Brangi v. Conn. Motor Lines Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 April 1948
• Citation: 59 A.2d 295,134 Conn. 562
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: BRANGI v. CONNECTICUT MOTOR LINES, Inc. et al.

134 Conn. 562

59 A.2d 295

BRANGI

v.CONNECTICUT MOTOR LINES, Inc. et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 22, 1948.

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Alcorn, Judge.

Action by Michael Brangi, Administrator of the estate of Michael Brangi, deceased, against Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., and Francis R. Daniels to recover for the deceased's death as result of alleged negligence of defendants in operation of a truck. From a judgment for defendants after trial to jury before Alcorn, J., in the Superior Court in New Haven County, the plaintiff appeals.

No error.

Milton Rice, of New Haven (Alexander Winnick, of New Haven, on the brief), for appellant.

Philip R. Shiff, of New Haven, for appellees.

Before MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, JENNINGS, ELLS and DICKENSON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff's decedent, an eight-year-old boy, was killed when he came into contact with a truck owned by the named defendant and operated by its driver, Francis R. Daniels, hereinafter referred to as the defendant. The jury brought in a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff excepts to the charge.

The plaintiff offered evidence to prove and claimed to have proved the following facts: The defendant was operating a trailer truck, thirtyeight feet long, westerly on Chapel Street in New Haven. He knew that it was a populous neighborhood and that children went to and from school along Chapel and Franklin Streets. He made a left turn into Franklin Street, and the rear of the trailer came close to the curbing of the southeasterly corner of Franklin and Chapel Streets. Plaintiff's decedent stepped from the curb onto the southerly crosswalk of Chapel Street, was struck by the left rear wheel of the trailer and died as a result of the injuries received. The defendant did not see the boy before he was struck.

The charge conformed to the usual pattern in such cases. No written requests were filed. At the close of the charge, the plaintiff excepted in accordance with Practice Book, § 156, as follows: ‘The only object I can possibly think of, Your Honor, is that in defining proper lookout, Your Honor said he must keep a lookout for anything in the path of the vehicle. I thought that if that were a little broader, that it should be, ‘anything in the path or in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle,’ since in this case the boy came from the crosswalk.'

The court charged with reference to lookout: ‘Of course, the operator of a motor vehicle must keep a...