Brantley v. Skeens

• Decision Date: 09 April 1959
• Docket Number: No. 14596,14597.,14596
• Citation: 266 F.2d 447,105 US App. DC 246
• Parties: Willie BRANTLEY, Appellant, v. Edward J. SKEENS, Guardian ad litem, Appellee. Herbert MATHIS, Appellant, v. Edward J. SKEENS, Guardian ad litem, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

105 US App. DC 246, 266 F.2d 447 (1959)

Willie BRANTLEY, Appellant, v. Edward J. SKEENS, Guardian ad litem, Appellee.

Herbert MATHIS, Appellant, v. Edward J. SKEENS, Guardian ad litem, Appellee.

Nos. 14596, 14597.

United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued February 9, 1959.

Decided April 9, 1959.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mr. Julius W. Robertson, Washington, D. C., with whom Mrs. Dovey J. Roundtree, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant in No. 14596.

Messrs. Bruce R. Harrison and William A. Smith, Washington, D. C., also entered appearances for appellant in No. 14596.

Mr. William A. Smith, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Curtis P. Mitchell, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant in No. 14597.

Mr. Edward J. Skeens, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before WASHINGTON, BASTIAN and BURGER, Circuit Judges.

BASTIAN, Circuit Judge.

This case concerns conflicting claims to accidental death insurance benefits. We have before us appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of Edward J. Skeens, guardian ad litem, and from a denial of motions for summary judgment by Willie Brantley and Herbert Mathis.

The original complaint in this case was filed by Willie Brantley, who claimed to be the surviving spouse and widower of Elizabeth Brantley, also known as Elizabeth Mathis, who, at the time of her death, was an employee of the Federal Government and, as such, was covered by the provisions of the Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act. The complaint alleged that the decedent met her death accidentally as a result of a gunshot wound, and that at the time of her death she was covered by a policy of insurance issued pursuant to the Act and was entitled to accidental death benefits. The complaint further alleged that Brantley and the decedent were married on April 17, 1932 in the State of South Carolina, and that of this union there was born one child, William Brantley. The complainant further alleged that he was entitled to the proceeds of the group life insurance policy by virtue of the provisions of the Act, which established the surviving spouse as the person to receive the proceeds in the absence of a named beneficiary, and that no beneficiary had been named by the decedent. Complainant asserted that he had duly made claim on forms supplied for that purpose and that payment had been withheld.

The defendant in the original complaint was Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. In its answer, the defendant admitted that at the time of her death the decedent was insured, and that by reason of her death the sum of $8,000 is payable to the person or persons entitled thereto, this amount including the accidental death benefit. The answer further stated that the defendant had received claims to the proceeds of said policy not only from the plaintiff but also from one Herbert Mathis, he also claiming to be the widower of the decedent. The answer further set forth that, under the provisions of the said policy, if the insured left no widower then the proceeds thereof were payable to her children in equal shares, and that the surviving children of the insured were seven in number. Embodied in the answer of the defendant insurance company was a counterclaim for interpleader, asking that it be allowed to pay the proceeds of said insurance into the registry of the court, there to abide the judgment of the court, and asking that Herbert Mathis and the surviving children of the insured be made parties defendant to the action and be required to interplead their respective claims.

After motion was made to dismiss the counterclaim for interpleader and after the answer of the defendant Mathis had been filed, in which he claimed to be entitled to the proceeds of the insurance by virtue of a common law marriage with the decedent, the court entered its order authorizing the deposit of the $8,000 into the registry of the court and interpleading Mathis and the children of the decedent. A guardian ad litem was appointed for the infant defendants and claims were filed by the plaintiff Brantley, Mathis and the guardian ad litem for the infant children. The adult child of the decedent, while personally served, has not appeared in the proceeding.

The facts disclosed by the record in the case are as follows:

On April 17, 1932, Willie Brantley, appellant, married the deceased insured in a ceremony solemnized in Allendale, South Carolina. One child, William Brantley, was born of this marriage. The parties subsequently separated and, in 1941, Elizabeth Brantley moved to Washington, where she resided until her death in 1956. About January 1942 the decedent began living with Herbert Mathis in the District of Columbia without the benefit of a marriage ceremony. This relationship, which resulted in the birth of six children, continued until 1956, when the decedent met her death as a result of a bullet fired by Mathis. Mathis was indicted for the crime of first degree murder but was subsequently acquitted of that charge.

At some time during the period between 1944 and 1946, Willie Brantley entered a second marriage with one Sarah Gadsen, admittedly without having previously obtained a divorce from Elizabeth Brantley. In connection with the issuance of the second marriage license, Brantley swore that he was "legally capacitated to marry."

Appellant Brantley's cause is founded on the contention that he is the lawful surviving widower of the decedent and thus entitled to the death benefits under the insurance policy, pursuant to 5 U.S. C.A. § 2093, which section specifies the order of payment where no beneficiary is named.

Appellant Mathis denied that Brantley was the lawful surviving spouse, and counterclaimed for payment of the proceeds to himself as the lawful surviving spouse. Appellant Brantley replied and denied this counterclaim.

The answer filed by the guardian ad litem denied that either Brantley or Mathis was entitled to the proceeds of the policy as surviving spouse, and petitioned the court to compel payment of the proceeds to himself in his capacity as guardian. Both Brantley and Mathis replied and denied this claim. The guardian ad litem then made a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 Fed.R.Civ.P., 28 U.S.C.A., alleging that there was no genuine issue of fact in controversy. Oppositions to that motion were filed by Brantley and Mathis and, in addition, they both filed motions for summary judgment on their respective behalves.

When the motions came on for hearing, the court found that:

(1) Herbert Mathis was not the surviving spouse of Elizabeth Brantley by alleged common law marital relationship;

(2) Willie Brantley, while legally married to the decedent, entered into a second marriage and is thereby estopped from asserting a claim to the proceeds of the policy in question;

(3) Edward J. Skeens, guardian ad litem, had established a valid claim on behalf of the six minor children and was therefore entitled to summary judgment;

(4) William Brantley, also known as William Bradley, the adult son of deceased, was entitled to judgment in the amount of $1,028.50 representing a one-seventh interest in the net insurance proceeds;

(5) Motions for summary judgment filed by Brantley and Mathis were denied.

Subsequently, Brantley and Mathis filed notices of appeal.

We think that, the decedent having been a resident of the District of Columbia for about ten years prior to her death and having been employed by the District of Columbia government, and the insurance having been issued to her here, the contract is one which should be construed under the laws of the District of Columbia.

The law establishing the Federal Employees Group Life Act of 1954 was Public Law 598, ch. 752, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), and insofar as payment of death proceeds is concerned provides as follows:

5 U.S.C.A. "§ 2093 — Death claims; order of payment.

"Any amount of group life insurance and group accidental death insurance in force on any employee at the date of his death shall be paid, upon the establishment of a valid claim therefor, to the person or persons surviving at the date of his death, in the following order of precedence:

"First, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries as the employee may have designated by a writing received in the employing office prior to death;

"Second, if there be no such beneficiary, to the widow or widower of such employee;

"Third, if none of the above, to the child or children of such employee and descendants of deceased children by representation;

"Fourth, if none of the above, to the parents of such employee or the survivor of them;

"Fifth, if none of the above, to the duly appointed executor or administrator of the estate of such employee;

"Sixth, if none of the above, to other next of kin of such employee entitled under the laws of domicile of such employee at the time of his death.

"If any person otherwise entitled to payment under this section does not make claim therefor within one year after the death of the employee, or if payment to such person within that period is prohibited by Federal statute or regulation, payment may be made in the order of precedence as if such person had predeceased the employee, and any such payment shall be a bar to recovery by any other person."

As the matter comes before us, we find there are three main claims presented: (1) the claim of Willie Brantley; (2) the claim of Herbert Mathis; and (3) the claim of the children. We will proceed to discuss these in the order just stated.

Claim of Willie Brantley.

No. 14596.

This appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the guardian ad litem because the right of the surviving spouse to take the proceeds of an insurance policy under the Federal Employees' Life Insurance Act is declared by that Act, and that, under the facts of this case, there is no legal ground for the application of the doctrine of estoppel to preclude such a...