Brandon v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:99cv200-D-A (N.D. Miss. 5/12/2000)

• Decision Date: 12 May 2000
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:99cv200-D-A.
• Parties: BARBARA BRANDON, Plaintiff, v. BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL-GOLDEN TRIANGLE, INC., and LEROY BROOKS, INDIVIDUALLY and IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

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BARBARA BRANDON, Plaintiff, v. BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL-GOLDEN TRIANGLE, INC., and LEROY BROOKS, INDIVIDUALLY and IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 1:99cv200-D-A.

United States District Court, N.D. Mississippi, Eastern Division.

May 12, 2000.

OPINION

DAVIDSON, GLEN H., District Judge.

Before the court is the motion of the Defendant, Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle, Inc., for summary judgment. Upon due consideration, the court finds that the motion should be granted.

Factual Background¹

Plaintiff, Barbara Brandon, filed the underlying Complaint against the Defendants Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle, Inc. (BMH), and Leroy Brooks, alleging, inter alia, that she was unlawfully terminated from employment as a licensed practical nurse with BMH on the basis of race and gender discrimination. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint provides, at best, an ambiguous maze of allegations with no clear indication as to either the extent of her federal claims, or the manner in which she is pursuing her allegations. It is altogether unclear whether she is asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or some combination of each. The court is, therefore, constrained to glean from the Amended Complaint and her Brief Opposing Defendant Baptist's Motion for Summary Judgment, the full scope of her contentions.

Barbara Brandon began working for BMH in 1979.² Originally employed as a nurse's assistant, Brandon later ascended to the position of licensed practical nurse (LPN) where she remained until her termination on June 11, 1997.³ The events leading to Brandon's dismissal center around her political aspirations, specifically her campaign for a seat on the Columbus City Council.

In early 1997, Brandon qualified as a candidate for a position on the Columbus City Council, Ward 5, for the May 6, 1997 election. Brandon, running in the Democratic primary, was opposed by the incumbent, Jackie Evans. At all times prior to the election, Brandon continued working for BMH as an LPN. On April 18, 1997, Brandon was approached by Tom Murphree, Assistant Administrator of Patient Care Services for BMH, and questioned whether she had engaged in campaign activities and/or vote solicitation while on duty at the hospital. Brandon denied the allegation.

The parties' respective factual summaries diverge at this juncture and the remaining events are substantially contested. To be sure, the bulk of Plaintiff's claims include allegations of a vast conspiracy between her political foe and her employer, which culminated in her termination from BMH.

Brandon contends that Jackie Evans, Tom Murphree, Stuart Mitchell, Administrator of BMH, and Defendant Leroy Brooks, a long-time political adversary of the Plaintiff, worked together to secure her discharge from BMH. Evans, who was working as an Administrative Assistant to Lowndes County Supervisor Brooks, purportedly contacted Stuart Mitchell about Brandon. According to Plaintiff, Brooks and Evans held a secret meeting with Mitchell to discuss Brandon's alleged voter solicitation at BMH. This meeting resulted in Murphree again asking Brandon if she had been campaigning on the job, which she further denied. Murphree later produced a copy of an absentee ballot application of BMH patient, Mary Lee, and asked Brandon whether her signature appeared on the ballot application as a witness. Brandon acknowledged her signature to Murphree and was thereafter suspended pending review of the matter. By letter dated June 11, 1997, Brandon was terminated from employment with BMH for soliciting votes from patients while on duty.⁴

Brandon contends that the patient, Mary Lee, overheard a conversation about the Plaintiff's political campaign and requested assistance in registering to vote. While off-duty, Brandon returned to the hospital and out of "extraordinary courtesy" provided Lee with a registration form and absentee ballot. Plaintiff's Memorandum Brief Opposing Defendant Baptist's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 6. Brandon further alleges that BMH's policy prohibiting solicitation is muddled and confused, that she was not familiar with the contents of the Administrative Policy and Procedures Manual, that Murphree failed to provide a clear explanation of the reason for Brandon's termination, and that she was ultimately terminated for exercising her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. As noted above, however, Plaintiff's allegations focus on her theory that BMH was working in tandem with Leroy Brooks and Jackie Evans to undermine her political activities.

Discussion

A. Summary Judgment Standard

On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ("The burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' .. . that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case."). Under Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. That burden is not discharged by "mere allegations or denials." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). All legitimate factual inferences must be made in favor of the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. Before finding that no genuine issue for trial exists, the court must first be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Claims Against BMH

Title VII

To the extent Brandon is alleging a claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, those claims are jurisdictionally barred by her failure to file an administrative complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See Barnes v. Levitt, 118 F.3d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1997) (filing administrative complaint is jurisdictional prerequisite to Title VII action); Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 780 (5th Cir. 1995) (exhaustion of administrative remedies required prior to seeking judicial relief); Abeita v. TransAmerica Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir. 1998) ("Federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims unless the claimant explicitly files the claim in an EEOC charge. . . ."). Accordingly, any claim asserted by Brandon pursuant to Title VII shall be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

42 U.S.C. § 1981

Brandon alleges that BMH unlawfully terminated her employment on the basis of racial and gender discrimination. Given that her Title VII claims are barred, the court will assume she is pursuing her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 which provides:

a) Statement of Equal Rights

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.

In addition to the plain language of the statute, the Supreme Court has clearly established that claims for sexual discrimination are not within the scope of § 1981. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167, 96 S.Ct. 2586, 2593, 49 L.Ed.2d 415 (1976) (Section 1981 in no way addresses claims for religious or sex discrimination, but is instead concerned with discrimination on the basis of race or color.). Thus, Brandon's claim of gender discrimination also fails and shall be dismissed.

The court will now turn to Plaintiff's claim of race discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under § 1981, a plaintiff must prove:

1) that she is a member of a protected class;

2) that she was qualified for her position;

3) that despite her qualifications, she suffered an adverse employment decision; and

4) her employer replaced her with a person who is not a member of the protected class, or in cases where the employer does not intend to replace the plaintiff, the employer retains others in similar positions who are not members of the protected class.

Meinecke v. H & R Block Income Tax Sch., Inc., 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995); Valdez v. San Antonio Chamber of Commerce, 974 F.2d 592, 596 (5th Cir. 1992); Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 642 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Williams v. General Motors Corp., 656 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943, 102 S.Ct. 1439, 71 L.Ed.2d 655 (1982)).

A plaintiff may use either direct or circumstantial evidence to prove a case of intentional discrimination. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 1481 n. 3, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983). Because direct evidence is rare, a plaintiff ordinarily uses circumstantial evidence to meet the test set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green: 1) The plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination; 2) if successful, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to produce a legitimate and nondiscriminatory basis for the adverse employment decision; and 3) finally, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's offered reason is pretext and that race discrimination was the...