Brandt v. Hudspeth
| Citation | 178 P.2d 224,162 Kan. 601 |
| Decision Date | 08 March 1947 |
| Docket Number | 36808. |
| Parties | BRANDT v. HUDSPETH. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Kansas |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The record in a habeas corpus proceeding, examined and held: (1) Petitioner's claim that he was held in jail incommunicado and denied the rights of consulting with his friends and relatives is affirmatively disproved by the evidence; (2) petitioner's unsupported and uncorroborated statements to the effect he did not enter a plea of guilty to larceny of an automobile are not sufficient to set aside the authenticity of a recorded judicial finding to the contrary even if the evidence did not affirmatively prove--which it does--that on two different occasions he actually entered such a plea; (3) petitioner voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment challenged by him; (4) the respondent's own testimony conclusively establishes that the provisions of G.S.1945 Supp. 62-1304, pertaining to the appointment of counsel for persons about to be arraigned upon an information for an offense against the laws of the state, had not been complied with at the time petitioner, who was not represented by counsel, entered a plea of guilty.
2. Following Davis v. Hudspeth, 161 Kan. 354, 167 P.2d 293, it is held that failure to comply with the requirements of the provisions of G.S.1945 Supp. 62-1304; (1) deprived the district court of jurisdiction to accept petitioner's plea of guilty; (2) vitiates the judgment rendered upon such plea, and (3) requires that petitioner be released from the state penitentiary and returned to the county jail of Crawford county to await proper disposition of the criminal action there pending against him in the district court of such county.
Milton P. Allen, of Lawrence, for petitioner.
Harold R. Fatzer, Asst. Atty. Gen., (A. B. Mitchell, Atty. Gen., and Leon Lundblade, of Topeka, on the brief), for respondent.
This is an original habeas corpus proceeding in which the petitioner who is now an inmate of the state penitentiary by virtue of a judgment of the district court of Crawford County sentencing him to confinement in that institution, under the habitual criminal statute, Gen.St. 1935, 21-107 et seq., for larceny of an automobile, seeks his release upon the basic proposition the judgment authorizing his restraint is null and void.
The application for the writ, which was supported by a verified statement of facts and accompanied by a motion requesting the appointment of counsel, was prepared by the petitioner and mailed by him to the clerk of this court. In due time the papers were presented to us for attention and after having examined them we ordered that they be filed without a deposit for costs and the case docketed as an original proceeding. Thereafter, we appointed Milton P. Allen, a reputable and competent attorney of Lawrence, to assist the petitioner in any and all matters relating to the preparation and presentation of his action. Mr. Allen accept employment consulted with the petitioner, filed a brief in his behalf and personally argued the merits of his cause when it came on for final hearing.
Petitioner's application sets forth at length the 11 grounds on which he relies for the granting of a writ but it will not be necessary to relate them in detail. Summarized, and in inverse order of their importance they are: (1) That while confined in jail petitioner was held incommunicado and was not allowed to consult with his friends and relatives; (2) that he did not enter a plea of guilty to the crime with which he had been charged; (3) that--and this statement covers 8 of the variously stated claims set forth in the application--he was arrested in Missouri by Kansas officers and by force and violence removed from the state of Missouri to Kansas without compliance with the laws pertaining to extradition of persons charged with crime and (4) that he was not represented by counsel at the time of entering his plea as required by law.
Briefly stated, the respondent's answer and return denies the allegations of the application, alleges that petitioner was lawfully in custody by reason of a valid judgment and sentence, sets forth copies of the authority for petitioner's restraint and includes verified statements of at least five public officials dealing with factual issues raised by the application.
In our consideration of the issues, as in all other habeas corpus cases, statements of fact made by the deponents in the verified statements presented by the parties in support of their respective positions will be given the same weight to which they would be entitled had the affiants been personally present and orally testified as witnesses.
Claims 1 and 2, heretofore referred to, warrant little time or space in this opinion. So far as No. 1 is concerned the evidence not only reveals the petitioner has failed to establish his contention that he was held incommunicado and denied the right of consulting with his friends and relatives as is required by our decisions (Downs v. Hudspeth, Kan., 178 P.2d 219) but conclusively establishes that he was not denied that privilege. With respect to No. 2, in the face of a record to the contrary, the petitioner's unsupported and uncorroborated statements to the effect he did not plead guilty are not sufficient to set aside the authenticity of a recorded judicial proceeding (Powers v. Hudspeth, 161 Kan. 777, 173 P.2d 251; Wooner v. Amrine, 154 Kan. 211, 117 P.2d 608) even if the evidence did not affirmatively prove--which it does--that on two different occasions he actually entered such a plea.
It is next urged that petitioner was arrested in Missouri by Kansas officers and forcibly and violently returned to Kansas without compliance with the laws pertaining to extradition of persons charged with crime. Counsel, who construes the evidence as having affirmatively established that fact strenuously argues the court had no jurisdiction to render judgment. At the outset it must be conceded the petitioner was apprehended in Missouri and brought to Kansas without the issuance of extradition papers. Even so, it does not follow the Kansas court in which the criminal proceeding was pending lacked...
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Stebens v. Hand
...laws he has broken--certainly none which ought to entitle him to escape punishment for his offense. * * *' See, also, Brandt v. Hudspeth, 162 Kan. 601, 605, 178 P.2d 224, and cases accumulated in 165 A.L.R. 948. The petitioner, represented by counsel of his own selection, waived formal arra......
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...person in a criminal action is not affected by the way it is acquired.' (Syl. 2.) Among other cases of like import, see Brandt v. Hudspeth, 162 Kan. 601, 178 P.2d 224; State v. Cook, 194 Kan. 495, 399 P.2d 835; Call v. State, 195 Kan. 688, 408 P.2d 668; Thompson v. State, 197 Kan. 630, 419 ......
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