Brannon v. Wood
Decision Date | 23 August 1968 |
Citation | 251 Or. 349,444 P.2d 558 |
Parties | Burton BRANNON, Appellant, v. James A. WOOD et al., Respondents. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Gerald H. Robinson, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Lent, York & Paulson and Charles Paulson, Portland.
Curtis W. Cutsforth, Portland, argued the cause for respondent James A. Wood. With him on the brief were King, Miller, Anderson, Nash & Yerke, Portland.
Bruce Spaulding, Portland, argued the cause for respondent The Portland Clinic. With him on the brief were Mautz, Souther, Spaulding, Kinsey & Williamson, Portland.
Before PERRY, C.J., and SLOAN, O'CONNELL, DENECKE, HOLMAN, LUSK and RODMAN, JJ.
The plaintiff has appealed from an adverse judgment in a personal injury action. In 1964, he was admitted into St. Vincent Hospital for the purpose of having the defendant James A. Wood, a thoracic surgeon, remove a posterior mediastinal tumor from his chest. During the course of the operation it was determined that the tumor was a meningocele. A meningocele is a pouching out of a portion of the covering membrane (the dura) of the spinal cord so that the fluid around the spinal cord, which is held in by the dura, tends to force out the membrane in the same way that a weak spot in an inner tube is forced out in a bubble. The meningocele protruded through an opening (called a foramen) in the plaintiff's spinal column into his chest cavity. The tumor, which was about the size of a small lemon or large egg, was excised, the patient's chest closed and he was taken to the recovery room.
Several hours later it was noted that the plaintiff was hemorrhaging severely. He was returned to surgery and the incision reopened in order to locate the source of bleeding and stop it. Dr. Wood determined that the bleeding was coming up through the foramen from which the meningocele had been removed. In an attempt to stop the hemorrhaging, he used silver Cushing clips to clamp off bleeding veins and applied Gelfoam over the source of the bleeding. Gelfoam is a type of gelatin which will facilitate clotting and is eventually absorbed by the body. When the Gelfoam was removed after a few minutes the bleeding began again at a rapid rate. He next inserted a sponge into the foramen with forceps, but this too was ineffectual. In the meantime, a blood transfusion had been commenced to offset a critical loss of blood.
When these measures failed, Dr. Wood packed Surgicel in through the foramen until the bleeding had stopped. Surgicel is a cellulose substance which is very hemostatic and similar in function to Gelfoam. It swells 10 to 20 per cent when exposed to liquids and will eventually dissolve in the body. After observing that the bleeding had stopped, the defendant Wood again closed the chest opening and returned the plaintiff to the recovery room.
In the recovery room it was discovered that the lower portion of Brannon's body was paralyzed. He was again returned to surgery and a neurosurgeon performed a laminectomy through the patient's back and removed the Surgicel. This failed to relieve the paralysis and the plaintiff remains a paraplegic with complete loss of feeling and motion from the umbilicus downward. There were other medical procedures involved in the case and the trial consisted largely of medical testimony; however, the statement above is sufficient to dispose of the issues that have been raised on appeal.
In his complaint the plaintiff set forth various specifications of negligence against the defendants. Before the case was submitted to the jury, the plaintiff withdrew all specifications of negligence except the following:
(1) In placing and leaving packing against plaintiff's spinal cord in such a position that it was likely to impinge upon plaintiff's spinal cord.
(2) In failing to warn plaintiff of the known and inherent risks, dangers and possible consequences of the planned surgical procedure, particularly the risk of massive hemorrhage, cord compression from hemorrhage, rupture of adjacent blood vessels, and spinal cord compression.
It was not disputed by the defendants that the plaintiff had suffered permanent paralysis and that it was caused by compression of the spinal cord by the Surgicel packed within the spinal canal. The defendants, other than Dr. Wood, were partners in The Portland Clinic. Dr. Wood was an associate of that firm and the only liability of the other defendants would arise from that relationship.
The case was submitted to the jury upon the two specifications of negligence set forth above, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.
Plaintiff's first assignment of error is that the court erred in failing to give a requested instruction on Res ipsa loquitur. 1 The second assignment of error is related to the first; it is that the court erred in giving the usual instruction that the mere fact that an injury was sustained is not evidence of negligence, since, unless qualified, that would not be a correct statement of the law in a case involving the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur. The plaintiff does not contend that Res ipsa loquitur applies to the specification of negligence charging the failure to warn the plaintiff of the risks and dangers of the surgery. Since the jury found against the plaintiff on that specification, we will not consider it further.
The lower court did not err in refusing to give plaintiff's requested instruction on Res ipsa loquitur. Likewise, there is no merit to the plaintiff's second assignment of error as the only fault claimed is that the instruction is inappropriate in a Res ipsa loquitur case.
In Mayor v. Dowsett, 240 Or. 196, 400 P.2d 234 (1965), this court held that, subject to some limitations not of moment in this case, the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur may be applied in a medical malpractice case just as in any other negligence action. The elements which must be present in order for the doctrine to be available are:
240 Or. at 214, 400 P.2d at 242.
There is no question but that the plaintiff's injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendants. The plaintiff alleged and proved that his paralysis was caused by the act of Dr. Wood placing Surgicel in such a position that it impinged upon his spinal cord. None of the seven doctors who testified for the defendants suggested that the injury was caused in any other way. The plaintiff was unconscious throughout the operation, and, of course, no action on his part contributed to the paralysis. If the jury could find that an accident of this kind does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence, then the case would fall within the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur.
Courts are not in agreement as to the effect on Res ipsa loquitur of pleading specific allegations of negligence. 38 Am.Jur. Negligence § 305 at 1001--1002, sets out the several rules:
This court has followed the rule stated last in the above text. Boyd v. Portland Electric Co., 40 Or. 126, 66 P. 576, 57 L.R.A. 619 (1902); Boyd v. Portland Electric Co., 41 Or. 336, 68 P. 810 (1902); Short v. D. R. B. Lggoing Co., 192 Or. 383, 232 P.2d 70, 235 P.2d 340 (1951).
The application of this principle is illustrated in the second Boyd case wherein the plaintiff had been burned by an electrical wire of the defendant which had broken and fallen on the ground:
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Sides v. St. Anthony's Medical Center, SC 88948.
...(noting that an expert's testimony failed to supply necessary foundation for res ipsa loquitur instruction). 21. Brannon v. Wood, 251 Or. 349, 444 P.2d 558, 563 (1968) (en banc) (jurors are "permitted to draw upon the testimony of experts" in res ipsa 22. Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hosp......
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...have occurred had the physician exercised due care. Kerr v. Bock, 5 Cal.3d 321, 95 Cal.Rptr. 788, 486 P.2d 684 (1971); Brannon v. Wood, 251 Or. 349, 444 P.2d 558 (1968); see also, Malpractice-Res Ipsa Loquitur, 82 A.L.R.2d 1262 (1962); Injury by X-ray, 41 A.L.R.2d 329 § 8 at 355 (1955); Res......
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Watzig v. Tobin
...In a number of earlier cases we have listed "elements" of res ipsa loquitur which must be proved. For example, in Brannon v. Wood, 251 Or. 349, 355, 444 P.2d 558 (1968), we stated that the elements of res ipsa loquitur " ' "* * * (1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not ......
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