Brantley Cnty. Dev. Partners v. Brantley Cnty.
| Decision Date | 02 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | CV 5:19-109 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
| Parties | BRANTLEY COUNTY DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS, LLC, Plaintiff, v. BRANTLEY COUNTY, GEORGIA by and through its Chairman and Members of the Brantley County Board of Commissioners; CHRIS “SKIPPER” HARRIS, RANDY DAVIDSON, BRIAN HENDRIX, JESSE MOBLEY, and RAY GRIFFIN, all in their individual and official capacities as Commissioners, Defendants. |
Presently before the Court is Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 48. Plaintiff has filed a Response in opposition to Defendants' Motion, dkt. no. 52, to which Defendants have filed a Reply, dkt. no. 55. For the reasons below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff Brantley County Development Partners, LLC (“Plaintiff”) is a limited liability company registered to do business under the laws of the State of Georgia. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 1. On December 22, 2014, Plaintiff purchased 2, 839 acres of land (the “Property”) to pursue the construction and operation of a solid waste handling facility in Brantley County (the “County”). Id. ¶ 9. Under the provisions of Georgia's Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Act (the “CSWMA”), O.C.G.A §§ 12-8-20 et seq., any person seeking to operate a solid waste handling facility must obtain a solid waste handling permit by application to the Georgia Environmental Protection Division (the “EPD”). In order to proceed through the EPD's permitting process, the applicant must submit certain letters from the local governing authority certifying that the proposed site complies with local land use ordinances and is consistent with the local solid waste management plan (the “SWMP”). O.C.G.A. § 12-8-24(g). Moreover pursuant to the rules of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources, written verification of local zoning compliance must be “reaffirmed by the governmental authority prior to permit issuance.” Ga. Comp. R. & Regs 391-3-4-.05(1)(a).
Before closing on the Property, Plaintiff sought and obtained written verification (the “2014 Verification Letters”) from County Manager Carl Rowland (“Rowland”) certifying that Plaintiff's proposed solid waste handling facility (the “Proposed Facility”) was consistent with the County's SWMP and local land use plan. Dkt. No. 1-2 at 3. At that time, the County did not have any zoning ordinances in effect at all. Id. at 2.
On February 5, 2015, at a regularly scheduled meeting, the Brantley County Commission, through its Board of Commissioners (“Defendants”), [1] took official action to authorize Plaintiff's Proposed Facility. Dkt. No. 1-4 at 4. The minutes and regular agenda show Plaintiff requested Defendants ratify and confirm the prior certification that the Proposed Facility and related activities were “consistent with [the] local land use plan and [the] Solid Waste Management Plan.” Id. Consequently, Defendants authorized the Chairman of the Board of Commissioners, Charlie Summerlin, to execute two letters (“the 2015 Verification Letters”):
[T]he first letter acknowledging that the solid waste handling facilities proposed by [Plaintiff] . . . is consistent with the approved Solid Waste Management Plan adopted by Brantley County and the cities of Hoboken and Nahunta on June 26, 2006, and our most recent 2011 Five Year Short Term Work Program 2010-2019; and, the second letter acknowledging that the facilities proposed by [Plaintiff] is consistent with Brantley County's Local Land Use Plan.
Id. The minutes acknowledge that Defendants knew these letters were necessary for Plaintiff to obtain permits from the EPD in order to conduct solid waste material activities. Id.
On February 6, 2015, Chairman Summerlin signed and issued the 2015 Verification Letters to Claudia Moeller, an EPD program manager, verifying Plaintiff's Proposed Facility was consistent with the County's SWMP and local land and zoning regulations. Dkt. No. 1-5 at 3. These letters reiterated that “Brantley County at the present time does not have a zoning ordinance.” Id. at 2.
On September 8, 2016, Defendants voted to adopt a new landuse ordinance for Brantley County (the “2016 Zoning Ordinance”). Dkt. No. 1-7. Plaintiff alleges it received assurances from Defendants that the 2016 Zoning Ordinance would not apply to its Proposed Facility. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 18. Moreover, at the time the 2016 Zoning Ordinance was adopted, the ordinance did not include a map identifying the various zoning classifications, and no motion was made to approve any official zoning map. Id. ¶ 19. On December 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed a permit application with the EPD for the Proposed Facility. Dkt. No. 1-11. The EPD accepted the application along with Plaintiff's filing fee for processing. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 28.
Beginning in 2017, a noticeable shift occurred in Defendants' stance toward the siting and construction of a solid waste handling facility on Plaintiff's Property. On January 3, 2017, Defendants imposed a 180-day moratorium on any landfills in Brantley County. Dkt. No. 1-12. That same day, Defendants also moved to send a written objection to the EPD regarding Plaintiff's Proposed Facility. Dkt. No. 1-14 at 2. The January 3, 2017 Board minutes show that Defendants moved to instruct all county officials to “immediately cease and desist any communications or efforts with [Plaintiff] or any other individual or entity where the intent is to establish or facilitate a landfill or solid waste handling facility.” Id. at 3.
On January 6, 2017, County Attorney Deen Strickland, on behalf of Defendants, sent a letter to the EPD stating that Defendants were unanimously opposed to Plaintiff's Proposed Facility and advising the EPD that Defendants had passed a moratorium on the proposed location. Dkt. No. 1-16 at 2. On January 19, 2017, Defendants took official action to hire outside counsel for the purpose of “stopping the landfill” on Plaintiff's Property. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 35.
On June 15, 2017, Defendants convened and took action to downzone Plaintiff's Property from Heavy Industrial to Light Industrial (the “2017 Rezoning Decision”). Id. ¶ 42. Under the Light Industrial zoning classification, landfills are forbidden on Plaintiff's Property. Id. ¶ 45. Plaintiff contends Defendants' entire rezoning process failed to follow proper procedures and no notice was given. Id. That same day, Defendants also allegedly adopted a new zoning ordinance (the “2017 Zoning Ordinance”) along with an official zoning map. Id. ¶ 43.
Finally, at the same meeting, Defendants also adopted an amended Solid Waste Management Plan (the “2017 SWMP”). Dkt. No. 45 ¶ 151. The 2017 SWMP, as amended, prevents solid waste facilities from importing any waste from outside the County. Id. ¶¶ 151, 154. Specifically, any waste disposal facility must “limit use of such sites to disposal of waste generated from only within the County.” Id. ¶ 154.
On June 19, 2019, Plaintiff demanded Defendants provide the necessary written verification of local zoning compliance (the “Reaffirmation Letters”) for its EPD permit. Id. ¶ 58; see also Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 391-3-4-.05(1)(a). Specifically, Plaintiff requested that Defendants confirm Plaintiff's Property is not subject to the 2017 Rezoning Decision, the 2017 SWMP, or any zoning ordinances at all. Dkt. No. 1-26 at 3. Plaintiff also put Defendants on notice of its constitutional objections to the 2017 Rezoning Decision and the 2017 Zoning Ordinance based on its vested rights. Id. Defendants have refused and continue to refuse to provide the Reaffirmation Letters sought by Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 59.
Plaintiff alleges it has expended over three million dollars to purchase and develop its solid waste handling facility on the Property-all in reliance on the representations and letters from Defendants. Id. ¶ 49.
On July 17, 2017, Plaintiff timely filed a complaint against Defendants in the Superior Court of Brantley County. Id. ¶ 117; Dkt. No. 52-1. However, on November 13, 2019, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed that complaint in order to file the present action in federal court. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 100. On November 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed its first complaint, dkt. no. 1, as an alleged renewal of its prior Superior Court action. Id. Thereafter, on July 8, 2020, Plaintiff amended its complaint to include a claim for violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Dkt. No. 45 ¶¶ 148-50, 161-63 (the “Amended Complaint”). As it presently stands, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint asserts four federal claims against Defendants: violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment (Count I); violation of Plaintiff's procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count II); violation of the First Amendment (Count III); and violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause (Count VII). Plaintiff also alleges three claims under Georgia law: violation of substantive due process (Count IV); an unconstitutional denial of vested property rights (Count V); and a state law rezoning appeal (Count VI). On July 22, 2020, Defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 48.
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction. Ishler v. Internal Revenue, 237 Fed.Appx. 394, 395 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 974 (11th Cir. 2005)). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) there are two types of motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction-facial attacks and factual attacks. Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 925 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Lawrence v. Dubar, 919 F.2d 1525 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). “Facial attacks challenge subject...
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