Brasfield v. United States
| Decision Date | 22 November 1926 |
| Docket Number | No. 243,243 |
| Citation | 71 L.Ed. 345,272 U.S. 448,47 S.Ct. 135 |
| Parties | BRASFIELD et al. v. UNITED STATES |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mr. John W. Preston, of San Franciso, Cal., for petitioners.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Donovan and the Attorney General, for the United States.
Petitioners were convicted in the District Court for northern California of the offense (section 37 of the Criminal Code (Comp. St. § 10201)) of conspiracy to possess and transport intoxicating liquors in violation of the National Prohibition Act (Comp. St. § 10138 1/4 et seq.). The conviction was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Nith Circuit. 8 F. (2d) 472. This court granted certiorari. 269 U. S. 550, 46 S. Ct. 201, 70 L. Ed. 407; Judicial Code, § 240(a) as amended (Comp. St. § 1217).
The only errors assigned which are pressed upon us concern proceedings had upon the recall of the jury after its retirement. The jury having failed to agree after some hours of deliberation, the trial judge inquired how it was divided numerically, and was informed by the foreman that it stood nine to three, without indicating which number favored a conviction.
In Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 307, 25 S. Ct. 243, 49 L. Ed 482, where a conviction was reversed on other grounds, this court condemned the practice of inquiring of a jury, unable to agree, the extent of its numerical division, although a response indicating the vote in favor of or against conviction was neither sought nor obtained. This court then said (page 308 (25 S. Ct. 250)):
'* * * We do not think that the proper administration of the law requires such knowledge or permits such a question on the part of the presiding judge.'
There is a diversity of view in the Circuit Courts of Appeals whether noncompliance with the rule as stated in the Burton Case is reversible error, or whether the expressions in that opinion are hortatory only. See St. Louis & S. F. R. R. v. Bishard (C. C. A. 8th), 147 F. 496, 78 C. C. A. 62; Stewart v. United States (C. C. A. 8th), 300 F. 769, 782 et seq.; Nigro v. United States (C. C. A. 8th), 4 F (2d) 781, holding that the inquiry requires a reversal. And compare Bernal v. United States (C. C. A. 5th), 241 F. 339, 342, 154 C. C. A. 219; Quong Duck v. United States (C. C. A. 9th), 293 F. 563, 564, supporting the view that the practice, while improper, is not prejudicial error.
We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial that the inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for reversal. Such procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its division. Its effect upon a divided jury will often depend upon circumstances which cannot properly be known to the trial judge or to the appellate courts and may vary widely in different situations, but in general its tendency is coercive. It can rarely be...
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State v. O'Neill
...There was no indication then or thereafter of the nature or number of the division of the jury. See Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345 (1926). Initially, we point out that the trial judge clearly and articulately instructed the jury just prior to the "Chip ......
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People v. Rodriguez
...this trial judge negates any inference that the constitutional privilege was abused.14 As appellant notes, Brasfield v. United States (1926) 272 U.S. 448, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345, concluded that inquiry into the jury's numerical division is inherently coercive and thus reversible per se ......
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People v. Brooks
...'s reasoning is flawed because it relied on a series of cases that had assertedly misstated the rule in Brasfield v. United States (1926) 272 U.S. 448, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345, which held that inquiry into the numerical division of a deadlocked jury is inherently prejudicial and per se r......
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State v. Ralls
...held is so clear as to require no elaboration.' Jenkins v. United States, supra, 446, 85 S.Ct. 1060; cf. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345; United States v. Dunkel, 173 F.2d 506 (2d I would find error, set aside the judgment and order a new trial. 1 Since ......
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Trials
...without counsel present). Harmless error is discussed more fully in Harmless Error in APPEALS in Part V. 1838. See Brasfield v. U.S., 272 U.S. 448, 449-50 (1926) (reversible error when judge inquired into numerical division of jury although not which side the majority favored). Such an inq......
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Trial
...defense counsel raises no objection.” [Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 34 Geo. L. J. 517, 531-32 (2005); Brasfield v. United States , 272 U.S. 448 (1926). See also Sanders v. Lamarque , 357 F.3d 943, 947-50 (9th Cir. 2004) (reversible error when judge removed sole dissenting juror upon......
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§ 1-33 Allen Charge (charge Used to Encourage a Deadlocked Jury to Reach a Verdict)
...you need charged again. Send a note by the bailiff. ? Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 239 (1988) (quoting Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926)) ("the inquiry into the jury's numerical division necessitated reversal because it was generally coercive and always brought to ......
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§ 1-30 Allen Charge (charge Used to Encourage a Deadlocked Jury to Reach a Verdict)
...you need charged again. Send a note by the bailiff. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 239 (1988) (quoting Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926)) ("the inquiry into the jury's numerical division necessitated reversal because it was generally coercive and always brought to be......