Bratton v. Roadway Package System, Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 February 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-1560,95-1560
• Citation: 77 F.3d 168
• Parties: 70 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 178, 67 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,942 Warren L. BRATTON and Eugenia Bratton, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ROADWAY PACKAGE SYSTEM, INCORPORATED, Edward Howenstein, Scott Kolling, Cheryl Barcus and Fred Coffman, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 168

77 F.3d 168

70 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 178,

67 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,942

Warren L. BRATTON and Eugenia Bratton, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. ROADWAY PACKAGE SYSTEM, INCORPORATED, Edward Howenstein Scott Kolling, Cheryl Barcus and Fred Coffman Defendants-Appellees.

No. 95-1560.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued Sept. 29, 1995.

Decided Feb. 22, 1996.

Douglas M. Grimes (argued), Gary, IN, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Douglas J. Heckler (argued), Barnes & Thornburg, Indianapolis, IN, Jill D. Jones Barnes & Thornburg, Elkhart, IN, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before CUMMINGS, FLAUM and MANION, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge.

Warren Bratton ("Mr. Bratton") delivered packages as an independent contractor for Roadway Package System, Inc. ("RPS") from February 1990 until February 1994. For several years Mr. Bratton's wife, Eugenia Bratton ("Mrs. Bratton"), assisted Mr. Bratton by delivering packages in vehicles owned by the Brattons. In February of 1994, RPS terminated Mr. Bratton's contract, and the instant suit followed against RPS and several of its employees (the defendants will be referred to collectively as "RPS"). Mr. Bratton alleged breach of contract, race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a first amendment violation, and failure to pay vacation pay. Mrs. Bratton alleged race and sex discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of RPS on all counts. The Brattons appeal the district court's decision with respect to the breach of contract claim and the race and sex discrimination claims.

I.

As we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we present the facts in the light most favorable to the Brattons, the non-moving party. Zenith Electronics Corp. v. Panalpina, Inc., 68 F.3d 197, 201 (7th Cir.1995). Warren Bratton, an African American, entered into a written contract with RPS to pick up and deliver packages in the Elkhart, Indiana area. The contract, drafted by RPS, was entitled "Agreement for Leased Equipment and Independent Contractor Services" ("the Agreement") and was dated February 26, 1990. In the Agreement, RPS identified itself as a "duly licensed common and contract carrier by motor vehicle" operating under authority from the Interstate Commerce Commission and state agencies. Mr. Bratton was identified as an independent contractor.

Pursuant to the Agreement, RPS leased from Mr. Bratton a certain vehicle listed on an addendum to the Agreement, namely a 1990 step van owned by Bratton ("leased equipment"). Mr. Bratton was specifically required to maintain the leased equipment in "accordance with the safety and equipment standards specified in applicable" federal, state, and municipal laws, and Department of Transportation ("DOT") regulations. In fact, many of the provisions in the contract referred exclusively to the leased equipment, including sections on equipment identification requirements, insurance coverage, operating expenses, and liability. However, paragraph eleven of the Agreement stated generally that "[RPS] and [Bratton] each agree to abide by all applicable federal, state and municipal laws and regulations." There is no reference to leased equipment in this section. In addition, in paragraph two of the Agreement, Mr. Bratton agreed to "be responsible for the proper performance of [the] Agreement in accordance with all applicable federal, state and municipal laws, regulations and orders."

Paragraph twelve permitted Mr. Bratton to employ persons to assist him in performing his contractual obligations, but required that "[a]ll persons so employed by [Bratton] shall be qualified pursuant to U.S. Department of Transportation safety standards." The section further provided that such qualified persons:

shall be considered employees or agents of [Bratton], ... and shall be subject to [Bratton]'s exclusive direction and control including the selection, hiring, firing, supervising, directing, training, setting of wages, hours and working conditions.... [Bratton] further agrees to:

A. Bear all expenses associated with qualifying persons employed including, without limitation, the cost of physical examinations, drug screen tests and securing motor vehicle records....

Paragraph thirty-two of the Agreement granted Mr. Bratton the right to terminate the contract upon thirty days written notice, and either party the right to terminate the contract "if the other party breaches this Agreement."

Shortly after Mr. Bratton entered the Agreement with RPS, he determined that it would be helpful in meeting his service goals to have Mrs. Bratton, also an African American, deliver packages in another vehicle. To that end, from February of 1990 until August of 1993, Mrs. Bratton would often drive the Brattons' 1984 Ford Ecoliner van to the RPS Elkhart terminal and load it with RPS packages. She would then deliver the packages in a borrowed RPS uniform.

During this time Mr. Bratton did not assemble any documentation of Mrs. Bratton's qualifications, Mrs. Bratton did not submit a DOT application, and RPS did not approve Mrs. Bratton as an authorized driver or have any records of her employment. Mrs. Bratton did not participate in any pre-employment drug screening, nor did she keep any driving log or mileage chart. The van used by Mrs. Bratton was not approved by RPS as a second vehicle. However, it is evident from the record that the RPS Elkhart terminal manager, Fred Coffman, knew of and approved (if not encouraged) the employment of Mrs. Bratton and the use of the Ford Ecoliner. White contractors also used their personal vehicles to deliver RPS packages during this time. Mrs. Bratton, though, was the only black female that assisted a contractor with deliveries; in fact, she was the only female who assisted with deliveries.

In late August of 1993, Coffman did obtain some documentation from Mrs. Bratton, including a Contractor Information Sheet, a Drivers Annual Certification of Motor Vehicle Violations, a Physical Examination Certificate and Report, and a DOT Driver-Qualification Examination. Mrs. Bratton, though, did not fill out a complete DOT application, was not tested for drugs, and did not begin to maintain a driving log. Mrs. Bratton also did not provide documentation demonstrating that she had one year of verifiable commercial driving experience, which RPS required of all of its drivers. The Brattons' van remained unauthorized by RPS. Shortly thereafter, Coffman was terminated by RPS, in part because he allowed Contractors to use unapproved, unqualified drivers and vehicles.

Coffman was replaced by Cheryl Barcus in September of 1993. Barcus had discussions with Mr. Bratton on three different occasions in September 1993, October 1993, and November 1993. Each time Barcus advised Mr. Bratton that he could not use his personal vehicle or Mrs. Bratton to assist him because neither were DOT qualified or RPS approved. Mr. Bratton was told that his wife did not have a complete driver qualification file or one year verifiable driving experience. Barcus explained to Mr. Bratton exactly how to qualify Mrs. Bratton and have the van approved. Mr. Bratton refused to comply, claiming his contract did not cover additional vehicles and assistants, and that he had been using both the van and Mrs. Bratton for over two years with Coffman's approval. Barcus twice informed Mr. Bratton that his actions were no longer acceptable, and that if he continued them, his contract would be terminated. Mr. Bratton persisted in having his wife deliver packages in their personal van, and in February 1994 RPS terminated Mr. Bratton's contract pursuant to paragraph thirty-two.

Shortly before his termination, Mr. Bratton's delivery route was modified. His route had also been modified three times before. Mr. Bratton claims each modification resulted in a loss of customers and income. Mrs. Bratton testified in her deposition, however, that each time her husband's route was changed, he received more business. Mr. Bratton claims that following three of the four modifications, Gregg Robertson, a white male, was assigned to the profitable routes taken away from him. Mr. Bratton admitted that his contract did not provide for any specific route, and that he was not guaranteed any particular area. Mr. Bratton also conceded that white contractors' routes were also modified and that these drivers were unhappy with the changes.

After Mr. Bratton's termination, he and his wife brought this suit, alleging, among other claims, breach of contract, race discrimination and sex discrimination. On RPS' motion for summary judgment, the district court concluded that Mr. Bratton had breached his contract by violating certain DOT regulations, and thus RPS had a valid defense to the contract claim. The court also found that neither Mr. nor Mrs. Bratton could establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, and that Mrs. Bratton had no statutory basis for a sex discrimination claim. The court therefore granted RPS' motion for summary judgment.

II.

We review grants of summary judgment de novo, construing the record in the light most favorable to the motion's opponent. Zenith, 68 F.3d at 201. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings and supporting documents "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). If no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party, summary judgment should be granted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Where the party opposing a motion for summary judgment will bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, he must go beyond the pleadings and affirmatively establish a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Brattons appeal the decision of the district court, claiming the evidence...