Brantley v. Batson

• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CALHOON, J.
• Citation: Brantley v. Batson, 84 Miss. 411, 36 So. 524 (Miss. 1904)
• Decision Date: 02 May 1904
• Parties: WlLLIAM H. BRANTLEY v. THOMAS E. BATSON ET AL

36 So. 524

84 Miss. 411

WlLLIAM H. BRANTLEY v. THOMAS E. BATSON ET AL

Supreme Court of Mississippi

May 2, 1904

March 1904

FROM the chancery court of, second district, Perry county HON STONE DEAVOURS, Chancellor.

Brantley the appellant, was complainant, and Batson and others, the appellees, were defendants in the court below. From a decree in defendants' favor the complainant appealed to the supreme court.

The facts sufficiently appear from the opinion of the court.

Affirmed.

Ellis & Sullivan, for appellant.

The complainant was not actually occupying the lot in litigation at the time of the levy of the executions, but he moved on it and impressed it with the homestead character before the day of sale. This he could do under the authority of Trotter v. Dobbs, 38 Miss. 198; Irwin v. Lewis, 50 Miss. 363; Letchford v. Cary, 52 Miss. 791; Jones v. Hart, 62 Miss. 13; and Dulion v. Harkness, 80 Miss. 8. The complainant comes clearly within the provisions of § 1971, Code 1892. He meets every requirement of the law in reference to holding property exempt from execution. He is a citizen of the state; he is a householder and head of a family; he resides on the lot with his family, and it is worth less than two thousand dollars in value. He owns no other place or residence. But it will be contended that he is estopped from asserting his claim to the lot as exempt from these executions. We do not think the doctrine of estoppel can be invoked to prevent one from asserting his right of exemption of the homestead from seizure and sale under execution or attachment. To apply this doctrine would be equivalent to declaring that one, under certain conditions, could forfeit the right to hold his homestead free from execution or attachment, although he meets all the requirements of the law as to citizenship, being the head of a family, a householder, and actually residing on the property with his family, it would be equivalent to outlawing, not only the head of the family, but the family also, for the conduct of the head of the family, for which they were in no way responsible. Hinds v. Morgan, 75 Miss. 509.

It will be contended that the complainant asserted his exemption to the place in the country, and when it was released from the levy he sold it, and cannot now claim his exemption in the town property. The evidence shows a bona fide sale of the country place, and when the complainant sold it and moved from it, it ceased to be his homestead. On what principle can it be said that he is not entitled to acquire another homestead?

Richie v. Duke, 70 Miss. 66, is not authority for the ruling of the court below in the case at bar.

Stevens & Stevens, for appellees.

We refer this court to the following authorities, which we consider conclusive and as settling the question at issue--viz., can appellant, with two places and with judgment liens against his entire property and with executions in the hands of the officer, move from one place to the other and claim in succession each as his bona fide home? Rutherford v. Jamieson, 65 Miss. 219; Richie v. Duke, 70 Miss. 66, and authorities there cited--to wit, Stone v. Darnell, 20 Tex., 11; Woodhall v. Rudd, 41 Ib., 375; Willis v. Mathewson, 46 Ib., 478; Thompson on Homesteads, paragraphs 225, 319, 419, 648, 856; also 15 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 660 and 661.

OPINION

CAL...