Braswell v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Ga.

• Decision Date: 26 April 2005
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A.1:04-CV-2583-TWT.,Civ.A.1:04-CV-2583-TWT.
• Citation: 369 F.Supp.2d 1371
• Parties: Mari Louise BRASWELL, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

369 F.Supp.2d 1371

Mari Louise BRASWELL, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA, et al., Defendants.

No. Civ.A.1:04-CV-2583-TWT.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

April 26, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Julian Hue Henry, Office of J. Hue Henry, Athens, GA, for Mari Louise Braswell.

Joseph C. Chancey, Kelleen Huang Hubbs, Drew Eckl & Farnham, Atlanta, GA, Edward D. Tolley, Cook Noell Tolley Bates & Michael, Athens, GA, for University of Georgia Athletic Association, Inc.

Bryan K. Webb, Office of State Attorney General, Atlanta, GA, for Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia.

OPINION AND ORDER

THRASH, District Judge.

This is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. The Plaintiff asserts violations of her rights secured by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. It is before the Court on the Defendant University of Georgia Athletic Association, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 15], and the Defendants Michael F. Adams, Frank Crumley, Damon Evans, and the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia's Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 16]. The Defendant Athletic Association's motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Defendants Adams, Crumley, Evans, and the Board of Regents' motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. All claims for monetary damages are dismissed. The Plaintiff's claim for permanent injunctive relief may proceed to a final disposition on the merits by motions for summary judgment or trial.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Marilou Braswell was employed by Defendant Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia ("Board of Regents") as the coordinator of the University of Georgia cheerleading program. Defendant Michael F. Adams is the president of the University of Georgia and the chairman of the Board of the Defendant University of Georgia Athletic Association, Inc. (the "Athletic Association"). Defendant Frank Crumley is employed as senior associate athletic director. Defendant Damon Evans was employed as an associate athletic director and is currently athletic director at the University. The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Crumley and Evans are employees of the Athletic Association. They contend that they are employees of Defendant Board of Regents.

Braswell alleges in her Complaint that she is a Christian. She states in her Complaint that as cheerleading coordinator she permitted and participated in team prayers. She also alleges that her husband, an ordained Christian minister, conducted Bible study classes in their home that were attended by University of Georgia cheerleaders. In 2003, two Jewish cheerleaders complained to the athletic department that Braswell had discriminated against them based on their religion. The two cheerleaders alleged that Braswell used her position to encourage students to adopt certain religious practices and treated non-Christian cheerleaders unfavorably.

One of the Jewish cheerleaders pursued a formal complaint against Braswell. As a result of this complaint and the University's investigation of it, the University placed Braswell on disciplinary probation. Defendant Evans sent a letter to Braswell dated November 23, 2003, outlining the terms of her probation. The letter stated that:

In addition, there are to be no more religious overtones in your program. This includes, but is not limited to the following: bible studies, prayers on the list serve, utilizing the name of religious figures which has the potential of eliminating persons of a different faith, etc. It should be noted that further violation of University Policy regarding religious discrimination will subject you to termination.

(Pl.'s Mot. T.R.O., Ex. 32.) The University also accommodated the complaining student by giving her an extra year to cheer and placing her, without a tryout, on the football cheerleading squad.

Braswell vehemently objected to the University's handling of the complaint and the complaining cheerleader. She asked for guidance from the University as to what to say concerning the accommodations made to the complaining cheerleader. Her supervisor, Defendant Crumley, instructed her to say that the accommodation was made at the Athletic Association's directive. Instead, on August 7, 2004, Braswell read a prepared statement to the entire cheerleading squad, including the complaining cheerleader. It read, in its entirety as follows:

On or about June, 2003, [NAME REDACTED] issued a complaint with the UGA Legal Affairs Department accusing me of religious discrimination against her. It is my position that her accusations are totally without merit. I have retained counsel to investigate the matter and prove my position.

However, because the allegations were made, the UGA Athletic Department has mandated that [NAME REDACTED] be placed, without having to try out, on this squad.

Because this is an ongoing investigation, I will have no further comment regarding this situation at this time, except to say this. From this point forward, we will act in a manner that is consistent with what is the "greater good" for this squad. [NAME REDACTED] is a member of this team and is to be treated like any other member. I will not tolerate any negative action, discussion or comments regarding [NAME REDACTED], as a result of this situation. We will move on with the business of being the best cheer squad that we can be.

(Compl., Ex. A.)

As a result, on August 23, 2004, Defendant Crumley sent a letter to Braswell terminating her employment. (Pl.Mot.TRO., Ex. 46.) In the letter, he advised Braswell that her reading of her prepared statement had violated University policy. (Id.) The letter further noted that based on a totality of the circumstances and complaints received by the University, Crumley no longer had confidence in Braswell's ability to exercise the judgment and leadership required of her position. (Id.) Braswell appealed her termination to Defendant Evans, who affirmed Crumley's decision.

On September 2, 2004, Braswell filed this action, alleging four constitutional violations: (1) deprivation of free exercise of religion; (2) deprivation of freedom of speech; (3) deprivation of due process of law; and (4) deprivation of equal protection of the laws. On October 14, Braswell moved for injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order or a temporary injunction. She requested that this Court order the Defendants to reinstate her as coordinator of the University's cheerleading program. Upon reinstatement, she requested that this Court prohibit further deprivation of her rights of freedom of religion and speech and bar enforcement of the University's nondiscrimination policy. The Court heard oral argument on Braswell's motion for a temporary restraining order on December 21, 2004, and verbally denied the motion.

On November 1, Defendants Adams, Crumley, Evans and the Board of Regents moved to dismiss Braswell's claims for failure to state a claim. These Defendants contend that they are immune from monetary liability and that Braswell's claims for injunctive relief fail on the merits. On November 2, the Athletic Association moved to dismiss Braswell's claims as against it.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

A complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only where it appears beyond doubt that no set of facts could support the plaintiff's claims for relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir.1992). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the facts pleaded in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Quality Foods de Centro America, S.A. v. Latin American Agribusiness Dev. Corp., S.A., 711 F.2d 989, 994-95 (11th Cir.1983). Generally, notice pleading is all that is required for a valid complaint. See Lombard's, Inc. v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 753 F.2d 974, 975 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1082, 106 S.Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed.2d 892 (1986). Under notice pleading, the plaintiff need only give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The University of Georgia Athletic Association

Braswell names the University of Georgia Athletic Association as a Defendant. The Athletic Association contends that Braswell fails to state a claim as against it. The Athletic Association maintains that it was not involved, directly or indirectly, in the hiring, probation, termination or any other employment decision involving Braswell. Nor, it argues, is it responsible under a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of Adams, Crumley, or Evans.

Braswell's Complaint states that she was employed by the Athletic Association. (Compl., ¶ 8). The Complaint also states that Crumley and Evans were and are employed by the Athletic Association. (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7). The Athletic Association's briefs and supporting affidavits reveal that Braswell and the individual Defendants were employees of the Board of Regents of the University of Georgia, not the Athletic Association. (Huckaby Aff. ¶¶ 10, 16-17). For this reason, the Court issued an Order directing Braswell to show cause why the Athletic Association is a proper Defendant to this action. In her response, Braswell asserts that even if neither she nor the individual Defendants are formally listed as employees of the Athletic Association, they are agents of the association, which as principal is liable for the actions of the individual Defendants taken on its behalf. She cites the Court of Appeals of Georgia's recent decision in MCG Health, Inc. v. Nelson, 270 Ga.App. 409, 606 S.E.2d 576 (2004), for a restatement and proper application of Georgia law of agency and employment. The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the primary consideration in determining whether an employment relationship...