) that the primary assumption of risk doctrine is not available to BIPA defendants under Illinois law because BIPA is a strict liability statute. Op. (d/e 20) pp. 8-13; 17-18.
In the month following the Court issuing its ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, various parties filed additional motions. On October 14, 2021, proposed Intervenor Plaintiff Roxann Hall filed a Motion to Intervene in this case. Hall filed her own action in the Circuit Court for the First Judicial Circuit, Williamson County, Illinois, which Meridian then removed to the Southern District of Illinois in Case Number 21-cv-55. In her case, Hall alleges that Meridian similarly violated BIPA through the use of fingerprint scanning, like Bradenberg's claims, and through the use of retina scanning, unlike Bradenberg's claims. See Mem. (d/e 22) Ex. B.
Then, on October 15, 2021, Meridian filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Opinion on the Motion to Dismiss (d/e 23) and followed that up 12 days later with a Motion to Transfer to the Southern District of Illinois (d/e 27). Upon further briefing of Meridian's Motion for Partial Reconsideration, the Court determined that relevant legal issues to this case were pending in decisions in Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc., 2023 IL 127801; Marion v. Ring Container Techs., LLC, No. 3-20-0184; and White Castle System, Inc. v. Cothron, No. 20-8029 (7th Cir. filed Oct. 13, 2020). Those cases were either pending before the Illinois Supreme Court or with certified questions to the Illinois Supreme Court from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals regarding (1) the appropriate statute of limitations to be applied to BIPA claims and (2) when BIPA claims accrue. This Court determined, sua sponte, that a stay in this case pending those decisions and answers to those questions was appropriate and stayed this case until those questions were resolved.
The Illinois Supreme Court has now issued final decisions in both Tims v. Black Horse Carriers, Inc., -- N.E.3d --, 2023 IL 127801 (Ill. 2023) and Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc., --N.E.3d --, 2023 IL 128004 (Ill. 2023). In Tims, the Court held that the five-year catch-all of limitations set out in 735 ILCS 5/13-205 applies to BIPA claims. In Cothron, the Court addressed a question certified to it by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals:
Do section 15(b) and 15(d) claims [under BIPA] accrue each time a private entity scans a person's biometric identifier and each time a private entity transmits such a scan to a third party, respectively, or only upon the first scan and first transmission?
Cothron v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 20 F.4th 1156, 1167 (7th Cir. 2021), certified question answered, 2023 IL 128004, as modified on denial of reh'g (July 18, 2023). The Illinois Supreme Court issued a final ruling answering that question on July 18, 2023, holding that “a separate claim accrues under [BIPA] each time a private entity scans or transmits an individual's biometric identifier or information in violation of section 15(b) or 15(d).” Cothron v. White Castle Sys., Inc., 2023 WL 4567389, at *1 (Ill. Feb. 17, 2023) as modified on denial of reh'g (July 18, 2023). The questions which formed the basis of the stay entered by this Court having now been answered, Bradenberg's Unopposed Motion to Lift Stay (d/e 39) is GRANTED, and the Court may now turn to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration (d/e 23), the Motion to Intervene (d/e 21), and the Motion to Transfer (d/e 27).
“Pre-judgment orders, such as [denials of] motions to dismiss, are interlocutory and may be reconsidered at any time.” Cameo Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. Percy, 800 F.2d 108, 110 (7th Cir. 1986). “Motions for reconsideration serve a limited function; to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Rothwell Cotton Co. v. Rosenthal & Co., 827 F.2d 246, 251 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting Keene Corp. v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co., 561 F.Supp. 656, 665-66 (N.D. Ill. 1982), affd, 736 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1984)). A motion for reconsideration may also be appropriate where the Court has patently misunderstood a party or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues originally presented. Quaker Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus. Inc., 123 F.R.D. 282, 288 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (quoting The Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D. Va. 1983)).
Meridian asks the Court to partially reconsider the previous Order (d/e 20) on two grounds, arguing as incorrect the Court's application of the five-year statute of limitations to Bradenberg's claims and conclusion that the primary assumption of risk defense is not available to BIPA defendants.
Regarding the statute of limitations issue, the Illinois Supreme Court, as previously stated, has made clear that the five-year statute of limitations articulated in 735 ILCS 5/13-205 applies to BIPA claims like Bradenberg's here. Tims, 2023 IL 127801, ¶ 42.
Because that is the same conclusion this Court previously reached, Meridian's request for reconsideration is denied.
Meridian's request for reconsideration regarding primary assumption of risk is also denied. Meridian argues that the issue of whether BIPA is a strict liability statute was not before the Court in previous briefing, and so the /Court's conclusion that BIPA does impose strict liability, and therefore cannot be defended by the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, was beyond the scope of that briefing. But in Meridian's Motion to Dismiss, Meridian advanced the defense of primary assumption of risk as to Bradenberg's BIPA claims. See Mem. (d/e 10) p. 15. In response, Bradenberg argued that defense cannot be brought against BIPA claims because BIPA claims “have a strict liability component.” Resp. (d/e 12) p. 11. As the Court explained, under Illinois law “assumption of the risk is not an available defense when a statute calls for strict liability.” Op. (d/e 20) p. 17 (quoting Olle v. C House Corp., 967 N.E.2d 886, 890 (Ill. App. 2012)). It would be nonsensical for the Court to allow Meridian to argue the primary assumption of risk defense while simultaneously prohibiting Bradenberg from arguing, and this Court from analyzing, an applicable strict liability rebuttal. Meridian opened the door by raising the primary assumption of risk defense. The issue of whether BIPA is a strict liability statute was squarely before the Court.
Moreover, and as Meridian concedes, Meridian went on to argue that “BIPA is not a strict liability statute.” Mem. (d/e 10) p. 11. And while that argument is included in the section of Meridian's brief regarding the sufficiency of Bradenberg's pleadings that fact does not neutralize this Court's ability or opportunity to analyze BIPA's strict liability nature.
Lastly the Court declines to revisit its finding that ...
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