Brandenburg v. Ohio

• Decision Date: 09 June 1969
• Docket Number: No. 492,492
• Citation: 23 L.Ed.2d 430,89 S.Ct. 1827,395 U.S. 444
• Parties: Clarence BRANDENBURG, Appellant, v. State of OHIO
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

395 U.S. 444

89 S.Ct. 1827

23 L.Ed.2d 430

Clarence BRANDENBURG, Appellant,

v State of OHIO.

No. 492.

Argued Feb. 27, 1969.

Decided June 9, 1969.

Allen Brown, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant.

Leonard Kirschner, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant, a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group, was convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for 'advocat(ing) * * * the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform' and for 'voluntarily assembl(ing) with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.'Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2923.13.He was fined $1,000 and sentenced to one to 10 years' imprisonment.The appellant challenged the consitutionality of the criminal syndicalism statute under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, but the intermediate appellate court of Ohio affirmed his conviction without opinion.The Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed his appeal, sua sponte, 'for the reason that no substantial constitutional question exists herein.'It did not file an opinion or explain its conclusions.Appeal was taken to this Court, and we noted probable jurisdiction.393 U.S. 948, 89 S.Ct. 377, 21 L.Ed.2d 360(1968).We reverse.

The record shows that a man, identified at trial as the appellant, telephoned an announcer-reporter on the staff of a Cincinnati television station and invited him to come to a Ku Klux Klan'rally' to be held at a farm in Hamilton County.With the cooperation of the organizers, the reporter and a cameraman attended the meeting and filmed the events.Portions of the films were later broadcast on the local station and on a national network.

The prosecution's case rested on the films and on testimony identifying the appellant as the person who communicated with the reporter and who spoke at the rally.The State also introduced into evidence several articles appearing in the film, including a pistol, a rifle, a shotgun, ammunition, a Bible, and a red hood worn by the speaker in the films.

One film showed 12 hooded figures, some of whom carried firearms.They were gathered around a large wooden cross, which they burned.No one was present other than the participants and the newsmen who made the film.Most of the words uttered during the scene were incomprehensible when the film was projected, but scattered phrases could be understood that were derogatory of Negroes and, in one instance, of Jews.¹ Another scene on the same film showed the appellant, in Klan regalia, making as peech.The speech, in full, was as follows:

'This is an organizers' meeting.We have had quite a few members here today which are—we have hundreds, hundreds of members throughout the State of Ohio.I can quote from a newspaper clipping from the Columbus, Ohio Dispatch, five weeks ago Sunday morning.The Klan has more members in the State of Ohio than does any other organization.We're not a revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some revengeance taken.

'We are marching on Congress July the Fourth, four hundred thousand strong.From there we are dividing into two groups, one group to march on St. Augustine, Florida, the other group to march into Mississippi.Thank you.'

The second film showed six hooded figures one of whom, later identified as the appellant, repeated a speech very similar to that recorded on the first film.The reference to the possibility of 'revengeance' was omitted, and one sentence was added: 'Personally, I believe the nigger should be returned to Africa, the Jew returned to Israel.'Though some of the figures in the films carried weapons, the speaker did not.

The Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute was enacted in 1919.From 1917 to 1920, identical or quite similar laws were adopted by 20 States and two territories.E. Dowell, A History of Criminal Syndicalism Legislation in the United States 21 (1939).In 1927, this Court sustained the constitutionality of California's Criminal Syndicalism Act, Cal. Penal Code §§ 11400—11402, the text of which is quite similar to that of the laws of Ohio.Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S.Ct. 641, 71 L.Ed. 1095(1927).The Court upheld the statute on the ground that, without more, 'advocating' violent means to effect political and economic change involves such danger to the security of the State that the State may outlaw it.Cf.Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 47 S.Ct. 655, 71 L.Ed. 1108(1927).But Whitney has been thoroughly discredited by later decisions.SeeDennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, at 507, 71 S.Ct. 857, at 866, 95 L.Ed. 1137(1951).These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.² As we said in Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297—298, 81 S.Ct. 1517, 1520—1521, 6 L.Ed.2d 836(1961), 'the mere abstract teaching * * * of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.'See alsoHerndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259—261, 57 S.Ct. 732, 739—740, 81 L.Ed. 1066(1937);Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 134, 87 S.Ct. 339, 348, 17 L.Ed.2d 235(1966).A statute which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.It sweeps within its condemnation speech which our Constitution has immunized from governmental control.Cf.Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356(1957);De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255, 81 L.Ed. 278(1937);Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117(1931).See alsoUnited Stats v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 88 S.Ct. 419, 19 L.Ed.2d 508(1967);Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629(1967);Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 86 S.Ct. 1238, 16 L.Ed.2d 321(1966);Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992(1964);Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 84 S.Ct. 1316, 12 L.Ed.2d 377(1964).

Measured by this test, Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act cannot be sustained.The Act punishes persons who 'advocate or teach the duty, necessity, or propriety' of violence 'as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform'; or who publish or circulate or display any book or paper containing such advocacy; or who 'justify' the commission of violent acts 'with intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrines of criminal syndicalism'; or who 'voluntarily assemble' with a group formed 'to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.'Neither the indictment nor the trial judge's instructions to the jury in any way refined the statute's bald definition of the crime in terms of mere advocacy not distinguished from incitement to imminent lawless action.³

Accordingly, we are here confronted with a statute which, by its own words and as applied, purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action.⁴Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.The contrary teaching of Whitney v. California, supra, cannot be supported, and that decision is therefore overruled.

Mr. Justice BLACK, concurring.

I agree with the views expressed by Mr. Justice DOUGLAS in his concurring opinion in this case that the 'clear and present danger' doctrine should have no place in the interpretatio of the First Amendment.I join the Court's opinion, which, as I understand it, simply cites Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137(1951), but does not indicate any agreement on the Court's part with the 'clear and present danger' doctrine on which Dennis purported to rely.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, concurring.

While I join the opinion of the Court, I desire to enter a caveat.

The 'clear and present danger' test was adumbrated by Mr. Justice Holmes in a case arising during World War I—a war 'declared' by the Congress, not by the Chief Executive.The case was Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 S.Ct. 247, 249, 63 L.Ed. 470, where the defendant was charged with attempts to cause insubordination in the military and obstruction of enlistment.The pamphlets that were distributed urged resistance to the draft, denounced conscription, and impugned the motives of those backing the war effort.The First Amendment was tendered as a defense.Mr. Justice Holmes in rejecting that defense said:

'The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.It is a question of proximity and degree.'

Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 39 S.Ct. 249, 63 L.Ed. 561, also authored by Mr. Justice Holmes, involved prosecution and punishment for publication of articles very critical of the war effort in World War I. Schenck was referred to as a conviction for obstructing security 'by words of persuasion.'Id., at 206, 39 S.Ct. at 250.And the conviction in Frohwerk was sustained because 'the circulation of the paper was in quarters where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame.'Id., at 209, 39 S.Ct., at 251.

Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 39 S.Ct. 252, 63 L.Ed. 566, was the third of the trilogy of the 1918 Term. Debs was convicted of speaking in opposition...