Braun v. Ultimate Jetcharters, Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 5:12CV1635 |
| Parties | CARRIE BRAUN, PLAINTIFF, v. ULTIMATE JETCHARTERS, INC., DEFENDANT. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
After a five-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff Carrie Braun ("plaintiff" or "Braun") on her state law retaliation claim, and awarded plaintiff compensatory damages of $70,250.00 and punitive damages of $100,000.00. (Doc. No. 105.) Amidst the flurry of post-trial motion practice, and at the request of plaintiff, the Court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, in accordance with the jury's verdict. (Doc. No. 109.) Following the entry of judgment, plaintiff moved for attorney's fees (Doc. No. 115), and defendant Ultimate Jetcharters, Inc. ("UJC") filed an appeal from the judgment. (Notice of Appeal, Doc. No. 129.) The Sixth Circuit has held the appeal in abeyance while this Court resolves the parties' post-trial motions. (See Doc. No. 132.)
On June 24, 2012, plaintiff brought suit against UJC and several of its employees, claiming that her employment as a pilot with UJC was marred by sexual harassment and gender discrimination. In her complaint, she raised a number of claimsincluding discrimination and retaliation under federal and Ohio law. (Complaint, Doc. No. 1.) Defendants filed several dispositive motions, and, in two separate memorandum opinions and orders, the Court dismissed the individual defendants and all of plaintiff's claims against UJC except the retaliation claim under Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.1 (Doc. Nos. 25, 68.)
The case proceeded to trial on the remaining state law retaliation claim. Plaintiff testified that, from the beginning of her employment with UJC, she was exposed to a corporate climate hostile to female pilots. She claimed that two male pilots in particular, Bob Rossi and Burt Wells, continually harassed her about her marital status, her uniform, and her off-duty behavior. (Trial Transcript for Aug. 20, 2013, Doc. No. 120 at 1493-94, 1497, 1550-53, 1607.) According to plaintiff, she was continuously subjected to undeserved criticism on account of her gender, especially from Rossi and Wells, and that crude sexual jokes were callously bantered around in her presence. (Id. at 1563-64, 1566, 1640-41.) She testified that she reported this behavior to senior management members on multiple occasions, and was fired a mere three weeks after she sent an email to Dave Parsons, Ultimate Jetcharters's director of operations, requesting that this harassment cease. (Id. at 1522, 1533-34, 1631-32, 1660-62, 1664.) During its defense, Ultimate Jetcharters offered the testimony of several of its employees, who testified that plaintiff engaged in wild behavior while off-duty and violated several company policies, including the prohibition against using a cellular phone below a certain altitude. (Doc.No. 120 at 1658; Trial Transcript for Aug. 21, 2013, Doc. No. 121 at 1817, 1822-26, 1829, 1835-36, 1839-42, 1948-54.)
Before the case was submitted to the jury, the parties agreed that if plaintiff obtained a verdict in her favor and was awarded punitive damages, she would be eligible to seek attorney's fees under Ohio law. The parties further agreed to submit the question of punitive damages to the jury but to reserve for the Court the question of attorney's fees in the event that punitive damages were awarded. On August 26, 2013, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and awarded her the aforementioned compensatory and punitive damages. On August 28, 2013, the Court entered judgment consistent with the jury's verdict. (Doc. No. 109.)
The parties then set about the business of filing post-trial motions. On September 4, 2013, UJC filed a motion to stay execution of judgment based upon its anticipated motion for a new trial. (Doc. No. 113.) On September 9, 2013, plaintiff filed her motion for attorney's fees. (Doc. No. 115.) On September 25, 2013, defendants filed a motion for remittitur (Doc. No. 125), and a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. (Doc. No. 127.) During this same time period, plaintiff filed her opposition to defendants' motion for attorney's fees (Doc. No. 111), as well as a supplement to her own motion for attorney's fees. (Doc. No. 116.)
On September 27, 2013, UJC filed its notice of appeal. (Doc. No. 129.) On October 3, 2013, the Sixth Circuit filed an appeal remark, wherein it indicated that the appeal "will be held in abeyance until after the district court rules on pending motions, identified under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4), and jurisdiction transfers to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals." (Doc. No. 132 at 2635.)
Pursuant to Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, UJC moves for judgment as a matter of law. In the alternative, it moves, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), for a new trial. (Doc. No. 127 at 2615.)2 Plaintiff opposes the motion (Doc. No. 148), and UJC has filed a reply. (Doc. No. 150.) According to UJC, the Court must enter judgment as a matter of law in its favor, or grant a new trial, because the evidence offered at trial was legally insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict.
Before the Court can reach the merits of UJC's motion for JMOL and/or a new trial, it must address plaintiff's motion to strike. (Doc. No. 138.) UJC opposes the motion. (Doc. No. 144.) In her motion, plaintiff insists that most of the arguments UJC raised in its Rule 50(b) motion were waived because UJC failed to raise them in its Rule 50(a) motion for a directed verdict. According to plaintiff, UJC must confine its Rule 50(b) motion to the previously raised issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support a determination that UJC was aware of plaintiff's alleged protected activity.
It is true that a "post-trial motion for judgment may not advance additional grounds that were not raised in the pre-verdict motion." Kusens v. Pascal Co., Inc., 448 F.3d 349, 361 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Bolt, 106 F.3d 155, 159-60 (6th Cir. 1997)). Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit has counseled against a hyper-technical application of this rule, especially where the rule's purpose of providing the Court and opposing party notice of any possible deficiencies in the plaintiff's case beforeit goes to the jury has been satisfied. Id. (). UJC suggests that, applying a liberal interpretation to its Rule 50(a) arguments, its Rule 50(b) arguments are mere extensions of the arguments advanced at trial.
The Court has revisited the arguments made by UJC at the close of plaintiff's case, and agrees with plaintiff that most of the arguments UJC now advances in support of its "renewed" motion were not raised at trial. (See Doc. No. 121 at 1782-1802.)3 Nonetheless, the issue is academic for two reasons. First, UJC has alternatively moved for a new trial under Rule 59(e). A party may seek Rule 59(e) relief, even if he is not entitled to a post-trial judgment as a matter of law. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). While different standards apply to each motion, the Court must still review UJC's arguments testing the sufficiency of the evidence as they pertain to its motion for a new trial. Second, none of the arguments raised by UJC warrant disturbing the jury's verdict under either rule. Plaintiff's motion to strike, therefore, is DENIED.
Rule 50(a), which governs judgment as a matter of law, provides:
(B) grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on a claim or defense that, under the controlling law, can be maintained or defeated only with a favorable finding on that issue.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). When reviewing a motion for a judgment as a matter of law based on the insufficiency of the evidence, the court should not weigh evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury; rather, it must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Arban v. W. Publ'g Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 400 (6th Cir. 2003); Hall v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 337 F.3d 669, 672 (6th Cir. 2003). Such a motion should only be granted where "'there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.'" Denhof v. City of Grand Rapids, 494 F.3d 534, 543 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)).
Rule 59 permits a court to grant a motion for a new trial "for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). In deciding whether to order a new trial, the governing consideration is "whether, in the judgment of the trial judge, such course is required in order to prevent an injustice . . . ." Davis ex rel. Davis v. Jellico Cmty. Hosp. Inc., 912 F.2d 129, 133 (6th Cir 1990) (quoting Kilgore v. Greyhound Corp., 30 F.R.D. 385, 387 (E.D. Tenn. 1962)). A motion for a new trial may be granted if "the verdict is clearly against the weight of the evidence." Denhof, 494 F.3d at 543 (citing J.C. Wyckoff & Assoc. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 1474, 1487 (6th Cir. 1991)). Under this standard, a new trial is required "only when a jury has reached a seriously erroneous result as evidenced by [] (1) the verdict being against the weight of the evidence; (2) the damages being excessive; or (3) the trial being unfair to the moving party in somefashion, i.e., the proceedings...
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