Brant v. Bockholt
| Decision Date | 24 May 1995 |
| Citation | 532 N.W.2d 801 |
| Parties | Jonas BRANT, Appellant, v. Tina BOCKHOLT and Brenda J. Neil, Appellees. 93-1736. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
C.A. Frerichs of Fulton, Frerichs, Martin & Andrews, Waterloo, for appellant.
David L. Riley of Lindeman, Yagla, McCoy & Riley, Waterloo, for appellees.
Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, CARTER, LAVORATO, and SNELL, JJ.
Plaintiff, Jonas Brant, who was awarded some damages in a personal injury action growing out of an automobile collision, appeals from that judgment. He urges that the damages awarded were inadequate, involved inconsistent elements of recovery, and were the product of erroneous jury instructions. The defendants in the action are Tina Bockholt and Brenda Neil, who were the driver and the owner, respectively, of an automobile that collided with another vehicle in which plaintiff was riding as a passenger. After considering the arguments presented, we conclude that the district court should not have instructed the jury that plaintiff's award for future pain and suffering must be reduced to present worth. As a result, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case for a new trial on the issue of plaintiff's damages.
On February 2, 1990, a collision occurred between a motor vehicle in which plaintiff was riding as a passenger and another vehicle owned by defendant Brenda Neil and driven by Tina Bockholt. Defendant Bockholt had lost control of the automobile, crossed over the centerline, and collided with the vehicle in which plaintiff was riding. Plaintiff was thrown into the windshield and suffered severe cuts and lacerations to his face.
Following the collision, plaintiff was taken to Allen Memorial Hospital in Waterloo and later transferred to the University of Iowa Hospitals in Iowa City. He was hospitalized for two days. He later underwent four surgical procedures to reduce facial scarring. Plaintiff was in his senior year of high school when the collision occurred. He returned to school three weeks following his initial discharge from the hospital. Approximately six weeks following the collision, he was able to resume most normal activities and in the spring of 1990 participated on the school track team and in a school play.
At the time of trial, plaintiff was gainfully employed and indicated in his testimony that he was able to carry on normal life activities, including an active social life. Although he did not claim to have suffered physical pain as a result of the injuries sustained, he did sustain numbness in the facial area and permanent facial scarring.
The case was tried to a jury, and a verdict was returned awarding plaintiff the following amounts:
$19,000 for treatment of facial scarring
$31,000 for future medical expenses
$25,000 for past pain and suffering
$10,000 for future pain and suffering
The jury awarded plaintiff nothing for past or future loss of function of the body or for future loss of earnings.
Plaintiff has appealed, contending that his pretrial motion for summary judgment on the issue of defendants' negligence should have been sustained, and that the jury's award of damages was inadequate, included inconsistent elements of recovery, and was prompted by erroneous jury instructions. Because we agree with plaintiff's contention that the jury should not have been instructed to reduce the award for future pain and suffering to present worth, we reverse the judgment of the district court. We remand the case to that court for a new trial on the issue of plaintiff's damages.
Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in not adjudicating defendants' negligence as a matter of law in ruling on plaintiff's pretrial motion for summary judgment. We do not reach the merits of this contention. This court has consistently held that errors against a party are cured by a verdict in that party's favor unless the error was prejudicial with respect to the amount of recovery. Mills v. Guthrie County Rural Elec. Coop., 454 N.W.2d 846, 848 (Iowa 1990); Nassif v. Pipkin, 178 N.W.2d 334, 337 (Iowa 1970); Edgren v. Scandia Coal Co., 171 Iowa 459, 474, 151 N.W. 519, 524-25 (1915). It might be otherwise if the appeal resulted in a new trial in which the same question might again arise with respect to the defendants' liability. In the present case, however, the grant of new trial is limited to the issue of damages, and liability will not be revisited.
Plaintiff objected to the trial court's jury instructions No. 20 and No. 25 to the extent that they required the jury to reduce the recovery for future pain and suffering to present value. That objection was overruled, and the jury was instructed that all elements of future damage should be reduced to present worth. Plaintiff contends that this was reversible error with respect to elements of noneconomic damage.
In reviewing the authorities on this issue, it appears that the overwhelming weight of decided case law favors plaintiff's position. So does Restatement (Second) of Torts section 913A (1979). This section of the Restatement provides:
The requirement of reduction to present worth applies to future pecuniary losses in general, but it arises most frequently with personal injuries. If earning capacity has been lost or impaired, the future losses in earnings are discounted. So also with damage awards covering future medical expenses; the payment of them at the future date will be a pecuniary loss. But an award for future pain and suffering or for emotional distress is not discounted in this fashion.
Id. (emphasis added). Cases holding that awards for future pain and suffering and other noneconomic losses should not be discounted to present worth include the following: Flanigan v. Burlington N., Inc., 632 F.2d 880, 886 (8th Cir.1980); Taylor v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 438 F.2d 351, 353 (10th Cir.1971); Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 676 (Alaska 1967); Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 80 So.2d 662, 667 (Fla.1955); Bagley v. Akins, 110 Ga.App. 338, 138 S.E.2d 430, 431 (1964); Barlage v. The Place, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Minn.Sup.Ct.1979) ; Dickerson v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 697 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Mo.App.1985); Ball v. Burlington N. R.R., 672 S.W.2d 358, 361 (Mo.App.1984); Porter v. Funkhouser, 79 Nev. 273, 382 P.2d 216, 218-19 (1963); Friedman v. C & S Car Serv., 108 N.J. 72, 527 A.2d 871, 873 (1987) (citing O'Byrne v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 632 F.2d 1285, 1286 (5th Cir.1980)); McKenna v. State, 112 A.D.2d 996, 492 N.Y.S.2d 805, 807 (1985); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Handley, 341 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex.Civ.App.1960); Borzea v. Anselmi, 71 Wyo. 348, 258 P.2d 796, 804 (1952); see also United States v. Harue Hayashi, 282 F.2d 599, 605 (9th Cir.1960).
In Flanigan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, applying federal law under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., determined the issue as follows:
The same amount of pain and suffering does not occur from year to year nor can the degree of pain and suffering that will occur in any year be quantified with any degree of certainty. Requiring the reduction of an award for pain and suffering to its present value would improperly allow a jury to infer that pain and suffering can be reduced to a precise arithmetic calculation.
632 F.2d at 886. In considering this conclusion, we would also note that, in addition to the inexact quantification of pain, there is an absence of a precise time of occurrence from which a discount formula may be calculated.
The appellees urge that, notwithstanding the results of courts in other jurisdictions, Iowa law requires that all future elements of recovery be reduced to present worth, including noneconomic damages. They cite the case of Schnebly v. Baker, 217 N.W.2d 708 (Iowa 1974), as authority for that contention.
The "present worth" issue before this court in the Schnebly case concerned whether future economic damages were required to be reduced to present worth when they were computed on current prices rather than future prices and there was evidence that the rate of inflation would approximately equal the rate of return on money. We held that, if the evidence as to the inflation rate was believed, this would result in inflation...
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Shepard v. Wapello County, Iowa
...items."Jury determinations of damages are apt to be influenced by the recovery allowed for other elements of damage." Brant v. Bockholt, 532 N.W.2d 801, 805 (Iowa 1995). In employment cases the economic and non-economic items of damage are often related. The economic impact of a loss of emp......
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