Brantley v. United States
| Decision Date | 26 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | CRIMINAL INDICTMENT NO. 1:17-CR-0077-LMM-CCB-1,CIVIL FILE NO. 1:20-CV-0585-LMM-CCB |
| Parties | DAVEON BRANTLEY, Movant, v. UNITED STATES, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Movant has filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his federal sentence entered under the above criminal docket number. The matter is before the Court on the § 2255 motion, (Doc. 107), and Respondent's response, (Doc. 109). For the reasons discussed below, Movant's motion to vacate and a certificate of appealability should both be denied.
In April of 2017, Movant was charged, along with codefendant Amber Brinson, in the following four counts: (1) conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a minor (A.P.), (2) sex trafficking of a minor, (3) production of child pornography, and (4) distribution of child pornography. (Doc. 39). On November 27, 2017, Movant, represented by William Morrison, appeared before the Court to enter a guilty plea to count two. Movant, however, failed to admit that he had committed the offense, and the Court did not accept the plea. (Doc. 68 at 12, 51). In December of 2017, the Court denied Movant's motions to suppress and set trial for February 12, 2018. (Docs. 70, 71). On January 2, 2018, the government filed motions to exclude and to introduce certain evidence at trial. (Docs. 72-73).
Before the government's motions were decided, Movant renewed his intention to plead guilty. On January 9, 2018, Movant, again represented by Mr. Morrison, entered a plea of guilty to all four counts. (Doc. 76-1). The Court accepted the plea. (Doc 81 at 43). By judgment entered on April 18, 2018, the Court imposed a total sentence of 265 months in prison. (Doc. 90). On February 21, 2019, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment against Movant. (Doc. 105); United States v. Brantley, 762 F. App'x 730, 732 (11th Cir. 2019).
In his § 2255 motion, Movant seeks relief based on the following grounds: (1) judicial bias during sentencing, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to the guilty plea, (3) ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to seeking a competency examination, (4a) ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to notify the Court that Movant wished "to represent himself," and (4b) ineffective assistanceof appellate counsel in refusing to raise grounds one through three on direct appeal.1 (Doc 107 at 4-8).
Section 2255 of Title 28 allows a district court to vacate, set aside, or correct a federal sentence that was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or was imposed by a court without jurisdiction, exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The § 2255 movant bears the burden to establish his or her right to collateral relief, Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306, 1316 (11th Cir. 2015), which is limited. "Once [a] defendant's chance to appeal has been waived or exhausted, . . . we are entitled to presume he stands fairly and finally convicted," and "to obtain collateral relief a prisoner must clear a significantly higher hurdle than would exist on direct appeal." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164, 166 (1982).
"Once a matter has been decided adversely to a defendant on direct appeal it cannot be re-litigated in a collateral attack under section 2255." Stoufflet v. United States, 757 F.3d 1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, collateral review of a claim that could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is foreclosed unless the movant can show cause and prejudice for his default or actual innocence.2 Fordham v. United States, 706 F.3d 1345, 1349 (11th Cir. 2013).
Section 2255 relief "'is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1232 (quoting Richards v. United States, 837 F.2d 965, 966 (11th Cir. 1988)). A constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which generally cannot be fully litigated on direct appeal, is properly raised on collateral review in order to allow for adequate development and presentation of relevant facts. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505-09 (2003).
"The district court is not required to grant a petitioner an evidentiary hearing if the § 2255 motion 'and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.'" Rosin v. United States, 786 F.3d 873, 877 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting § 2255(b)). That is the case here, as shown in the discussion below.
In grounds two through four(b), Movant asserts ineffective assistance of counsel, to which Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), applies. A criminal defendant possesses a Sixth Amendment right to "reasonably effective" legal assistance. Id. at 687. To show constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must establish (1) that counsel's representation was deficient and (2) that hewas prejudiced by counsel's deficient representation. Id. at 690-92. The Court may resolve an ineffective assistance claim based on either of the two prongs. Pooler v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 702 F.3d 1252, 1269 (11th Cir. 2012).
Under the first prong, a movant must show that "in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. "Because we presume counsel was competent, [the movant] 'must establish that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take.'" Dell v. United States, 710 F.3d 1267, 1281 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1315 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). Under the second prong, a movant Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The habeas petitioner or § 2255 movant has the burden of affirmatively proving prejudice, and a "conceivable effect" on the proceedings does not show prejudice. Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693); see also Collins v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 745 F. App'x 849, 859 (11th Cir. 2018) ().
Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel also are governed by the Strickland test. Owen v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 686 F.3d 1181, 1202 (11th Cir. 2012). To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the movant must demonstrate deficient performance by counsel and show that, if counsel had not performed deficiently, there is a reasonable probability that the appellate outcome would have been favorable to the movant. See Dell, 710 F.3d at 1273-1274, 1281.
Movant's codefendant Brinson, who pleaded guilty to count one and who was sentenced before Movant, received a 115-month sentence. (Doc. 91).
Movant, who pleaded guilty to all four counts, was subject to (1) up to a life term of imprisonment on count one, (2) a mandatory minimum of 15 years and up to life on count two, (3) a mandatory minimum of 15 years and up to 30 years on count three, and (4) a mandatory minimum of five years and up to 20 years on count four. (Doc. 81 at 23-28). At sentencing, in accord with the PSR guideline calculation, the Court found that Movant had a total offense level of 44, a criminal history categoryof IV, and a guideline sentencing range of life. (PSR at 25; Doc. 101 at 4). Movant had no objections to the guideline calculations. (Id.). Movant, however, sought a downward variance from the guideline range of life and asked the Court to consider as mitigating circumstances that he had come from "very, very difficult surroundings, very very difficult upbringings" and the "type of community" where there was a violent atmosphere and a lack of parenting and structure. (Doc. 101 at 5-9). The Court observed that, although some communities struggle with illegal conduct, sex trafficking of children was not endemic in those communities and that Movant had not convinced the Court that coming from a difficult community mitigated Movant's responsibility for his particular crimes. (Id. at 10-11). Movant asked the Court to sentence him to "something similar" to 192 or 215 months. (Id. at 13, 15).
Movant's mother addressed the Court and reiterated that Movant grew up in a bad community. (Id. at 16). The government recommended a prison term of 24 years (288 months). (Id. at 26). In his allocution to the Court, Movant stated, "I'm a product of my environment[.]" (Id. at 32). Judge William Duffey stated (1) that, although he had seen before him too many young minority members who were products of their environment and had been caught engaging in illegal conduct, it was only a small subset that committed crimes against young girls, and (2) thatMovant's decision to commit the crimes he committed was "on" him, not his community or environment. (Id. at 38-40). After the Court's comments, Movant asked if he could say something additional but withdrew his request after conferring with counsel. (Id. at 40-41). The Court then asked Movant directly, "Do you want to say something else, Mr. Brantley?" Movant responded "No, your Honor." (Id. at 41)....
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