Brannberg v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ.
| Citation | 503 P.3d 893,2021 COA 132 |
| Decision Date | 28 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 20CA0641 |
| Parties | Judy A. BRANNBERG and John Dewey Institute, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COLORADO STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION and Douglas County School District RE-1, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Colorado |
Klenda Legal LLC, Steven A. Klenda, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants
Phillip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Julie C. Tolleson, First Assistant Attorney General, Jenna Zerylnick, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Colorado State Board of Education
Caplan and Earnest LLC, Elliott Hood, Boulder, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee Douglas County School District RE-1
Opinion by JUDGE TAUBMAN *
¶ 1 Plaintiffs, Judy A. Brannberg1 and her proposed charter school, John Dewey Institute, Inc. (JDI), appeal the district court's judgment concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the rejection of their charter school application by defendants, the Douglas County School District RE-1 (the District) and the Colorado State Board of Education (collectively, the School Boards). Because we disagree with the district court's conclusion that the statute at issue bars court review of plaintiffs’ claims, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 2 This case presents the question of whether the General Assembly has precluded the courts’ authority to hear and decide a given class of cases under the Charter Schools Act, sections 22-30.5-101 to - 120, C.R.S. 2021. The Act allows individuals or groups to apply to a local school board to create a charter. § 22-30.5-107, C.R.S. 2021. In the event of an adverse decision, applicants may appeal the local board's decision to the Colorado State Board of Education. § 22-30.5-108, C.R.S. 2021. When the initial appeal of the local board's decision — known as the first appeal — occurs, subsection 108(3)(a) instructs the state board either to affirm the decision or to remand the proceeding to the local board. If, on remand, the local board again renders a decision adverse to the applicant, the applicant may take a second appeal to the state board. § 22-30.5-108(3)(c). Following instructions explaining how the state board must decide the second appeal, subsection 108(3)(d) concludes by stating that "[t]he decision of the state board shall be final and not subject to appeal."
¶ 3 The issue in this case is whether this appeal-preclusion language also applies to a state board decision rendered after a first appeal — a scenario in which the Board has affirmed the local board's decision, without the applicant getting to a second appeal and thus to subsection 108(3)(d), where the appeal-preclusion language appears. While the Colorado Constitution vests our courts with broad jurisdiction, the General Assembly may define and restrict this jurisdiction through statutory language that explicitly or by necessary implication does so.
Colorow Health Care, LLC v. Fischer , 2018 CO 52M, ¶ 21, 420 P.3d 259, 263 (citing Colo. Const. art. VI, §§ 1, 2, 3, 9 ). Resolving a question of statutory interpretation, we conclude that the appeal-preclusion language in subsection 108(3)(d) does not explicitly or by necessary implication apply to state board decisions rendered after a first appeal. Subsection 108(3)(d) thus does not revoke courts’ subject matter jurisdiction to review such decisions.
¶ 4 Before turning to the meaning of the provision in question, we provide background on both the procedural history of this case and the charter school appeals process.
¶ 5 JDI brought claims against the School Boards under the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act (APA), alleging that they failed to follow the procedures required by the Act. Specifically, JDI's complaint alleged, among other things, that the District violated section 22-30.5-107(2) by failing to rule on its charter application in an official board resolution. JDI also alleged that the District violated section 22-30.50-107(4) by failing to adequately provide reasons for the denial. At a board meeting, JDI alleged, District board members verbally expressed their reasons for denying the application rather than setting them forth in an official, written resolution. JDI alleged that these statutory violations created an inadequate record for review for its state board appeal. Finally, JDI alleged that the State Board erred by affirming the District's denial.
¶ 6 The School Boards moved to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) on two grounds. First, they argued that subsection 108(3)(d) barred judicial review of both first- and second-appeal state board decisions. Second, they argued that JDI lacked standing to bring the suit under the political subdivision doctrine. The district court did not reach the second ground because it granted the School Boards’ motion on the first ground alone. It concluded that subsection 108(3)(d) was ambiguous with respect to whether it applied to both first- and second-appeal decisions, but that extra-textual considerations weighed in favor of it precluding judicial review of first-appeal state board charter-application decisions under section 22-30.50-108. Accordingly, the court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. JDI now appeals.
¶ 7 The General Assembly declared that one purpose of the Act is "[t]o provide citizens with multiple avenues by which they can obtain authorization for a charter school." § 22-30.5-102(2)(j), C.R.S. 2021. To this end, sections 22-30.5-106 and -107 of the Act detail procedures and requirements for individuals or groups to submit applications to a local school board to establish a charter school within its district. If the application is approved by the local board, it serves as the basis for a governing contract between the charter school and the local board. § 22-30.5-105(1)(a), C.R.S. 2021. If, however, the local board either denies a charter application or accepts the application with unilaterally imposed conditions on the applicant school,2 any person may appeal that decision to the state board. § 22-30.5-108(2).
¶ 8 Subsection 108(3) sets forth the procedures and standards the state board must follow in appeals from the local school board. It describes two possible decisions of the state board: (1) a remand or affirmation in the appeal of the local board's initial decision, and (2) in the event the state board remands an initial decision, a second remand with instructions or affirmation in the appeal of the local board's second decision. § 22-30.5-108(3). It is this appeal-remand-appeal process — and the finality accorded to ultimate state board decisions at either step — that is at issue here.
¶ 9 Subsection 22-30.50-108(3)(a) governs the first appeal. It requires the state board to determine whether the local board's initial decision was "contrary to the best interests of the pupils, school district, or community."
Id. If it so finds, the state board must remand the proceeding to the local board with specific matters for the local board to reconsider. Id.
¶ 10 Subsection 108(3)(a) does not explicitly mention the possibility that the state board may affirm the local board's initial decision. Nevertheless, a first-appeal affirmation would constitute the state board's ultimate decision on the matter. Most important for our purposes, subsection 108(3)(a) does not contain any appeal-preclusion language.
¶ 11 On remand, if the local board again denies or unilaterally imposes unacceptable conditions on the applicant, the applicant may again appeal to the state board. § 22-30.5-108(3)(b), (c). The state board must then apply the same "contrary to the best interests" standard stated in subsection 108(3)(a). § 22-30.5-108(3)(d). This time, however, if the state board again disagrees with the local board's decision, its remand no longer contains mere recommendations; rather, it is an order to the local board to either approve the application or dispense with any of the board's unacceptable conditions. See id.
¶ 12 Like subsection 108(3)(a), subsection 108(3)(d) does not expressly mention the possibility that the state board may affirm the local board's decision on second appeal. Unlike subsection 108(3)(a), however, subsection 108(3)(d) ends with a provision on finality: "The decision of the state board shall be final and not subject to appeal."
¶ 13 The parties agree that this appeal-preclusion language bars judicial review of state board decisions rendered after a second appeal. They disagree, though, about the meaning of this language — specifically whether "the decision of the state board" also includes a state board decision under subsection 108(3)(a) to affirm after a first appeal.
¶ 14 JDI contends that the district court erred by concluding that subsection 108(3)(d) precludes judicial review of first-appeal state board decisions. We agree.
¶ 15 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Munoz v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. , 2018 CO 68, ¶ 9, 425 P.3d 1128, 1130.
¶ 16 To preserve an issue for appeal, "all that was needed was that the issue be brought to the attention of the trial court and that the court be given an opportunity to rule on it." Berra v. Springer & Steinberg, P.C. , 251 P.3d 567, 570 (Colo. App. 2010). No "talismanic language" is necessary, People v. Melendez , 102 P.3d 315, 322 (Colo. 2004), at least so long as the party presented the district court with the "sum and substance" of the argument it makes on appeal, and the district court ruled on it, Berra , 251 P.3d at 570.
¶ 17 In the district court, JDI contended that subsection 108(3)(d) did not bar its suit. The court ruled that this subsection was ambiguous, and it interpreted the appeal-preclusion language as barring judicial review of both first- and second-appeal decisions. We therefore...
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...judicial review of State Board decisions rendered after a first appeal. Brannberg v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 2021 COA 132, ¶ 14, 503 P.3d 893, 897. division of the court of appeals agreed and concluded that the appeal-preclusion language in section 108(3)(d) was clear-"it does not explici......