Brantley v. State, No. 49532

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
• Citation: 522 S.W.2d 519
• Docket Number: No. 49532
• Parties: Ronald Ray BRANTLEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Decision Date: 07 May 1975

Page 519

522 S.W.2d 519 Ronald Ray BRANTLEY, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee. No. 49532. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. May 7, 1975.

Max Blankenship, Fort Worth, Court appointed on appeal, for appellant.

Tim Curry, Dist. Atty., and Cue, Lipscomb, Marvin Snodgrass & John Hill, Asst. Dist. Attys., Fort Worth, Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., and David S. McAngus, Asst. State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

OPINION

GREEN, Commissioner.

In a trial before a jury, appellant was convicted of murder with malice. Punishment was assessed at life.

Appellant initially attacks the sufficiency of the evidence on the basis that his extra-judicial confessions, oral and written, are not sufficiently corroborated by other evidence.

The indictment alleged that on or about August 31, 1972, in Tarrant County, Ronald Ray Brantley did then and there voluntarily with malice aforethought kill Mary Emma Davis by cutting her with a knife and hitting her in the head with an iron skillet.

The record reflects that Mary Emma Davis, 85 years old, was found dead by her daughter Fay Miller on the morning of August 31, 1972. Miller testified that a photograph of the body, being State's Exhibit No. 2, accurately depicts the scene of the crime as she found it. The photograph shows that the vaginal area of deceased had been cut away, and blood is shown around the area where the throat was cut.

Allen Russel, a police officer, testified that when he saw deceased she had a would on her left forehead. He saw a skillet on a stove with the bottom broken out and pieces from the bottom lying in the blood around deceased's head.

The pathologist who examined the body the day that it was found testified that he observed a severe laceration in the left side of the head above the left eye, evidently caused by being struck with a hard object, a deep cutting wound about five inches long in her neck, and the absence of the entire vulva and part of the vagina. She died as the result of the assault committed on her.

The evidence apart from the confession reflects that the body of deceased was identified and her death was shown to have been caused by the criminal act of another. The corpus delicti was thus established. Self v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 513 S.W.2d 832. In his written confession, appellant admitted killing deceased under circumstances sufficient to prove murder with malice.

Page 522

In Self v. State, supra, at page 837, we said:

'. . .. The State having established the corpus delicti could prove the appellant's guilt as the agent guilty of the commission of the crime by his confession unaided by other evidence. See, e.g. Gutierrez v. State, (502 S.W.2d 746) supra; Brookins v. State, 499 S.W.2d 320 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Bayless v. State, 492 S.W.2d 588 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Thomas v. State, 458 S.W.2d 817 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). The remaining element of proof essential to the State's case that the appellant was the guilty agent in causing the deceased's death was proved by the appellant's extrajudicial written confession and his oral admissions to Beamer. All cases heretofore holding that the corpus delicti in a murder prosecution consists of three elements are hereby overruled to the extent they are in conflict with this opinion.'

The first ground of error is overruled.

In his second and third grounds, appellant says that the court erred in admitting in evidence his oral and his written confessions.

During the trial on October 4, 1973, but prior to the introduction of the confessions in evidence, the court conducted a hearing to determine their admissibility. After much testimony, the court made the findings beyond a reasonable doubt, both as to the oral and the written confession, which we summarize as follows:

1. Prior to making any statements, appellant was warned by the officer taking the statements that he had the right to have a lawyer present to advise him prior to and during any questioning; if he were unable to employ a lawyer, he had the right to have one appointed; he had the right to remain silent and not make any statement at all, and any statement he made could and might be used against him at his trial; and that if he chose to answer questions, he had the right to stop at any time. The appellant was given an opportunity to call an attorney if he wished or of having one appointed if he wished.

2. Appellant knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived each of the foregoing rights prior to and also during the making of the statements offered in evidence.

3. Appellant was not coerced into making any statement by any force, threats, persuasion or promises or any other improper influence.

4. Appellant had the mental capacity to understand the warnings given him, and to intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily waive the rights explained to him, and he did understand such warnings.

5. The confessions were voluntarily executed by appellant, and he was not denied the right of counsel.

The court further found, as to the oral confession, that the statement was found to be true which conduced to establish the guilt.

The record fully supports the findings of the court.

The evidence shows that appellant was arrested on October 4, 1972 on another charge. About 10:15 that night, detective Raulston fully informed him of his Miranda ¹ and Article 38.22, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., rights. After a short conversation, appellant confessed orally to killing deceased, and offered to take officers to the place where he had buried parts of her body. He then accompanied officers to an old abandoned house, where, with his directions, they found a sack containing flesh. When this was found, appellant stated: 'See, I told you I put it there,' telling the officers that the parts found were portions of deceased's body. This was confirmed by appellant in his written confession, supra. The admission of the oral confession under the circumstances

Page 523

was not error. Art. 38.22, subd. 1(e), V.A.C.C.P.; Chase v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 508 S.W.2d 605; Simmons v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 504 S.W.2d 465; Martinez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 507 S.W.2d 223.

Thereafter, Raulston took appellant before a magistrate, who administered to him the Article 15.17, V.A.C.C.P., warnings. Appellant then made and executed the written confession, which at its top contained the warnings prescribed by Miranda, supra, and Article 38.22, V.A.C.C.P. This confession before being signed was read by appellant, who marked several mistakes as shown by the original.

Appellant's contention that the oral confession was erroneously admitted in evidence is based on the same arguments made concerning the admissibility of the written confession; it 'was not voluntarily made because of the illegal detention of the appellant' and 'the fact that he was a mentally retarded person incapable of knowingly and intentionally waiving the rights secured him by the 6th Amendment to the United States of America Constitution, to the effective assistance of counsel at each and every stage of all proceedings.'

Appellant's contention that the evidence showed that his mentality was such that he could not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel or his right to remain silent is not borne out by the evidence. See Price v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 496 S.W.2d 103; Casias v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 452 S.W.2d 483. The testimony of the officers to whom the confessions were made, and of the newspaper reporter who sat in on the taking of the written confession and witnessed appellant's signature,...