Brantley v. State
| Decision Date | 16 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 18S–CR–98,18S–CR–98 |
| Citation | 91 N.E.3d 566 |
| Parties | Billy BRANTLEY, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Attorneys for Appellant : Ruth Ann Johnson, Valerie K. Boots, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee : Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McLean, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
This case presents the unusual and rare circumstance where a defendant is charged with voluntary manslaughter without also being charged with murder. At trial, the State conceded the existence of sudden heat to support the standalone charge and a jury found Billy Brantley guilty. Brantley appealed arguing the State was required to prove sudden heat and the State's concession rendered his self-defense defense illusory. Although the trial court instructed the jury that the State conceded the existence of sudden heat, we find there was evidence that Brantley acted in either sudden heat or self-defense. Therefore, the jury was presented with a classic question of fact, and in its judgment determined Brantley was guilty. Thus, we grant transfer and affirm.
Billy Brantley lived in Indianapolis with his sister, Martha Gunn; brother-in-law, Bruce Gunn; and their son, Sean. Brantley had known Bruce for eighteen years and previously lived with Martha and Bruce when Brantley was in high school and after spending some time in the military.
Bruce was retired and suffered from physical and mental health problems. Bruce had had multiple back surgeries, experienced seizures, and was often in search of pain medication in addition to his vagal nerve simulator, a device implanted in his shoulder to lessen chronic pain. Bruce's poor health often translated into anger, making him a volatile figure in the home. He and Martha fought often and more than once Martha feared for her life at his hands. When Brantley was in high school, he had to use a pool cue to stop Bruce from choking Martha. Another time, Brantley had to protect the couple's son when Bruce placed a knife to Sean's neck. Bruce's struggles were not limited to others, though; they also led him to self-harm. Bruce stabbed himself at least two times, tried to overdose with pills, and even drank antifreeze. These suicide attempts were well known to Brantley, Martha, and Sean who would often find him and intervene. On any given day, Martha was unsure if Bruce would kill himself, her, or their son.
On July 14, 2014, Brantley woke up around 9:00 AM, showered, and got ready for a job interview scheduled for 10:00 AM. Brantley's interview was in a high-crime area of town so he armed himself with a gun. When he came downstairs from his bedroom, Brantley found everyone asleep in the living room: Martha and Sean on a couch and Bruce in a chair. Brantley briefly woke up Martha, who in turn woke up Bruce and asked him to give Brantley twenty dollars for gas. Bruce gave him the money, wished him good luck, and Brantley left.
An hour or so later, Brantley arrived home and warmed himself some leftover pizza in the kitchen. He could hear Bruce and Martha arguing, but assumed their screaming was just the usual type of fighting that occurred between them. Although he could sense the tension, Brantley joined them in the living room so he could eat in front of the television. Their fighting briefly stopped—for just five or ten minutes—and Bruce asked about the interview, but when Martha tried to leave the room, Bruce's temper flared. His screaming elevated and he forcefully stood up from his chair, blocking the only exit out of the living room. Martha then returned to the couch and Bruce sat back down, but the fighting continued. Bruce was "belligerent to where he was very angry, screaming and he was bouncing up out of his chair, back down into his chair." Tr. 583. During all of this, Brantley monitored the situation, asking Bruce "what's going on," "let's talk about this," "what can I do," but the atmosphere remained "very chaotic." Tr. 583.
Bruce would not calm down and became increasingly irate. He turned his attention to Brantley and told him he was " ‘getting ready to get rid of all [his] problems right now.’ " Ex. 6, p. 15. Then Bruce "lunged" from his chair, and Brantley and Martha each noticed his fist was clenched around something shiny. Tr. 640. Brantley thought it was a knife because Bruce was known for keeping sharp objects, including knives, in his chair. Fearing Bruce was going to "kill" or "destroy" him, Brantley drew his gun and told Bruce to stop. Tr. 601. But Bruce continued toward him and Brantley fired. Bruce fell to the ground.
Martha grabbed Sean and they quickly ran out of the living room, past Bruce's body, and out the front door to a neighbor's house. Martha then called 911. She frantically reported that her brother, Brantley, had shot her husband after her husband tried to "attack" them. Ex. 2. In a separate 911 call, Brantley calmly told the operator that his "brother-in-law tried to attack [him] and [he] shot him." Ex. 2. When police arrived, they found Bruce's body crumpled on the floor next to his glasses—the shiny object Brantley and Martha had seen.
Brantley was charged with one count of voluntary manslaughter. At trial, Brantley claimed self-defense, and both he and Martha testified to that effect. The State, however, pointed to inconsistencies between Brantley's version of events and the physical evidence to undermine the defense. The trial court's proposed final instructions included instructions on self-defense, voluntary manslaughter, and the definition of sudden heat. Regarding voluntary manslaughter, the instruction provided that "sudden heat is a mitigating factor" and "[t]he State has conceded the existence of sudden heat by charging Voluntary Manslaughter instead of Murder." App. 95. Prior to the end of trial, Brantley and the State were given the opportunity to review the instructions. Each indicated the instructions were correct. The jury found Brantley guilty, and he was subsequently sentenced to ten years with five years suspended.
The Court of Appeals reversed Brantley's conviction. In doing so, it declined to address issues of instructional error and whether such error was invited, instead holding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Brantley acted with sudden heat and, therefore, the State was barred from retrial. Brantley v. State , 71 N.E.3d 397, 401, 403–04 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). A dissenting judge agreed Brantley's conviction should be reversed, but not for lack of evidence. Id. at 404. Rather, the dissent believed by instructing the jury that the State had conceded the existence of sudden heat, the province of the jury was invaded and the trial court committed fundamental error. Id. But in the dissent's view, retrial was possible because there was evidence of sudden heat. Id. at 404–05.
We now grant the State's petition to transfer and vacate the Court of Appeals opinion. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).
Sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments invoke a deferential standard of review, in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury. Drane v. State , 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007). We consider all the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict and will affirm the conviction if probative evidence supports each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Walker v. State , 998 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Ind. 2013).
Under appropriate circumstances, evidence supporting sudden heat as a mitigating factor may also support a self-defense defense, and a jury may consider both theories in delivering its verdict.
As a preliminary matter, we address whether voluntary manslaughter may be brought as a standalone charge. We find that it can.
While it is true that in most cases voluntary manslaughter is charged as a lesser-included offense to a murder charge, "[t]he authority to define crimes and establish penalties" is vested exclusively in the legislature as a matter of public policy and discretion. State v. Downey , 476 N.E.2d 121, 122–23 (Ind. 1985). We may not substitute our judgment as to the "desirability or wisdom of legislation" for that of the General Assembly. Id. at 122. Our General Assembly has separately defined the crime of voluntary manslaughter. See Ind. Code § 35–42–1–3(a) (2017) (). As evident by its own definition, we find that voluntary manslaughter may be brought as a standalone charge and, accordingly, the State was permitted to charge Brantley with only voluntary manslaughter.1
Turning to the merits, we must determine, first, whether sudden heat is an element or a mitigating factor to a freestanding charge of voluntary manslaughter; and, second, who bears the burden of proving sudden heat. Relying on this Court's opinion in Watts v. State , 885 N.E.2d 1228 (Ind. 2008), and the language of the voluntary manslaughter statute, the State argues sudden heat is nothing more than a mitigating factor, and thus it could concede its existence. In other words, the State claims sudden heat is not an element of the offense of voluntary manslaughter. Brantley, citing to the same sources, contends that sudden heat is only a mitigating factor when the State charges murder, and in this novel situation the State must prove sudden heat. We find that sudden heat is a mitigating factor. However, there must be some evidence of sudden heat, not merely a concession, to enable the factfinder to evaluate a defendant's culpability.
Although Watts involved a murder charge and an instruction on voluntary manslaughter, we agree that it is instructive. Watts was charged with murder and at trial requested jury instructions on involuntary...
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