Bratcher v. Pharmaceutical Product Development

• Decision Date: 07 April 2008
• Docket Number: No. 5:07-CV-451-D.,5:07-CV-451-D.
• Citation: 545 F.Supp.2d 533
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Parties: Carol Holder BRATCHER, Plaintiff, v. PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT, INC., Defendant.

545 F.Supp.2d 533

Carol Holder BRATCHER, Plaintiff, v. PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT, INC., Defendant.

No. 5:07-CV-451-D.

United States District Court, E.D. North Carolina, Western Division.

April 7, 2008.

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Annette Exum, Exum Law Group, Rose Marie Pahl, Raleigh, NC, for Plaintiff.

Michael Murchison, Andrew Kent McVey, Murchison, Taylor & Gibson, PLLC, Wilmington, NC, for Defendant.

ORDER

JAMES C. DEVER III, District Judge.

On October 19, 2007, plaintiff Carol Holder Bratcher ("Bratcher") filed this action in Wake County Superior Court against her former employer, defendant Pharmaceutical Product Development, Inc. ("PPD").¹ Bratcher, an African-American female, alleges numerous claims against PPD including employment discrimination on the basis of age, race, and sex, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). On November 15, 2007, defendant removed the action to this court. Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or alternatively, moves for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). As explained below, the court grants defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, dismisses the complaint without prejudice, and dismisses defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings as moot.

I.

According to the complaint, PPD employed Bratcher as a senior analyst from 2000 until November 1, 2006, when PPD terminated her employment. Compl. ¶¶ 6-9. At the time of her termination, Bratcher was 42 years old. Id. ¶ 10. Bratcher alleges that her termination was "motivated solely by the Defendant's intent to discriminate against [her] on the basis of her race, gender and age and with a retaliatory effort." Id. ¶ 11. Bratcher identifies her supervisor John Glisson ("Glisson") as the PPD decisionmaker with respect to the alleged employment discrimination. See id.

In support of her claims, Bratcher alleges the following discriminatory conduct. Shortly after Bratcher began working at PPD, PPD re-classified her position and downgraded her salary. Id. ¶ 48. A younger counterpart who performed the same or similar job functions as Bratcher, but who had less experience, allegedly received a higher pay grade. Id. ¶¶ 12-17. According to Bratcher, PPD excluded her from "mentoring status" due to her age. Id. ¶¶ 23-24, 41-45. Bratcher alleges that in March 2003, her supervisor, Glisson, promoted a younger Caucasian female who did not have the requisite experience and told Bratcher that she would not be promoted to that position. Id. ¶ 32. In August or September 2006, PPD modified Bratcher's job description, which resulted in diminished responsibility. Id. ¶¶ 60-61. Bratcher alleges that in October 2006, she qualified for a designer position which PPD advertised, but PPD did not promote her. Id. ¶¶ 46-47.

Additionally, Bratcher alleges that she continuously requested training necessary for advancement to the position of associate manager, but never received it. Id. ¶¶ 36-39. Unlike her male counterparts who maintained three supervisees, Bratcher states that she never supervised more than one individual. Id. ¶¶ 69-70. Bratcher alleges that her team of supervisees,² who were all African-American, also failed to receive adequate training despite Bratcher's requests. Id. ¶¶ 53-54. As a result, performance evaluations "reflected negative outcomes which jeopardized the employment opportunities for advancement." Id. ¶ 55. Bratcher alleges that her supervisor did not support her or insist that her instructions be followed. Id. ¶ 58.

In support of her retaliation claim, Bratcher states that when she reported alleged discriminatory conduct favoring an East Indian contractor who received training which made him eligible for promotion, PPD transferred her and continued to refuse her training. Id. ¶¶ 71-75. Bratcher alleges that PPD "immediately began a series of acts that affected her ability for promotions and work assignments," including decreasing her supervisory duties to file management duties and prohibiting her from attending weekly meetings with Glisson. Id. ¶¶ 76-80. Bratcher also alleges that PPD denied her request for office space, but granted three Caucasians' requests, despite assurances that she would receive the next available office. Id. 78-84. Bratcher contends that these actions gave her a perceived position of lesser rank among her peers. Id. ¶¶ 84-85. Rather than investigating the office space matter, PPD placed Bratcher on a corrective action plan and allegedly used past excused absences for disciplinary purposes. Id. ¶¶ 86-89. According to the complaint, PPD terminated Bratcher's employment on November 1, 2006, after she refused to sign an amended corrective action plan. Id. ¶¶ 9, 91-93.

On May 21, 2007, Bratcher filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging discrimination on the basis of age, race, sex, and retaliation. See Def.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss [hereinafter "Def.'s Mem."] Ex. 1. The EEOC charge states that the alleged discrimination occurred on November 1, 2006 — the date of Bratcher's termination. Id. On July 16, 2007, the EEOC dismissed plaintiffs charge and issued a right-to-sue letter indicating that Bratcher's "charge was not timely filed with [the] EEOC" and that Bratcher "waited too long after the date(s) of the alleged discrimination to file [her] charge." See Def.'s Mem. Ex. 2.³ On October 19, 2007, Bratcher filed this action against PPD in Wake County Superior Court alleging the following claims for relief: (1) age discrimination; (2) race discrimination; (3) sex discrimination; (4) retaliation; (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (7) bad faith; (8) negligent hiring; (9) negligent supervision; and (10) punitive damages. PPD removed the action to this court, and seeks dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or alternatively, judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).

II.

In analyzing a motion to dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," a court must determine whether the complaint is legally and factually sufficient. See Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, ___-___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1968-70, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Kloth v. Microsoft Corp., 444 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir.2006); accord Erickson v. Pardus, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam). A court need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts. Similarly, "[a court] need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Kloth, 444 F.3d at 319. The court addresses plaintiffs claims seriatim.

A.

Bratcher alleges that PPD discriminated against her based on her age, race, and sex, and retaliated against her. See Compl. ¶¶ 7-94. Although Bratcher is not proceeding pro se, Bratcher's complaint is very poorly drafted. In ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss, the court construes the complaint to rely on Title VII, the ADEA, and North Carolina law.

1.

Bratcher's complaint includes claims of age, race, and sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the ADEA. See Compl. ¶¶ 7-94. To challenge an alleged unlawful employment practice under Title VII or the ADEA, a plaintiff must first file a timely charge with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). "[I]f the employee does not submit a timely EEOC charge, the employee may not challenge that practice in court." Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., ___ U.S. ___, ___-___, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 2166-67, 167 L.Ed.2d 982 (2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); accord Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 122, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002),

Under Title VII and the ADEA, a plaintiff typically has 180 days following the alleged unlawful employment practice to file an EEOC charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1); see Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122, 122 S.Ct. 2061; Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 428-29 (4th Cir.2004). The statutory filing period is extended to 300 days in a deferral state⁴ if the plaintiff "initially instituted proceedings with a [designated Fair Employment Practices ('FEP')] State or local agency." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d)(2), 633(b).

A FEP agency "is a state or local agency that enforces state and local civil rights laws. The jurisdiction of such agencies overlaps that of the EEOC." EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 410 n. 15 (4th Cir.2005) (internal citations omitted). A FEP agency has jurisdiction with respect to charges covering employment practices under section 706(c) of Title VII. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.70(a) (2007). Section 706(c) pertains to allegedly unlawful employment practices occurring in states that have "a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice ... upon receiving notice thereof ..." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). The deferral agency system permits state or local FEP agencies to remedy alleged race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability, or age discrimination concurrently regulated by state or local law and Title VII or the ADEA. See id. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 633; 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.13(a)(3)(i), 1626.7, 1626.9; Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 469, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982); Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d at 410,

Bratcher claims that the alleged age, race, and sex discrimination and retaliation occurred on November 1, 2006, the date of her termination. See Def.'s Mem. Ex....