Brandt v. Eagle

• Decision Date: 18 February 1992
• Citation: 412 Pa.Super. 171,602 A.2d 1364
• Parties: Mary C. BRANDT, Appellant, v. Perry A. EAGLE, M.D., Appellee.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1364

602 A.2d 1364

412 Pa.Super. 171

Mary C. BRANDT, Appellant, v. Perry A. EAGLE, M.D., Appellee.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 12, 1991.

Filed Feb. 18, 1992.

Robert J. Goduto, Harrisburg, for appellant.

Randall G. Gale, Harrisburg, for appellee.

Before WIEAND, McEWEN, OLSZEWSKI, DEL SOLE, BECK, TAMILIA, POPOVICH, JOHNSON and HUDOCK, JJ.

BECK, Judge:

The issue is whether a plaintiff who has marked satisfied a judgment against one tort-feasor for less than the full amount of the judgment is barred from maintaining a second action against another tort-feasor for the same harm. We granted en banc reconsideration of this appeal to consider the effect of a recorded satisfaction of judgment. We conclude the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment to defendant and in dismissing appellant's second action.

The appeal is taken from an order granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Perry A. Eagle, M.D., in a medical malpractice action. The basis of the action was Dr. Eagle's alleged negligence in treating appellant, Mary C. Brandt, after she had been injured in a 1976 automobile accident. Appellant contends that the court below erred in determining, as a matter of law, that the suit against Dr. Eagle was barred. The ground for the trial court's decision was that appellant had recovered a judgment in a previous action she had brought against the driver of the vehicle who caused her initial injuries, had then settled that action for an amount less than the judgment and marked the judgment satisfied of record.

On August 30, 1976, appellant was involved in a two-car automobile accident in which she sustained injuries to her neck and back. As a result of these injuries, appellant underwent an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion in March, 1977. In November, 1978, appellant underwent a second anterior cervical discectomy and fusion involving a different portion of her spine. The operations were performed by appellee Dr. Eagle and Ivan L. Butler, M.D. In 1978, appellant brought an action against Theodore W. Copp, the driver of the other vehicle in the 1976 accident. At the trial, evidence was presented concerning appellant's initial injuries as well as her pain and suffering following the operations. Appellant recovered a verdict in the amount of $148,251.00.

In February 1981, appellant filed the present lawsuit against Dr. Eagle. ¹ Appellant's complaint alleged, inter alia, that during the second operation Dr. Eagle negligently severed her lateral femoral cutaneous nerve while he was excising the bone graft from her right iliac crest, and that this negligence resulted in permanent injury. While this suit was pending, on May 23, 1985, appellant and Copp, the defendant in the first action, arrived at a settlement. Appellant received the settlement proceeds and the docket in that case was marked "satisfied."

In November 1986, by leave of court, Dr. Eagle filed new matter in this action, alleging that the "unconditional satisfaction" of the judgment against Copp barred a subsequent suit against any other defendant for the same harm. In her reply, appellant alleged that the judgment against Copp was not actually fully satisfied because she had received only the agreed settlement amount, i.e. $25,000, and not the full amount of the verdict. Thus, she argued that the first suit did not bar this action against Dr. Eagle. Dr. Eagle then filed a motion for summary judgment, premised on the prior satisfaction. The trial court initially denied the motion, finding that appellant had not presented evidence of the full extent of her injuries in her action against Copp and, therefore, that she could proceed in her action against Dr. Eagle in an attempt to recover for additional injuries not addressed in the Copp action.

However, after further factual development, including production of the complete transcript of the Copp trial, Dr. Eagle renewed his motion for summary judgment. Following briefing and its own review of the trial transcript, on November 27, 1989, the trial court issued an order and opinion granting Dr. Eagle's motion for summary judgment. The court opined that after its review of the Copp transcript it was apparent that appellant had in fact presented evidence of all of her injuries arising from the accident and from both subsequent operations in the Copp action. The trial court thus reasoned:

... there remains no damages that could be submitted to the present jury that were not submitted in the original jury trial. Thus, the Court's original decision to permit Plaintiff to proceed with her lawsuit against the doctor was based on an improper premise, i.e., that there were damages which had not been presented to the original jury.

Since Plaintiff has proceeded against a Defendant, submitted all damages to a jury in a lawsuit against that Defe[n]dant, and then settled and satisfied the docket, Plaintiff is precluded from proceeding against any other Defendant for the same injuries and damages.

Trial Court Opinion at pp. 3-4.

Appellant filed this timely appeal from the trial court order granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Eagle.

Our standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is well-settled:

As an appellate court, we are bound to consider certain principles which dictate when and under what circumstances a trial court may properly enter summary judgment. Goebert v. Ondek, 384 Pa.Super. 100, 103-04, 557 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1989). .... Summary judgment should not be entered unless the case is clear and free from doubt. Hathi v. Krewstown Park Apartments, 385 Pa.Super. 613, 615, 561 A.2d 1261, 1262 (1989). A grant of summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file support the lower court's conclusion that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa.R.C.P. 1035, 42 Pa.C.S.A.; Hatter v. Landsberg, [386 Pa.Super. 438, 440, 563 A.2d 146, 147-48 (1989) ]. See Penn Center House, Inc. v. Hoffman, 520 Pa. 171, 176, 553 A.2d 900, 903 (1989) (entire record before lower court must be thoroughly examined and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact are to be resolved against a grant of summary judgment). We will overturn a trial court's entry of summary judgment only if there has been an error of law or a clear abuse of discretion. McCain v. Pennbank, 379 Pa.Super. 313, 318, 549 A.2d 1311, 1313 (1988).

O'Neill v. Checker Motors Corp., 389 Pa.Super. 430, 434-35, 567 A.2d 680, 682 (1989).

Appellant makes a single argument on appeal--that she should not be barred from proceeding with her action against Dr. Eagle because despite the recording of a satisfaction of judgment in the first action, she never actually received the full value of that judgment. ² She argues that since she accepted a settlement for less than the full amount of the judgment she should be permitted to proceed against Dr. Eagle in an attempt to recover the full value of her claim. We disagree.

There are important policy reasons and much wisdom behind the traditional rule that a plaintiff who records a satisfaction of judgment must treat that satisfaction as his or her commitment that the judgment has been fully satisfied. Judgments are frequently satisfied for less than their face value. The parties mutually agree that the plaintiff will accept less than he or she was entitled to under the judgment. The law encourages these as well as other settlements to end disputes between parties. To permit the plaintiff to later question the satisfaction on the basis of sufficiency of the consideration that she accepted in full satisfaction of the judgment would create uncertainty and unpredictability. It would erode the integrity of official public records. We see no reason to accord less respect for official public records than we would for promises between private parties.

The common law has traditionally attached great significance to the entry of a satisfaction of judgment. A plaintiff who is injured at the hands of more than one tort-feasor may sue and recover a judgment against any one or all of the tort-feasors and may attempt to collect the damages awarded by the judgment against any one or all of them. However, although a plaintiff may obtain a judgment against several tort-feasors for the same harm, he or she is entitled to only one satisfaction for that harm. See THOMPSon v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 A. 107 (1937); Franklin Decorators, Inc. v. Kalson, 330 Pa.Super. 140, 479 A.2d 3 (1984). The rationale underlying this rule is clear--the remedy provided to an injured person is to receive only one full compensation for the wrong done to him. Thompson, supra. Moreover, once the judgment is marked satisfied, the plaintiff is legally barred from further recovery against any of the tort-feasors because the law presumes that full satisfaction for the harm incurred has been received. Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959).

Appellant argues, however, that the important inquiry is not whether the plaintiff has marked the judgment satisfied, but rather whether the full amount of the judgment was actually received by the plaintiff. There is no support for this in the cases relied upon by appellant. For example, appellant contends that in Hilbert v. Roth, supra, the court held that a second action for damages for the same harm would not be barred unless two requirements were met--the judgment in the prior suit must have been marked satisfied and the plaintiff must in fact have received payment of the full amount of the judgment before a second action for damages for the same harm would be barred.

We do not read Hilbert as imposing these requirements. In Hilbert, the Court expressly stated that where a plaintiff has satisfied a judgment entered after an adversary trial, the common law presumption that he is satisfied will operate. Id., 395...