Bratton v. Gunn, 89-37
| Decision Date | 09 October 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-37,89-37 |
| Citation | 300 Ark. 140,777 S.W.2d 219 |
| Parties | Wade BRATTON, Appellant, v. H. Leland GUNN, d/b/a Gunn Systems, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Gerald Carlyle, Newport, H. David Blair, Batesville, for appellant.
David N. Laser, Todd Williams, Jonesboro, for appellee.
Gunn Systems, Inc., sued appellant Wade Bratton, its insurance agent, alleging that Bratton collected insurance premiums but did not obtain insurance coverage. The complaint asserted that appellant had "fraudulently converted Plaintiff's funds for his own use and deliberately failed to provide Plaintiff with insurance coverage." Subsequently, appellant filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Gunn Systems, Inc., had no corporate existence. An amended and substituted complaint was filed in the name of Leland Gunn, d/b/a Gunn Systems, appellee herein. The allegations and remedies sought in the amended and substituted complaint remained identical for all practical purposes.
Appellant denied the allegations and affirmatively stated that the insurance coverage had been obtained. Later, appellant moved again for summary judgment, attaching affidavits and exhibits which tended to refute entirely the factual and legal allegations contained in the amended and substituted complaint. No response to the motion for summary judgment was filed, and on the day before the hearing on that motion the appellee filed for, and obtained, a voluntary nonsuit.
Shortly before the nonsuit was entered, appellant filed a motion for ARCP Rule 11 sanctions, attached to which were an affidavit executed by appellant's attorney and other exhibits. Appellee responded, stating that he and his counsel believed the pleadings filed were well grounded in fact and denied that the suit was initiated for an improper purpose.
On October 7, 1988, counsel for both parties appeared before the trial court for a hearing on the Rule 11 motion. No testimony was taken, no exhibits were introduced and no record was made of the proceedings. On November 2, 1988, the trial court entered its order, which is quoted in its entirety:
The Court, having considered the defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, finds that the Motion is without merit and that sanctions should not be granted.
IT IS THEREFORE CONSIDERED, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant's Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions should fail and sanctions against Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel should not be imposed.
From this order, appellant appeals. The record on appeal consists solely of the pleadings, the affidavits and exhibits attached to them, and the order denying sanctions.
We considered Rule 11 in Miles v. Southern, 297 Ark. 274, 760 S.W.2d 868 (1988). We indicated our agreement with the approach taken by the 8th Circuit in O'Connell v. Champion Int'l. Corp., 812 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.1987), in that the imposition of sanctions is a serious matter to be handled with circumspection and that the trial court's decision was due substantial deference. The gist of the holding in Miles was that the appellant had not demonstrated error.
We start our analysis of this Rule 11 case by noting that the rule provides (1) that the signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or paper filed in the judicial proceedings, and (2) that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, those documents are well grounded in fact and are warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or renewal of existing law. The rule further provides that the pleading, motion or other paper is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. Rule 11 also provides for mandatory sanctions when the rule has been violated. Whether a violation of Rule 11 has occurred is a matter for the court to determine. While this determination involves...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Foust v. Montez-Torres
...a brief. This is because the burden is always on the appellant to demonstrate error in the circuit court's decree. Bratton v. Gunn, 300 Ark. 140, 777 S.W.2d 219 (1989). Additionally, contrary to the dissent's assertion, our review is not limited to those grounds elucidated by the circuit co......
-
Caplener v. Bluebonnet Mill. Co.
...The Trial Court has discretion in determining whether a violation occurred. Whetstone v. Chadduck, supra; See also Bratton v. Gunn, 300 Ark. 140, 777 S.W.2d 219 (1989). Only if this discretion is abused will we reverse. Whetstone v. Chadduck, supra; Ward v. Dapper Dan Cleaners and Laundry, ......
-
Young v. Young
...292 Ark. 225, 729 S.W.2d 156 (1987). It is appellant's burden to bring up a record sufficient to demonstrate error. Bratton v. Gunn, 300 Ark. 140, 777 S.W.2d 219 (1989). When an appellant fails to demonstrate error we affirm. Jenkins v. Goldsby, 307 Ark. 558, 822 S.W.2d 842 (1992). We will ......
-
Warr v. Williamson
...has occurred, the Rule makes sanctions mandatory. Id. The moving party has the burden to prove a violation of Rule 11. Bratton v. Gunn, 300 Ark. 140, 777 S.W.2d 219 (1989). The imposition of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 is a serious matter to be handled with circumspection, and the trial c......
-
Appendix E Model Reply Brief
...can't bootstrap evidence from a later motion to support a sanctions motion, especially when she didn't below. See Bratton v. Gunn, 300 Ark. 140, 143, 777 S.W.2d 219, 221 (1989) (refusing to consider other evidence in the record when reviewing Rule 11 order). Because Williams didn't support ......