Brantley Co. v. Simmons, A90A0628
Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Writing for the Court | POPE; DEEN, P.J., and BEASLEY |
Citation | 395 S.E.2d 656,196 Ga.App. 233 |
Parties | BRANTLEY COMPANY v. SIMMONS. |
Docket Number | No. A90A0628,A90A0628 |
Decision Date | 03 July 1990 |
Gibson & Jackson, Douglas L. Gibson, Waycross, for appellant.
W. Vincent Settle III, for appellee.
The Brantley Company, plaintiff below, appeals from the trial court's grant of Ralph Simmons' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The jury had returned a verdict of $15,165.27 on an open account against defendant Simmons and co-defendant Jack Wall. At trial, plaintiff proceeded on the theory that Simmons had represented to its general manager that he and Jack Wall were partners in a farming venture and that Simmons had agreed to "stand good" for Wall's debt. In his motion for JNOV, Simmons argued that because there was no writing signed by him in which he promised to pay Wall's debt, the Statute of Frauds was applicable and he could not be held liable. This was the basis upon which the trial court granted JNOV. Held:
Plaintiff first argues that defendant's motion for JNOV was based on a ground not raised in his motion for directed verdict as required by OCGA § 9-11-50(b). Our review of the record shows that defendant's motion for a directed verdict was on the basis that defendant never asked for any credit nor endorsed any credit and that under the UCC as it relates to retail sale of goods he could not orally agree to be responsible for the goods. The motion for JNOV was based upon the application of OCGA § 13-5-30, the Statute of Frauds. Although defendant argues his motion for directed verdict logically included § 13-5-30, we do not agree. OCGA § 9-11-8(c) specifically lists the Statute of Frauds as an affirmative defense that must be raised by pleading or be waived. Beck v. Johnston, 118 Ga.App. 541, 164 S.E.2d 342 (1968); see also New House Products v. Commercial Plastics, etc., Corp., 141 Ga.App. 199(1), 233 S.E.2d 45 (1977). Defendant never raised the defense, either in his pleadings, by motion or in the pre-trial order. We agree with plaintiff that the language used by defendant in his motion for directed verdict did not contain the ground raised in his motion for JNOV and even if it had, under the authorities set out above, the defense had been waived. It follows that the trial court erred in granting JNOV. Because OCGA § 13-5-30 was the only ground urged in support of the motion for JNOV, we need not consider the merits of defendant's alternative ground for directed verdict.
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