Brassard v. McCarthy, 1099
| Decision Date | 17 January 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 1099,1099 |
| Citation | 83 R.I. 479,120 A.2d 325 |
| Parties | Alfred J. BRASSARD, Jr., et al. v. Lawrence A. McCARTHY, Mayor. M. P. . Feb. 2, as of |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
Raymond F. Henderson, J. Frederick Murphy, Pawtucket, for petitioners.
John A. O'Neill, City Sol., Harvey J. Ryan, Asst. City Sol., Pawtucket, for respondent.
This is a petition for certiorari to quash the records of certain actions by the respondent mayor of the city of Pawtucket in hearing and deciding a charge that the petitioner Alfred J. Brassard, Jr. was guilty of 'misconduct' in his office as a member or commissioner of the housing authority of said city and in removing him therefrom on such ground. We issued the writ and pursuant thereto the pertinent records have been certified to this court.
The case was briefed and argued before us together with an amended petition in equity in the nature of quo warranto entitled Powers ex rel. Brassard v. Brunelle, R.I., 120 A.2d 328, which involves conflicting claims to the same office of commissioner of the housing authority.
It appears from the record in the instant case that petitioner Alfred J. Brassard, Jr. was duly appointed and qualified as a commissioner of the Housing Authority of the City of Pawtucket on July 14, 1952 pursuant to General Laws 1938 chapter 344; and that the respondent mayor on July 14, 1954, acting under § 8 of said statute, preferred a certain charge against petitioner which appears in the written notice to him as follows:
The petitioner's attorneys on July 29, 1954 notified the respondent in writing in substance that § 8 of the above-mentioned statute, which authorizes the mayor to remove a commissioner on charges, also provides that notice of the charges must be given an accused at least ten days before trial thereon; that it was then four days before the date assigned for trial by respondent in his notice; that no specification of the alleged misconduct had been received by petitioner; and that in the circumstances respondent would be acting without or in excess of his authority if he proceeded to an actual trial on August 2, 1954. Accordingly they suggested that such date be canceled and that no trial be held until ten days subsequent to their receipt of a copy of the charges.
When the respondent failed to give any further specification or to cancel the date for trial, the petitioner's attorneys appeared on the day of trial as fixed in the notice and entered a special appearance. They then renewed their challenge to the mayor's jurisdiction to proceed to trial at that time without first having given a statement of the charge so that they might know the offense with which petitioner was charged. The respondent, however, interpreted the notice and charge of 'misconduct' as sufficient compliance with the pertinent provisions of the statute and denied petitioner's request. Thereupon petitioner and his attorneys standing on the special appearance and challenge to the respondent's jurisdiction to proceed further at that time, withdrew from participation and the trial proceeded. Evidence was introduced and thereafter respondent rendered a decision against petitioner and removed him from office. As a result of such actions Clovis D. Brunelle was then appointed to the office of commissioner to fill the vacancy caused by said removal of petitioner.
The charge of 'misconduct' was preferred by respondent in the language of G.L. 1938, chap. 344, § 8, which reads as follows:
In our judgment a charge as made in the language of the statute is valid for the purposes of notifying the accused of the commencement of proceedings against him and of clothing the mayor with jurisdiction generally over the subject matter. However, we are also of the opinion that in order to justify proceeding further to an actual trial 'the charge must be sufficiently explicit to support itself.' State v. Spink, 19 R.I. 353, 354, 36 A. 91. In other words, if the charge is stated in the language of the statute,...
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Nocera Bros. Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Liquor Control Hearing Bd.
...did not vitiate the proceeding but merely exempted the accused from going to trial until such particulars were furnished. Brassard v. McCarthy, R.I., 120 A.2d 325. In the case at bar we think the administrator's letter to petitioner may be reasonably deemed tantamount to charging it with a ......
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Powers ex rel. Brassard v. Brunelle, 2330
...Laws 1938, chapter 344, § 8. The case was briefed and argued before us together with the petition for certiorari entitled Brassard v. McCarthy, R.I., 120 A.2d 325, in which our opinion has this day been In view of the decision in the latter case, wherein the records of the actions complaine......