Bratton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.

• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
• Writing for the Court: Before WALLACE and TANG; WALLACE
• Citation: Bratton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 649 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1980)
• Decision Date: 17 December 1980
• Docket Number: No. 77-2133,77-2133
• Parties: 26 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 783, 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,290, 26 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,000 Charles H. BRATTON, Guadalupe Galvan, Jr., Jim Haley, John Retamosa, Jr., Cleotha Starks, James E. Toney and Clevron Tucker, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION and Local 1845 United Steel Workers of America, Defendants-Appellees.

Page 658

649 F.2d 658

26 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 783,

24 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,290,

26 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,000

Charles H. BRATTON, Guadalupe Galvan, Jr., Jim Haley, John Retamosa, Jr., Cleotha Starks, James E. Toney and Clevron Tucker, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BETHLEHEM STEEL CORPORATION and Local 1845 United Steel Workers of America, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 77-2133.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 4, 1980.

Decided Sept. 29, 1980.

As Amended Dec. 17, 1980.

Martha Goldin, Hollywood, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Laurence D. Steinsapir, Los Angeles, Cal., on brief; Rudolph L. Milasich, Jr., Pittsburgh, Pa., Everett F. Meiners and William H. Emer, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before WALLACE and TANG, Circuit Judges, and HANSON, ^* District Judge.

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

Seven individual employees, who joined their separate actions alleging racial discrimination in a single complaint before the district court, appeal from the district court's award of summary judgment in favor of defendants Bethlehem Steel Corporation (the Company) and Local 1845 of the United Steelworkers of America (the Union). Each of the plaintiffs alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and of the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). The Company and the Union moved for summary judgment on five separate grounds: (1) the plaintiffs' Title VII actions were barred by the applicable California statute of limitations; (2) four of the plaintiffs had not filed timely charges with the EEOC, thus barring their Title VII claims; (3) the applicable California statute of limitations barred the plaintiffs' section 1981 actions; (4) there were no genuine issues of material fact; and (5) plaintiffs' individual actions were barred by a consent decree, to which none of these plaintiffs was a party, entered in a previous EEOC pattern and practice action brought against the major steel organizations (including the Company and the Union). In addition, the Union argued that the doctrine of laches barred the plaintiffs' Title VII and section 1981 claims against it. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Company and Union on the argued grounds. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

I

Plaintiffs have not brought a class action. Each of the individual claims must be evaluated on its own merits, and must be considered separately against the Company and the Union. It is thus necessary to set forth the facts as alleged in each plaintiff's complaint.

Charles Bratton (Bratton), a black person, has been employed at the Company, primarily as a welder, since 1950, except for a three-year period during 1973-1976 when he worked full-time as president of the Union. He was a member of the Union's bargaining unit at all relevant times. On April 4, 1967, Bratton filed a Title VII charge with the EEOC, alleging that the Company had denied him a promotion to supervisor on account of his race. This charge was settled by conciliation. The conciliation agreement provided that Bratton would release the Company from further liability based on this charge. Bratton claims that he never signed this agreement; the Company urges that Bratton acquiesced in its terms.

On August 4, 1969, Bratton filed a second charge, against both the Company and the Union, alleging that he was not allowed to call fellow on-duty workers to testify in his defense during a disciplinary hearing, although white workers were routinely permitted this privilege. The Company claims, in its affidavits, that Bratton voluntarily refused to call any witnesses. On May 3, 1976, the EEOC issued Bratton a "right to sue" letter, enabling Bratton to institute a private Title VII action concerning both the lack of promotion and the denial of the right to call witnesses. The instant action followed 64 days later, on July 6, 1976.

Bratton alleges in his complaint (1) that the Company has long maintained a system of distinct job classification for its black and Mexican-American employees; (2) that as part of this discriminatory policy Bratton was denied equal opportunities in regard to promotion, and terms and conditions of work; (3) that in 1976, upon his return to work following his three-year leave for service as Union president, the Company retaliated against him for his active protests against the Company's discriminatory employment practices by denying him a job transfer to a desirable department; and (4) that the Union failed, for racially discriminatory reasons, to represent Bratton adequately in grievance proceedings against the Company. In opposition to summary judgment, Bratton submitted an affidavit which details the facts underlying the allegations in his complaint.

Guadalupe Galvan (Galvan), a Mexican-American, has worked for the Company, primarily as a millwright, since 1967. He has been a member of the Union's bargaining unit during that entire period. On January 28, 1971, Galvan filed an EEOC charge against both the Company and the Union, claiming that the Company discriminatorily denied him a promotion and parity of pay with white workers in his job classification, and that the Union failed to represent him fairly. He received a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC on May 3, 1976. Galvan, like each of the other plaintiffs, joined his complaint to Bratton's and incorporates by reference Bratton's allegations concerning the Company's and the Union's discriminatory actions. In addition, Galvan alleges by affidavit that in October 1975 he was harassed on the job and unequally treated with regard to testing for promotion, for racially discriminatory reasons. He claims that this harassment and unequal treatment continues to the present. He further alleges that the Union has not cooperated in pursuing his grievances.

Clevron Tucker (Tucker), a black person, has worked for the Company since 1951, primarily as a truck driver, and has been at all relevant times a member of the Union's bargaining unit. On December 1, 1971, he filed an EEOC charge against both the Company and the Union alleging that the Company had discriminated against him in pay, days off, and shift assignments, and that the Union had failed properly to represent him, all on account of his race. He received a "right to sue" letter on May 3, 1976. In his affidavit opposing summary judgment, Tucker alleges that he was passed over for promotion for racially discriminatory reasons on several occasions, as recently as "around 1973." He further alleges that the Company presently discriminates in assigning trucks to its various drivers, and that black truck drivers are assigned broken-down trucks, which results in these drivers receiving lower pay than Mexican-American and white drivers.

James Haley (Haley), a black person, has worked for the Company as an automobile and truck mechanic, and has been a member of the Union's bargaining unit, since 1950. He filed an EEOC charge against the Company on April 12, 1972, claiming that he was discriminated against because of his race in testing, promotion, wages, and work assignments. He received a "right to sue" letter on May 3, 1976. In his affidavit, Haley claims that as recently as December 12, 1976, he was unfairly disciplined because of his race, in that he was written up for lateness to work while tardy whites were given only verbal warnings. He further claims that the Union has refused to help him process his resulting grievances.

Cleotha Starks (Starks), a black person, began working for the Company on March 30, 1973. On November 6, 1973, he filed an EEOC charge against the Company in which he alleged that the Company denied him a job transfer on account of his race. He was issued a "right to sue" letter on May 3, 1976. Starks incorporates by reference Bratton's charges of racial discrimination, but alleges no facts to support a charge of racial discrimination against himself. Starks claims only that he received less favorable work assignments than others with less seniority, and that he was required to resign for falsifying his employment record. He claims that a white employee was not discharged for "allegedly" falsifying employment records, but he does not indicate whether the white worker's "alleged" offense was actually proven. The Company's affidavits offer credible, non-racial reasons for Starks' discharge.

James Toney (Toney), a black person, began working for the Company in 1969 as a time-study technician. He was laid off on January 29, 1971. He has never been a member of the Union bargaining unit. Toney filed a charge with the EEOC on February 3, 1971, alleging that he was harassed on the job by his supervisor, denied a promotion to the accounting department, and laid off. Toney's charge set forth no reasons to suppose that these actions were taken on account of his race. He received a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC on May 3, 1976. Although Toney, like the other plaintiffs, incorporates by reference Bratton's generalized discrimination charges, Toney does not allege facts suggesting that he was subjected to or affected by racial discrimination. He does allege that two whites in his department remained employed when he was laid off during a Company-wide reduction in its labor force, but he does not allege that his layoff was due to his race, nor that the Company's work-force reduction impacted disproportionately on blacks. Moreover, Toney does not contest evidence contained in an affidavit of Lou Goodness, Superintendent of Labor Relations and Personnel Services at the Company plant where Toney worked, that Toney was laid off in accordance with normal, nondiscriminatory practices.

John Retamosa (Retamosa), a Mexican-American, began working for the Company in 1968 as a laborer, and was a member of the Union bargaining unit....