Branner v. Klaber

Citation49 S.W.2d 169
Decision Date12 April 1932
Docket NumberNo. 27224.,27224.
PartiesA.J. SCOTT BRANNER and BARGAIN REALTY COMPANY, Appellants, v. FRED W. KLABER, Public Administrator, and WILLIAM J. CARROLL, Administrator of the Estate of SAMUEL W. SCOTT.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. Hon. Willard P. Hall, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

J.M. Johnson, C.W. Prince, James N. Beery and Walter A. Raymond for appellant.

(1) The deed from Annie J. Scott Branner to S.W. Scott for the Kinloch property is void and neither he nor his wife and daughter as voluntary grantees from him acquired any title thereto. Roseberry v. Scott, 120 Kan. 578, 244 Pac. 1063; Booth v. Scott, 276 Mo. 1, 205 S.W. 643; Sec. 3039, R.S. 1909; Art. 12, sec. 8, Mo. Const. (2) S.W. Scott and family are not in possession under color of title. Booth v. Scott, 276 Mo. 1, 205 S.W. 643; Gaines v. Saunders, 87 Mo. 563; Wilkerson v. Eilers, 114 Mo. 245, 21 S.W. 515; Cullen v. Johnson (Mo.), 29 S.W. (2d) 48; Perkins Land & Lbr. Co. v. Irvin, 200 Mo. 491. (3) The rights of Annie J. Scott Branner are not barred by the Statute of Limitations. Stone v. Perkins, 217 Mo. 586, 117 S.W. 717; Woodside v. Durham, 295 S.W. 772; City of Pacific v. Ryan, 28 S.W. (2d) 654; Sec. 850, R.S. 1929; Buford v. Moore, 217 Mo. 586, 117 S.W. 871; Gray v. Shelton, 282 S.W. 53; Jamison v. Wells, 7 S.W. (2d) 348; Kingsolving v. W.D. Lasswell Lbr. Co., 300 S.W. 506; Carter v. Hornback, 139 Mo. 245, 40 S.W. 894; Hayes v. Pumphrey, 226 Mo. 129; Turner v. Hall, 60 Mo. 271; Lynde v. Williams, 68 Mo. 360; Brown v. Hartzell, 87 Mo. 564, 568; Barbee v. Bumpass, 191 N.C. 521, 132 S.E. 275; Ephriam Willow Creek In. Co. v. Olson, 258 Pac. 222; Noe v. Russell, 213 Ky. 746, 281 S.W. 1034; White v. McNabb, 131 S.W. 1021, 140 Ky. 828; Duncan v. Abell, 340 Ill. 613, 173 N.E. 59; Ver Steet v. Railroad Co., 250 Mo. 61, 156 S.W. 689; McVey v. Carr, 60 S.W. 1034, 159 Mo. 648; Crider v. Meatte, 7 S.W. (2d) 694; 2 C.J. 93, sec. 99. (4) S.W. Scott and family were estopped to plead the Statute of Limitations. 2 C.J. 112, sec. 178; Dry Goods Co. v. Goss, 65 Mo. App. 55; Bridges v. Stevens, 132 Mo. 524, 34 S.W. 559; Shearlock v. Life Ins. Co., 193 Mo. App. 430, 182 S.W. 91; McFarland v. McFarland, 211 S.W. 23, 278 Mo. 17; Glass v. Templeton, 170 S.W. 667. (5) The Statute of Limitations is no bar to Annie J. Scott Branner's defense to cause No. 45509, on the ground she was the real owner of the property. Butler v. Carpenter, 163 Mo. 597, 63 S.W. 823; Williamson v. Brown, 93 S.W. 791, 195 Mo. 329; Byrne v. Byrne, 233 S.W. 465. (6) By reason of the failure of consideration for the deed from Annie J. Scott Branner she was entitled to a vendor's lien. Bennett v. Shipley, 82 Mo. 453; Barnhart et al. v. Little (Mo.), 185 S.W. 178; McTernan v. Mason, 188 S.W. 923; Tate v. Citizen's Sav. Bank, 21 S.W. (2d) 227. (7) Sarah D. Scott and Helen Scott Jaccard were pendente lite grantees and hold subject to lis pendens lien. R.S. 1929, Chap. 22, Art. 1, secs. 3041-3155; Morrison v. Juden, 46 S.W. 994, 145 Mo. 282; 38 C.J. 58; 17 R.C.L. 1030, sec. 26. (8) S.W. Scott and his voluntary grantees, Sarah D. Scott and Helen Scott Jaccard were not entitled to be restored to statu quo. Booth v. Scott, 276 Mo. 1, 205 S.W. 643; Paquin v. Milliken, 63 S.W. 417, 163 Mo. 79; Maupin v. Ins. Co., 214 S.W. 398; Parish v. Casner, 282 S.W. 392, 412, 413; Flinn v. Gillen, 10 S.W. (2d) 927. (9) Tender of the worthless so-called stock by appellant was unnecessary, and the tender therefore sufficient though after judgment. Johnson v. Jines, 193 S.W. 15. (10) S.W. Scott is not entitled to be repaid for any improvements he may have made on the land. Gray v. Clement, 296 Mo. 497, 246 S.W. 940; Sec. 1384, R.S. 1929; Bank v. Handley, 9 S.W. (2d) 895; Railroad v. Soutter, 80 U.S. 517, 13 Wall. 523. (11) Under the prayer for general relief Annie J. Scott Branner was entitled to recover the par of the purchase price paper, with interest thereon if not entitled to return of her property. Gibson v. Shull, 251 Mo. 480, 158 S.W. 325; McQuilty v. Steckdaub, 190 S.W. 590; Ganty v. Halpin, 242 S.W. 97; Martin v. Jones, 286 Mo. 574, 228 S.W. 1051; Bentrup v. Johnson, 14 S.W. (2d) 537; Munford v. Sheldon, 9 S.W. (2d) 907, 911; Jamison v. Griswold, 2 Mo. App. 155; Bank of Auxvasse v. Harrison, 12 S.W. (2d) 759; State to use v. Laundry Co., 196 Mo. App. 636; Sage v. Finney, 156 Mo. App. 30; Lawson v. Cunningham, 275 Mo. 128, 204 S.W. 1105; Webb v. Rolls Produce Co., 234 S.W. 1068; Jones v. Park, 307 Mo. 462, 271 S.W. 370; Bank v. Handy, 9 S.W. (2d) 895.

Henry S. Conrad, L.E. Durham and Hale Houts for respondents.

(1) Limitation was a complete defense and bar against the appellant in the first case. (a) The case was sufficiently and well disposed of by the trial court as barred by limitation. Sec. 1305, R.S. 1919, now sec. 850, R.S. 1929; Robb v. Woodward, 50 Mo. 103; Hunter v. Hunter, 50 Mo. 451; Rogers v. Brown, 61 Mo. 193; Dunn v. Miller, 96 Mo. 339; Cooper v. Deal, 114 Mo. 527; Barrett v. Bank, 6 Mo. App. 317; Hughes v. Luttrall, 75 Mo. 573; Hudson v. Cahoon, 193 Mo. 559; Turnmire v. Claybrook (Mo.), 204 S.W. 178; Faris v. Moore, 256 Mo. 173; Miller v. Allen (Mo.), 192 S.W. 967; Butler v. Bell (N.C.), 106 S.W. 217; Campbell v. Dick (Okla.), 176 Pac. 520; Juyn v. Hepner, 45 Ind. 589; School Dist. v. Hansen (Iowa), 173 N.W. 873; Daman v. Hunt (Cal. App.), 191 Pac. 276; Campbell v. Genshlea (Cal.), 180 Pac. 336; Dwight v. Des Moines (Iowa), 156 N.W. 336; Etenbun v. Neary (Okla.), 186 Pac. 457; Franklin v. Ward (Okla.), 174 Pac. 244; Brazil v. Silva (Cal.), 185 Pac. 174; Tilton v. Rader (Iowa), 164 N.W. 873; 25 Cyc. 1025; Garth v. Roberts, 20 Mo. 523; Venuci v. Cademartoni, 59 Mo. 353; Miller v. Taylor, 61 Mo. 401; Rhodes v. Farish, 16 Mo. App. 430; Bensley v. Haeberte, 20 Mo. App. 648; State ex rel. v. Allen, 132 Mo. App. 98, 114; Hussman v. Druege, 181 S.W. 118; Matthews v. Heissler, 58 Mo. App. 147; Mitchner v. Holmes, 117 Mo. 185; Root v. Meade, 58 Mo. App. 477; Smith v. Mining Co., 47 Mo. App. 409; Clark v. Brotherhood, 99 Mo. App. 687; Adams v. Cowles, 95 Mo. 501; Sims v. Thompson, 291 Mo. 529; Beatty v. Lewis (N.J. Ch.), 68 Atl. 95; Zoll v. Carnahan, 83 Mo. 43; Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. Brammel, 192 Pac. 375; Miller v. Oliver (Cal. App.), 202 Pac. 168; Lewis v. Barnes (Mo.), 220 S.W. 487; Holcourt v. Mays (Mo.), 215 S.W. 771; Smith v. Cretors (Iowa), 164 N.W. 338; Barr v. Stone (Mo.), 242 S.W. 661; Wood v. Dill, 3 Kan. App. 489, 43 Pac. 823; Bixeman v. Warren (Okla.), 173 Pac. 443; Beebe v. Doster, 36 Kan. 66, 14 Pac. 150; Kober v. Kober, 23 S.W. (2d) 152; Parish v. Casner, 282 S.W. 409; Snow v. Funck, 41 S.W. (2d) 4. (b) The deed was not void, but upon the view of the matter most favorable to the appellant was merely voidable. It constituted legal and record title which appellant could not question after the expiration of ten years. (1) The development company did not violate the Missouri law. Booth v. Scott, 276 Mo. 1; Meir v. Crossley, 305 Mo. 206. (2) Regardless of the status of the development company the deed was not void. Bryan v. Hitchcock, 43 Mo. 527; Metropolitan Paving Co. v. Investment Co., 309 Mo. 638; Robb v. Woodward, 50 Mo. 95; Hunter v. Hunter, 50 Mo 445; Rogers v. Brown, 61 Mo. 187; Dunn v. Miller, 96 Mo. 324; Cooper v. Deal, 114 Mo. 527; Hughes v. Luttrall, 75 Mo. 573; Hudson v. Cahoon, 193 Mo. 547; Turnmire v. Claybrook, 204 S.W. 178; Faris v. Moore, 156 Mo. 173; Millar v. Allen, 192 S.W. 967; Parish v. Casner, 282 S.W. 392; Kober v. Kober, 23 S.W. (2d) 149. (c) Appellant's action was also barred by adverse possession of S.W. Scott. Jamison v. Wells, 7 S.W. (2d) 347; Norton v. Kowazek, 193 S.W. 556; Thompson v. Stillwell, 253 Mo. 89; Nall v. Conover, 223 Mo. 477; Benne v. Miller, 149 Mo. 228; Heinemann v. Bennett, 144 Mo. 113; Goltermann v. Schiermeyer, 111 Mo. 404; Hamilton v. West, 63 Mo. 93; Menkens v. Overhouse, 22 Mo. 70; Crider v. Meatte, 7 S.W. (2d) 699; Courtner v. Putnam, 30 S.W. (2d) 131; Cullen v. Johnson, 29 S.W. (2d) 47; Wilkerson v. Eilers, 114 Mo. 245. (d) S.W. Scott and family were not estopped to plead the Statute of Limitations. Snow v. Funck, 41 S.W. (2d) 4; Railway Co. v. Grain Co., 199 Mo. App. 432; Monroe v. Herrington, 110 Mo. App. 509, 520; Bridges v. Stephens, 132 Mo. 524. (2) If appellant was not barred by the Statute of Limitations, and had she otherwise been entitled to relief, it would still have been necessary for her to have restored S.W. Scott and his grantees to statu quo. Grafeman Dairy Co. v. Mercantile Club, 241 S.W. 927; Nelson v. Reed, 270 Mo. 405. (3) If appellant had otherwise been entitled to recover she was in any event barred by her failure to tender and inability to tender or deliver to S.W. Scott and his grantees the certificate of stock in the development company, which, by her own petition, was a consideration which she received for the conveyance to S.W. Scott. (a) Tender and delivery of the certificate of stock was not made unnecessary on the theory that it was worthless. Grafeman Dairy Co. v. Mercantile Club, 241 S.W. 927; Wilson v. Reed, 270 Mo. 405; Johnson v. Crowley, 191 S.W. 691. (b) There was no tender or delivery or evidence thereof during the trial and none was constituted by the "offer of restitution" filed by the appellant in the circuit court over two years after the judgment. Congregation B'Nai Abraham v. Arky, 20 S.W. (2d) 905; Hendricks v. Martin, 267 S.W. 1047; Mount Vernon Bank v. Porter, 148 Mo. 183; King v. Gilson, 206 Mo. 264; Knowles v. Mercier, 16 Mo. 455; Linz v. Lenhardt, 127 Mo. 281; Henson v. Kansas City, 277 Mo. 450; Stewart v. Stringer, 45 Mo. 113. (4) Appellant was not entitled to recover the par value of the certificate of stock. (a) Such relief would have been wholly inconsistent with and a departure from appellant's petition and not permissible under the prayer for general relief. (b) The claim, if otherwise permissible, would have to be denied because out...

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