Braun v. Craven

• Decision Date: 24 October 1898
• Citation: 51 N.E. 657,175 Ill. 401
• Parties: BRAUN v. CRAVEN.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

175 Ill. 401

51 N.E. 657

BRAUN

v.CRAVEN.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 24, 1898.

Appeal from circuit court, First district; James Goggin, Judge.

Action by Emma Braun against Thomas Craven. From a judgment of the appellate court (73 Ill. App. 189) reversing a judgment for plaintiff, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.William Prentiss, Russell M. Wing, and James Heckman, for appellant.

Pliny B. Smith and Morton V. Gilbert, for appellee.

The appellant sued appellee in an action on the case, and filed her declaraction, which contained four counts. The first count alleges that the plaintiff was living at the home of Julia Soper, in Evanston; that the defendant then and there entered the said house, and it then and there became and was the duty of the said defendant to conduct and demean himself in an orderly and peaceable manner, and to announce or give notice and warning of his approach to and into said house, and to the presence of the plaintiff; yet the defendant, wholly disregarding his duty in that behalf, neglected and wholly failed to announce his entry to the said house to the plaintiff or any other occupant thereof, but wrongfully and willfully then and there entered therein unbidden, and then and there stealthily, and without warning or announcement, entered the presence of the plaintiff, greatly surprising and shocking her; that the defendant then and there demeaned himself in the presence of the plaintiff in a violent and boisterous manner, using towards her violent, abusive, and threatening language, greatly frightening, terrifying, and shocking her, whereby she sustained a severe and permanent shock to her nervous system and mind, and otherwise sustained great and permanent bodily harm and injury, and became and was sick, sore, and disordered, and so remained thence hitherto, during all which time she suffered, and still does and will ever suffer, great pain. The second and third counts are substantially like the first. The fourth count alleges the plaintiff was in a bedroom in a certain dwelling, which dwelling was the home and residence of the plaintiff, and then alleges the facts substantially as set forth in the first count. A general demurrer to the declaration was interposed and overruled, and a plea of general issue was filed.

The evidence showed that appellant lived with her sister, who was a tenant of appellee. Appellee went to the house to collect rent. His conduct, actions, and language while there are alleged to have been so negligent that they caused the injury to appellant, by fright and mental shock, which resulted in serious physical impairment. The actions and language of appellee which are the basis of this suit are given by appellant and her witnesses substantially as follows: When appellee entered the house, his tenant, the sister of appellant, was having her household goods removed therefrom. Appellant testified as to what took place, as follows: ‘I was upstairs in my bedroom, sitting on the floor. Something made me look up, and Mr. Craven [appellee] waved his arms, and shouted. He seemed so big. I was flat on the floor. He said: ‘What are you doing here? I forbid you moving. If you attempt to move I will have a constable here in five minutes. I refuse to take possession of these premises.’ I was so frightened I was paralyzed with fear. I could not speak or move.' The brother of appellant testified: ‘I remember the day that we moved from Benson avenue down to Clark and Halsted streets. I saw the defendant at our home on that day. When I first saw him, he was standing just inside the bedroom door, where my sister, Mrs. Braun, was,-on the second floor. That bedroom was the northwest room. I heard him before I saw him. I heard him say: ‘Here! what are you doing? Don't you move. I refuse to take possession of these premises. I will have an officer here in five minutes to stop these goods.’ These words were spoken in a very loud and angry tone of voice. I was just out of sight, at the end of the hall, when he said, ‘Here! what are you doing? Don't you move;’ and then I came towards him to see what was the matter, not knowing what it was, and the rest of it I heard as he stood over her. She was sitting on the floor. As he was speaking these words, he was swinging his arms, and gesticulating very wildly. On hearing these words uttered by the defendant, I hurried to the front end of the hall, and saw him standing in the door. I went clear up to him. He was standing very close to my sister,-clear up to her, right by her side. She was sitting flat on the floor. He was close enough to have touched her with his hands if he had so desired to. I should say close up to her,-not six inches from her. Upon my going up there to where the defendant was, I said: ‘Here, what is the trouble here? What do you want?’ He turned to me, and said: ‘I refuse to take possession of these premises. I will have an officer here in five minutes to stop these goods.’ When he said these words, he was still close by my sister. I tried to stop him, and said, ‘What is the matter?’ and he turned around, and went downstairs as hard as he could go. He had a long, dark or black-very dark-ulster, or storm-coat ulster, I should say, and a black slouch hat, pair of overshoes or rubbers, or something of that sort. I did not hear him approach my sister's room or go up those stairs.' An expressman, Steen, testified: ‘He [defendant] told me to stop loading the goods. He opened the middle door, and walked very fast right up the stairs. He did not ring the bell. He wore stairs. He did not ring the bell. He wore went into the room where the plaintiff [Mrs. Braun] was, and said: ‘What are you doing here? I will have an officer here to stop these goods.’ He spoke at the top of his voice. He was angry. He stood in the doorway when he did this. Plaintiff was on her knees, packing. Her brother came in the room, and asked what was the matter. Defendant threw up his hands two or three times, and then went downstairs.' Another expressman, Schell, testified that he heard a little loud talking upstairs,-so loud that a man could hear it down to the first floor. No other witness for plaintiff in the trial court testified to any other acts or conduct as causing the alleged injury. Much additional evidence as to the effect of fright in causing injury was before the jury. A verdict was returned by the jury in favor of the plaintiff (appellant here) and her damage was assessed at $9,000. A motion for a new trial and a motion in arrest of judgment were both overruled, and judgment was entered on the verdict. The defendant, the appellee here, sued out a writ of error from the appellate court for the First district to review that judgment; and by the latter court the judgment of the superior court of Cook county was reversed, without remanding the cause, the appellate court holding, under the pleading and facts appearing in the record, there was no right of recovery. From that judgment of reversal, the plaintiff in the trial court, who was defendant in error in the appellate court, prosecutes this appeal.

PHILLIPS, J. (after stating the facts).

The declaration in this case charges appellee with negligence in approaching the room where appellant was, and in so speaking and acting in her presence as to cause her injury. This constitutes the entire allegation on which a recovery is sought under the various counts of this declaration. In addition to the evidence above recited, it is disclosed that appellee claimed there was rent due him, and he entered the house for the purpose of collecting the same before the tenant's goods should be removed therefrom. Under this state of facts, it is necessary to determine whether the language of the appellee, his manner of entering the house, and his acts therein, are such as can be held to constitute negligence, and whether the injury sustained by appellant was such as might have been foreseen, or was such a natural and probable consequence, under the surrounding circumstances, as might reasonably have been anticipated as the probable result of such acts and language. The principle is, damages which are recoverable for negligence must be such as are the natural and reasonable results of defendant's acts; and the consequences must be such as, in the ordinary course of things, would flow from the acts, and could be reasonably anticipated as a result thereof. Proximate damages are such as are the ordinary and natural results of the omission or commission of acts of negligence, and such as are usual and might have been reasonably expected. Remote damages are such as are the unusual and unexpected result, not reasonably to be anticipated from an accidental or unusual combination of circumstances,-a result beyond and over which the negligent party has no control. The law regards only the direct and proximate results of negligent acts as creating a liability against a defendant. Here, appellee approached the house, and entered the same, the door being ajar. So far as the averments of this declaration are concerned, he lawfully entered the house for the purpose of collecting rent. He passed noiselessly (because of wearing overshoes) up the stairs and along the hall, approached the door of the only room he saw occupied, and used the language and made the gestures testified to by the plaintiff's witnesses without impact with plaintiff's person. He then turned and left the room, and went hurriedly to the office of the justice of the peace. These acts could not, in the ordinary course of things, have been reasonably anticipated to cause a diseased condition of appellant,-to create in her a seriously diseased condition. Appellee might have reasonably anticipated that his acts would cause excitement, or even fright; but fright and excitement so seldom result in a practically incurable disease that, from the ordinary experience of mankind, such a result could not have been expected. The evidence for plaintiff was...