Brave v. Blakely, 18727

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: LEWIS; MOSS
• Citation: 250 S.C. 353,157 S.E.2d 726
• Parties: Alex BRAVE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Billy BLAKELY, Defendant-Appellant, and David Dickerson McCants, Respondent.
• Docket Number: No. 18727,18727
• Decision Date: 14 November 1967

Page 726

157 S.E.2d 726 250 S.C. 353 Alex BRAVE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Billy BLAKELY, Defendant-Appellant,
and
David Dickerson McCants, Respondent. No. 18727. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Nov. 14, 1967.

[250 S.C. 356]

Page 727

Rosen & Rosen, Georgetown, Suggs & McCutcheon, Conway, for plaintiff-appellant.

[250 S.C. 355] Smith & Moore, Georgetown, for defendant-appellant.

[250 S.C. 356] Grimes & Hinds, Georgetown, for respondent.

[250 S.C. 357] LEWIS, Justice.

This action arose out of a three car collision in which plaintiff's automobile, stopped on the roadway at the time, was struck in the rear by the pickup truck of defendant McCants whose truck was in turn hit from the rear by defendant Blakely's automobile. The action was originally instituted by plaintiff against McCants but Blakely was subsequently impleaded as a party defendant, with counterclaims against plaintiff and cross-complaints against each other being thereafter filed by both defendants. Under the final pleadings, the issues involved generally the liability of the respective parties for the resulting injuries and damage sustained by each in the collision, each alleging that his damages resulted from the negligence and recklessness of the other and pleading defensively the others contributory negligence and recklessness.

Upon the trial of the case, the trial judge, after refusing timely motions by all parties for nonsuit and directed verdict, submitted all issues to the jury, resulting in a verdict in favor of defendant McCants against plaintiff and the codefendant Blakely for the sum of Twenty Thousand ($20,000.00) Dollars, actual damages. Post trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, in the alternative, for a new trial were denied, from which plaintiff and defendant Blakely have prosecuted this appeal.

Under the appeal of the defendant Blakely, he contends that his motion for a directed verdict should have been [250 S.C. 358] granted by the trial judge because the evidence conclusively shows that respondent's damages resulted either from his own contributory negligence and recklessness or from the sole negligence and recklessness of the plaintiff; and, in the alternative, he seeks a new trial because of alleged error in the charge to the jury and the refusal of the trial judge to grant a motion made by him for a mistrial. The plaintiff appeals only upon the ground that the respondent is barred of recovery by his own contributory negligence and recklessness.

We dispose first of the position of the appellants that the trial judge erred in refusing their motions for a directed verdict.

Page 728

Viewing the testimony in the light most favorable to the respondent, as we are required to do, it appears that, on November 22, 1965, at approximately 6:00 o'clock a.m., while it was still dark, plaintiff, while proceeding north along South Island Road in the City of Georgetown, stopped his automobile on the paved portion of the road to investigate some mechanical trouble that had developed in the motor. South Island Road was a two lane street with one lane for traffic in each direction and a posted speed limit of 35 m.p.h. Plaintiff's vehicle was so stopped as to block the north bound lane, without lights or other signal to warn traffic of its presence in the street. While plaintiff's automobile was so stopped, respondent McCants, driving his pickup truck north along the street at a speed of 30 to 35 m.p.h. and momentarily blinded by the lights of an automobile approaching from the opposite direction, struck the rear of plaintiff's unlighted automobile. McCants testified that, when the lights of the oncoming vehicle blinded him, he immediately reduced the speed of his vehicle, but saw the plaintiff's car too late to stop.

Almost simultaneously with the...