Brandt v. Menard, No. 18-225

• Docket Nº: No. 18-225
• Citation: 237 A.3d 1251
• Case Date: July 17, 2020
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Vermont

237 A.3d 1251

Jeffrey-Michael BRANDT
v.
Lisa MENARD et al.

No. 18-225

Supreme Court of Vermont.

December Term, 2019
July 17, 2020

Jeffrey-Michael Brandt, Pro Se, Tutwiler, Mississippi, Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael J. Leddy of McNeil, Leddy & Sheahan, P.C., Burlington, for Defendants-Appellees.

Matthew F. Valerio, Defender General, and Emily Tredeau, Prisoners’ Rights Office, Montpelier, for Amicus Curiae Prisoners’ Rights Office.

PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Robinson, Eaton and Carroll, JJ., and Morris, Supr. J. (Ret), Specially Assigned

REIBER, C.J.

¶ 1. Plaintiff inmate appeals the trial court's order denying his motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). We reverse and remand.

¶ 2. In January 2017, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking compensatory and punitive damages for defendants’ alleged violations of his state and federal statutory and constitutional rights to free speech and association. On September 11, 2017, the trial court dismissed the complaint on res judicata grounds. Copies of the decision and other related orders were sent to the parties the same day. However, on October 2, 2017, plaintiff's copies were returned to the court as undeliverable, apparently because plaintiff had been moved to a new prison. On February 27, 2018, plaintiff sent a letter to the trial court asking that copies of the rulings be sent to him in Pennsylvania where he was incarcerated. The court sent the copies to plaintiff on the following day. On March 19, 2018, plaintiff moved to reopen the judgment pursuant to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing that he had not been "timely notified of the [September 11, 2017] entry of judgment in time for [him] to enter a notice of appeal." On June 13, 2018, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion, ruling that it was really a request for an extension of time to file an appeal pursuant to Vermont Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(d), which requires such motions to be filed no later than thirty days after expiration of the original thirty-day appeal period. Plaintiff appealed.

¶ 3. "A motion for relief from judgment is addressed to the discretion of the trial court and is not subject to appellate review unless it clearly and affirmatively appears from the record that such discretion was withheld or otherwise abused." Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 149 Vt. 365, 368, 543 A.2d 1320, 1322 (1988) (quotations and citation omitted). "Whether the court has authority to exercise its discretion [under Rule 60(b) ] is a legal issue that we review

237 A.3d 1253

de novo." Penland v. Warren, 2018 VT 70, ¶ 6, 208 Vt. 15, 194 A.3d 755.

¶ 4. Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just," a trial court "may relieve a party ... from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" for various reasons, which include:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial ...; (3) fraud ..., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged ...; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

A Rule 60(b) motion "shall be filed within a reasonable time." V.R.C.P. 60(b). For some of the enumerated reasons provided in Rule 60(b), the motion must be filed "not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken." V.R.C.P. 60(b) ; see also Brown v. Tatro, 136 Vt. 409, 411, 392 A.2d 380, 382 (1978) ("The one year bar is an absolute one where it applies ....").

¶ 5. "The hallmark of Rule 60(b) intervention is the prevention of hardship or injustice." Rule v. Tobin, 168 Vt. 166, 174, 719 A.2d 869, 874 (1998) ; Manosh v. Manosh, 160 Vt. 634, 635, 648 A.2d 833, 835 (1993) (mem.) ("A V.R.C.P. 60(b) motion is invoked to prevent hardship or injustice and therefore should be liberally construed."). At the same time, "[t]he rule does not protect a party from tactical decisions which in retrospect may seem ill advised, and it is not an open invitation to reconsider matters concluded at trial." Penland, 2018 VT 70, ¶ 7, 208 Vt. 15, 194 A.3d 755 (quotations and citations omitted). In addition, "[w]e must be concerned about the certainty and finality of judgments so that litigation can reach an end," id. (quotation omitted), and "a motion for relief is not intended to function as a substitute for a timely appeal," Tetreault v. Tetreault, 148 Vt. 448, 451, 535 A.2d 779, 781 (1987).

¶ 6. We have not previously addressed whether Rule 60(b) permits a trial court to vacate and re-enter judgment to enable a delayed appeal where the moving party failed to receive notice of the judgment at issue. Prior to 1991, federal courts generally held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which is nearly identical to Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), could be used to provide this relief under certain circumstances. See Vencor Hosps., Inc. v. Standard Life &...