Brass City Local, CACP v. City of Waterbury
| Decision Date | 09 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | SC 20337 |
| Citation | 254 A.3d 866,337 Conn. 576 |
| Parties | BRASS CITY LOCAL, CACP v. CITY OF WATERBURY |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Stephen F. McEleney, Hartford, with whom was David S. Taylor, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Joseph B. Summa, Waterbury, for the appellee (defendant).
Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker*
The plaintiff, Brass City Local, CACP (union), a collective bargaining unit representing employees of the Waterbury Police Department, appeals1 from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss of the defendant, the city of Waterbury (city), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The union filed this action, seeking to have the trial court confirm an interest arbitration award issued in accordance with the provisions of General Statutes § 7-473c2 of the Municipal Employees Relations Act (MERA), General Statutes § 7-467 et seq. The union contends that the trial court incorrectly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the award under General Statutes § 52-417.3 We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. The union and the city were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (agreement) that expired on June 30, 2012. On or about February 28, 2013, the parties began negotiating a successor agreement. After reaching an impasse in the negotiations, the parties, in accordance with § 7-473c, entered into compulsory binding arbitration before a panel of the state Board of Mediation and Arbitration. On April 18, 2016, the panel filed an arbitration statement, which included contractual provisions agreed on by the parties, as well as a list of unresolved issues to be determined by the panel. The parties thereafter submitted their last best offers with respect to each of the unresolved issues, and, on November 7, 2016, the arbitration panel issued its award. Approximately, one month later, the Waterbury Board of Aldermen (board of alderman) approved the award. Neither party filed a motion to vacate or to modify the award pursuant to § 7-473c (d) (10).4
On January 18, 2017, after the city began paying union members certain retroactive wages in accordance with the new agreement, the union requested that the city pay its members retroactive extra duty wages, which it believed were due under article VI of the agreement.5 In a letter to the union dated January 26, 2017, the city denied the union's request for retroactive extra duty wages on the ground that no such payments were due under the agreement. In response, the union filed a complaint with the state Board of Labor Relations (labor board), alleging that the city had engaged in a prohibited practice under General Statutes § 7-470 (a) (6)6 by refusing to pay the retroactive extra duty wages. The city subsequently filed a complaint with the labor board, alleging, inter alia, that the union's complaint had been filed in bad faith.
The city eventually withdrew its complaint and moved to dismiss the union's complaint on the ground that the labor board lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the union's claims. Specifically, the city argued that § 7-470 (a) (6), by its express terms, applies only to grievance arbitration awards rendered in accordance with the provisions of General Statutes § 7-472, whereas the parties’ interest arbitration award was rendered in accordance with the provisions of § 7-473c. The city maintained, moreover, that the union's claim that the city wrongfully refused to afford extra duty pay increases on a retroactive basis was "a mere breach of contract claim over which [the labor board had] no jurisdiction absent proof of repudiation," which the union had not alleged. In the absence of such proof, the city asserted, the union's sole recourse was to pursue the grievance procedures outlined in article XVI of the agreement applicable to breach of contract claims.7
On October 30, 2017, while the union's complaint was still pending before the labor board, the union filed an application in the trial court to confirm the interest arbitration award pursuant to § 52-417. After the labor board granted the city's motion to dismiss the union's complaint, the city filed a motion in the trial court seeking dismissal of the union's application to confirm for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In support of its motion, the city argued, inter alia, that, by virtue of its plain language, chapter 909 of the General Statutes; see General Statutes §§ 52-408 through 52-424 ; applies only to arbitration awards resulting from written agreements to arbitrate, and not to interest arbitration awards resulting from compulsory arbitration conducted in accordance with § 7-473c. The city further argued that, although § 7-473c authorizes judicial review of interest arbitration awards via applications to vacate or to modify pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52-418 and 52-419, respectively; see General Statutes § 7-473c (d) (10) ;8 § 7-473c does not authorize judicial review by way of an application to confirm brought pursuant to § 52-417. Thus, the city maintained, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the union's application to confirm.
The union objected to the city's motion to dismiss, claiming, inter alia, that, contrary to the city's assertions, the statutory scheme governing consensual arbitration proceedings set forth in chapter 909 applies not only to written agreements to arbitrate but to statutory arbitration proceedings, as well. According to the union, although § 7-473c does not expressly authorize judicial review of an interest arbitration award via an application to confirm, it reasonably can be inferred that such an application "is the mechanism through which the arbitration decision becomes final and binding" in light of the fact that § 7-473c references other provisions of chapter 909, namely, §§ 52-418 and 52-419.
Following a hearing, the trial court granted the city's motion to dismiss, agreeing with the city that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the union's application to confirm. The court reasoned that statutes in derogation of the common law, such as the statutory scheme contained in chapter 909, must be strictly construed and that, by its express terms, Because, the court further explained, § 7-473c does not, by its terms, authorize judicial review of an interest arbitration award by way of an application to confirm under § 52-417, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the union's application.
In reaching its decision, the trial court noted that other arbitration statutes, such as General Statutes § 38a-9 (b) (2), which governs disputes between insurance companies and claimants, and General Statutes § 42-181 (c) (4), which pertains to disputes between automobile manufacturers and consumers, specifically authorize judicial review of arbitration awards by use of applications to vacate, to modify and to confirm, whereas § 7-473c (d) contains no such language. In the trial court's view, this omission was significant because, if the legislature had wanted to authorize judicial review of an interest arbitration award by way of an application to confirm, it simply could have stated as much, as it did in the other statutory provisions. Finally, the trial court observed that, contrary to the assertions of the union, it was apparent that no further action was required to finalize and render binding on the parties a collective bargaining agreement resulting from interest arbitration conducted pursuant to § 7-473c because subsection (d) (10) of that statute expressly provides that "[t]he decision of the panel and the resolved issues shall be final and binding" on the parties.
On appeal, the union claims that the trial court improperly dismissed its application to confirm the interest arbitration award. The union contends that, even if statutes authorizing judicial review of arbitration awards are in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed, § 7-473c, unlike those provisions, is a remedial statute and, as such, should be liberally construed to permit confirmation of an interest arbitration award. The union argues that the purpose of § 7-473c is "to provide for the orderly and timely resolution of labor disputes" and that interpreting § 7-473c to authorize applications to confirm furthers this goal by "provid[ing] parties to binding [interest] arbitration assurance that the outcome [of the arbitration proceeding] will be respected and enforced." We reject the union's contention.9
It is well established that MERA "imposes compulsory arbitration on a municipality and the representatives of its employees whenever the parties have reached an impasse in their collective bargaining." International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 564 v. Jewett City , 234 Conn. 123, 124, 661 A.2d 573 (1995) ; see General Statutes § 7-473c (b). The primary purpose of interest arbitration under § 7-473c "is to avoid strikes and their attendant disruptions of municipal services by providing a mechanism to resolve by arbitration those issues concerning which the parties to an expiring municipal collective bargaining agreement have been unable to reach agreement by negotiations." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 131, 661 A.2d 573 ; see also C. Fisk & A. Pulver, " First Contract Arbitration and the Employee Free Choice Act," 70 La. L. Rev. 47, 50 (2009) (...
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