Brandon E. v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 01 November 1999
• Docket Number: No. 99-1262,99-1262
• Citation: 201 F.3d 194
• Parties: (3rd Cir. 2000) BRANDON E., by and through his next friend, Robert Listenbee, Esq.; JOY E., by and through her next friend, Robert Listenbee, Esq., JOSH R., by and through his next friend, Wendie Ziegler, Esq.; individually and on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, Appellants v. ABRAM FRANK REYNOLDS, THE HONORABLE, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Family Court Division, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated Argued:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 194

201 F.3d 194 (3rd Cir. 2000)

BRANDON E., by and through his next friend, Robert Listenbee, Esq.; JOY E., by and through her next friend, Robert Listenbee, Esq., JOSH R., by and through his next friend, Wendie Ziegler, Esq.; individually and on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly situated, Appellants v. ABRAM FRANK REYNOLDS, THE HONORABLE, Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Family Court Division, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated

No. 99-1262

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

Argued: November 1, 1999

Filed January 14, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania D.C. No.: 98-cv-04236 District Judge: Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr.,

Counsel for Appellants: Marsha L. Levick (Argued) Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia 801 Arch Street Sixth Floor Philadelphia, PA 19107

Counsel for Appellee: A. Taylor Williams (Argued) Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Administrative Office of PA Courts 1515 Market Street Suite 1414 Philadelphia, PA 19102

Before: SCIRICA, NYGAARD and ROSENN, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROSENN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal challenges the constitutionality of a state statute designed to assist parents in obtaining treatment for minors afflicted with a drug or alcohol dependency. The plaintiffs are three named minors who, on behalf of themselves and similarly situated minors, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 challenging the constitutionality of Act 53, a Pennsylvania statute enacted in 1997.¹ See 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 1690.112a (West Supp. 1999). The Act allows a minor's parents or a legal guardian who has custody of a minor to petition the court of common pleas of the judicial district in Pennsylvania where the minor is domiciled to order the involuntary commitment of the minor child to a drug and alcohol treatment program. The defendants are county judges responsible for presiding over Act 53 cases. They are sued only in their official capacity.² The district court dismissed the action on the ground that the judges, as "neutral adjudicators" are not the proper parties to defend the constitutionality of this statute. The plaintiff timely appealed. We affirm.

I.

Act 53 permits a parent or a guardian who has legal or physical custody of a minor to petition the court of common pleas of the jurisdictional district where the minor is domiciled for the commitment of the minor to involuntary drug and alcohol treatment services, including inpatient services, if the minor is incapable of accepting or unwilling to accept voluntary treatment. See 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 1690.112a (West Supp. 1999). The petition must set forth sufficient facts and good reason for the commitment. See id.

Upon petition, the court assigned to hear the matter must appoint counsel for the minor. See id. The court also must order the minor who is alleged to have a drug or alcohol dependency to undergo a dependency assessment. See id. The assessment is to be performed by a psychiatrist, a licensed psychologist with training in drug and alcohol assessment, or a certified addiction counselor ("CAC"). See id. The assessment must include a recommended level of care and length of treatment. See id. Assessments completed by certified addiction counselors must be based on the Pennsylvania Department of Health approved drug and alcohol level of care criteria. See id.

When the assessment is complete, the court must hold a hearing. See id. Before ordering the minor to undergo a period of involuntary commitment the court must: (1) hear the testimony of the person(s) who performed the assessment; (2) find by clear and convincing evidence that the minor is a drug-dependent person and that the minor is incapable of accepting or unwilling to accept voluntary treatment services; and (3) find that the minor will benefit from involuntary treatment services. See id.

The father of plaintiff Brandon E. petitioned the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Family Court Division, for involuntary commitment of Brandon for his alleged addiction to alcohol and marijuana. Judge Reynolds held a hearing, at which time he ordered that Brandon be assessed for drug and alcohol dependence. That same day, a CAC performed the assessment at the Philadelphia Family Court using the Adolescent Problem Severity Index ("APSI").

At a subsequent hearing before Judge Reynolds, the CAC presented a written report and recommendation that advocated committing Brandon to an inpatient drug treatment program for a period of sixty to ninety days. Plaintiffs allege that to avoid involuntary commitment, Brandon elected to take part in an outpatient drug treatment program. Subsequent to the filing of the complaint, Brandon was adjudicated a delinquent child under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 6801 et seq. (West 1982), and Judge Reynolds dismissed the Act 53 petition in September 1998.

The mother of the plaintiff, Joy E., also filed an Act 53 petition in Philadelphia Family Court in June 1998. According to plaintiffs, Joy appeared at a hearing before Judge Reynolds in July 1998, at which he ordered her assessment. A CAC then performed an evaluation using the APSI. The CAC did not prepare a written report of the results. At this same hearing, Judge Reynolds ordered Joy to undergo two urine tests each week and continued the hearing until August 1998. At the August hearing, the judge again ordered twice-weekly urine tests and continued the proceedings. At a subsequent hearing in September 1998, Judge Reynolds dismissed the petition against Joy after emancipating her from the custody of her parents.

The Act 53 petition against Josh R. was filed by his mother in March 1998, in the Berks County Juvenile Court. After his assessment, Josh voluntarily agreed to enter an inpatient drug and alcohol treatment program. Since the time of that agreement, Josh has been adjudicated a dependent child under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa. Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 6301 et seq. (West 1990) and the judge suspended the Act 53 proceedings.

II.

The underlying question in these proceedings seeking a declaratory judgment is whether Act 53, which authorizes county judges in Pennsylvania, on the petition of a parent or a legal guardian, to commit a minor to involuntary drug and alcohol treatment services if the minor is incapable or unwilling to accept voluntary treatment, is unconstitutional. However, the threshold and determinative question in this case is whether judges presiding over Act 53 petitions as provided by the statute are proper parties to be named as defendants to an action brought under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 attacking the Act as unconstitutional. The district court thought they were not and granted defendants' motion to dismiss. In reviewing the district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss the action, we exercise plenary review. See Coalition to Save Our Children v. State Bd. Of Educ., 90 F.3d 752, 759 (3d Cir. 1996).

III.

The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit because it found that "the judges presiding over Act 53 proceedings are acting solely within their adjudicatory roles" and, therefore, are not proper parties to a suit challenging the Act's constitutionality. In this connection, the district court carefully analyzed the functions and duties of the judges in the application of Act 53 and aptly concluded that the common pleas judges were acting precisely as they do in any judicial proceeding. Specifically, the district court noted that the judges "do not have the power to initiate actions against minors" and that the Act does not "appear to delegate any administrative functions to the judges." Accordingly, the district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

On appeal, plaintiffs contest the district court's dismissal on two grounds. Plaintiffs first argue that S 1983, as amended in 1996, expressly authorizes a suit for declaratory relief against a judge, who is acting in his or her judicial capacity, and that, therefore, the defendant judges are proper parties to the instant suit even though they are acting in their capacity as neutral adjudicators. Alternatively, plaintiffs contend that even if judges acting in their capacity as "neutral adjudicators" are not amenable to suit under S 1983, Act 53 "imposes non-judicial responsibilities on the judges sufficient to otherwise bring them within the scope of S 1983." In this connection, plaintiffs assert that Act 53 strips the judge of his traditional role because in ordering an evaluation of the minor his function is purely ministerial. They further charge that in ordering a drug assessment of the minor, the judge is discharging a prosecutorial or investigatory role, and that the absence of a representative of the commonwealth or county at the hearing requires the judge "to juggle both his prosecutorial and judicial roles simultaneously." We reject both of the plaintiffs' arguments.

Congress amended 42 U.S.C. S1983 in 1996 as part of the Federal Courts Improvement Act ("96 Amendments") for that year. As amended, S 1983 now provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any State, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in . . . [a] suit in equity . . . except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

42 U.S.C. S 1983 (emphasis added). The italicized portion reflects the language Congress added to the statute by the `96 Amendments.

The foregoing amendatory language to S 1983 does not expressly authorize suits for declaratory relief against judges. Instead, it...