Brave v. Blakely, 18727

• Decision Date: 14 November 1967
• Docket Number: No. 18727,18727
• Citation: 250 S.C. 353,157 S.E.2d 726
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Alex BRAVE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Billy BLAKELY, Defendant-Appellant, and David Dickerson McCants, Respondent.

Page 726

157 S.E.2d 726

250 S.C. 353

Alex BRAVE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Billy BLAKELY, Defendant-Appellant, and David Dickerson McCants, Respondent.

No. 18727.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Nov. 14, 1967.

Rosen & Rosen, Georgetown, Suggs & McCutcheon, Conway, for plaintiff-appellant.

Smith & Moore, Georgetown, for defendant-appellant.

Grimes & Hinds, Georgetown, for respondent.

LEWIS, Justice.

This action arose out of a three car collision in which plaintiff's automobile, stopped on the roadway at the time, was struck in the rear by the pickup truck of defendant McCants whose truck was in turn hit from the rear by defendant Blakely's automobile. The action was originally instituted by plaintiff against McCants but Blakely was subsequently impleaded as a party defendant, with counterclaims against plaintiff and cross-complaints against each other being thereafter filed by both defendants. Under the final pleadings, the issues involved generally the liability of the respective parties for the resulting injuries and damage sustained by each in the collision, each alleging that his damages resulted from the negligence and recklessness of the other and pleading defensively the others contributory negligence and recklessness.

Upon the trial of the case, the trial judge, after refusing timely motions by all parties for nonsuit and directed verdict, submitted all issues to the jury, resulting in a verdict in favor of defendant McCants against plaintiff and the codefendant Blakely for the sum of Twenty Thousand ($20,000.00) Dollars, actual damages. Post trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in the alternative, for a new trial were denied, from which plaintiff and defendant Blakely have prosecuted this appeal.

Under the appeal of the defendant Blakely, he contends that his motion for a directed verdict should have been granted by the trial judge because the evidence conclusively shows that respondent's damages resulted either from his own contributory negligence and recklessness or from the sole negligence and recklessness of the plaintiff; and, in the alternative, he seeks a new trial because of alleged error in the charge to the jury and the refusal of the trial judge to grant a motion made by him for a mistrial. The plaintiff appeals only upon the ground that the respondent is barred of recovery by his own contributory negligence and recklessness.

We dispose first of the position of the appellants that the trial judge erred in refusing their motions for a directed verdict.

Viewing the testimony in the light most favorable to the respondent, as we are required to do, it appears that, on November 22, 1965, at approximately 6:00 o'clock a.m., while it was still dark, plaintiff, while proceeding north along South Island Road in the City of Georgetown, stopped his automobile on the paved portion of the road to investigate some mechanical trouble that had developed in the motor. South Island Road was a two lane street with one lane for traffic in each direction and a posted speed limit of 35 m.p.h. Plaintiff's vehicle was so stopped as to block the north bound lane, without lights or other signal to warn traffic of its presence in the street. While plaintiff's automobile was so stopped, respondent McCants, driving his pickup truck north along the street at a speed of 30 to 35 m.p.h. and momentarily blinded by the lights of an automobile approaching from the opposite direction, struck the rear of plaintiff's unlighted automobile. McCants testified that, when the lights of the oncoming vehicle blinded him, he immediately reduced the speed of his vehicle, but saw the plaintiff's car too late to stop.

Almost simultaneously with the impact of the McCants vehicle with that of plaintiff, defendant Blakely, who had been following McCants, struck the rear of the McCants truck. Blakely testified that he had been following McCants for some distance and was aware of his presence ahead of him. As a result of the impact of the McCants vehicle with the parked automobile of plaintiff and the almost simultaneous blow from the Blakely automobile, McCants was seriously injured and his truck damaged.

Appellants contend that respondent is barred of recovery by his own contributory negligence and recklessness because he drove his pickup truck at such a rate of speed that it could not be stopped within the range of his vision. This is based upon testimony of respondent that he was travelling 30 to 35 m.p.h. and could only see 10 to 15 feet ahead. This contention overlooks other testimony of respondent, from which it is inferable that the range of his vision was so reduced at the time because he was momentarily blinded by the lights of an approaching automobile.

The conduct of a motorist in proceeding while momentarily blinded by the glare of oncoming lights must be assessed by the standard of due care under all of the particular facts and circumstances of each case. Whether or not a motorist is guilty of contributory negligence in failing to stop or to have his vehicle under such control that he can stop within the range of his vision is ordinarily a question for the jury. It becomes a question of law for the Court to decide only when but one reasonable inference can be drawn from the testimony. In applying these principles, we held in Edwards v. Bloom, 246 S.C. 346, 143 S.E.2d 614, that the conduct of the motorist in proceeding while blinded by the sun amounted to contributory negligence as a matter of law; while in Beverly v. Sarvis, 246 S.C. 470, 144 S.E.2d 220, the particular conduct of the driver in continuing to proceed after his vision became obstructed by lights from an oncoming vehicle was held to present a jury issue as to contributory negligence or recklesses. Also, in Jeffers v. Hardeman, 231 S.C. 578, 99 S.E.2d 402, the question of whether a motorist was reckless in continuing to drive at a reduced speed instead of stopping when momentarily blinded by a cloud of...