Brasfield v. Hood

• Decision Date: 22 May 1930
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 521.
• Citation: 221 Ala. 240,128 So. 433
• Parties: BRASFIELD v. HOOD.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

128 So. 433

221 Ala. 240

BRASFIELD v. HOOD.

6 Div. 521.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 22, 1930

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Richard V. Evans Judge.

Action for damages for personal injuries by Ralph Eugene Hood, a minor suing by his next friend, Mary Hood Hill, against C. W Brasfield. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed conditionally.

London Yancey & Brower and Jim C. Smith, all of Birmingham, for appellant.

Altman & Koenig, of Birmingham, for appellee.

ANDERSON C.J.

The trial court cannot be placed in error for not permitting the defendant to testify that he had the car under control a quarter of a mile and up to the time of the collision. In the first place, the proof did not qualify him as an expert in the operation of automobiles, which differentiates this case from Louisville & N. R. R. v. Jacobson, 218 Ala. 384, 118 So. 565. Second, the defendant got the substantial benefit of this question by an affirmative answer to the preceding question, which was not excluded.

The trial court cannot be reversed for the refusal of defendant's requested charge 13. If not otherwise faulty, the use of the words "contributed in the least degree" justified its refusal. Smith v. Crenshaw (Ala. Sup.) 126 So. 127.

The trial court did not commit reversible error in refusing the defendant's requested charge embodied in the fifth assignment of error. Whether good or bad, the defendant got the benefit of the proposition stated in his given charge 30.

There was no error in refusing defendant's requested charge 17. It contains the same defect as pointed out in the discussion of charge 13. Moreover, it instructs, as matter of law, that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in riding on the running board, and this was a question for the jury under the evidence, taking into consideration the necessity for doing so in order to expedite or discharge his work in delivering papers, the rate of speed the car was going, etc. If the car was going at a slow or moderate rate of speed, as the evidence tended to show, and the plaintiff was delivering papers therefrom to the different houses as they passed, we cannot say that he was guilty, as matter of law, in riding on the running board for this purpose. Vulcan Corp. v. Lawrence, 214 Ala. 378, 108 So. 3; Grabau v. Pudwill, 45 N.D. 423, 178 N.W. 124; Rook v. Schultz, 100 Or. 482, 198 P. 234; Donoghue v. Holyoke, 246 Mass. 485, 141 N.E. 278.

The case of Crider v. Yolande Co., 206 Ala. 71, 89 So 285, and other cases cited by ...