Braverman v. New Mexico

Decision Date26 September 2012
Docket NumberNo. CIV 11-0829 JB/WDS,CIV 11-0829 JB/WDS
PartiesKATE BRAVERMAN, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, THE HONORABLE SARAH SINGLETON, and JAMES HALL Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

KATE BRAVERMAN, Plaintiff,
v.
THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, THE HONORABLE SARAH SINGLETON, and JAMES HALL Defendants.

No. CIV 11-0829 JB/WDS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

Dated: September 26, 2012


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on: (i) Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Brief in Support, filed September 30, 2011 (Doc. 10)("Amended Motion"); (ii) Plaintiff's Second Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Brief in Support, filed February 28, 2012 (Doc. 29)("Second Motion"); and (iii) Plaintiff's Supplement to Second Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Brief in Support, filed February 29, 2012 (Doc. 31)("Second Supplement"). The Court held a hearing on March 22, 2012. The primary issues are whether the Court should enter an order: (i) enjoining Defendant State of New Mexico, acting through its agent the Honorable Sarah Singleton, District Judge, First Judicial District, State of New Mexico, from allowing Alan H. Goldstein to further dissipate Plaintiff Kate Braverman's inherited Individual Retirement Account ("IRA") assets in the account that Judge Singleton has seized; and (ii) enjoining former Defendant LPL Financial Corporation from transferring any of Braverman's IRA assets to Braverman's former husband, Alan H. Goldstein, or otherwise without Braverman's consent. The Court will deny the Second Motion for reasons stated on the record at the hearing, and for further reasons stated herein: the Second Motion does not overcome the legal barriers to her

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Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, filed September 16, 2011 (Doc. 2)("Motion for TRO"), which the Court explained in its Memorandum Opinion, filed October 19, 2011 (Doc. 19)("Memorandum Opinion"); and (i) Braverman's loss in New Mexico state district court against the State of New Mexico and Judge Singleton precludes her from re-litigating some issues and likely some claims in federal court; and (ii) the Court must abstain from interfering with ongoing state-court judicial proceedings.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This motion requires the Court to discuss not only cases before the Court, but also cases filed in the state court for the State of New Mexico, First Judicial District Court, as well as appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Braverman filed two state cases before she filed this federal case. The Court will discuss each of Braverman's two prior state cases first.

1. Braverman's Divorce Proceedings.

Braverman and her husband, Goldstein, are embroiled in a divorce proceeding in New Mexico state district court. See First Amended Complaint ¶ 2, at 1, filed November 7, 2011 (Doc. 21). Braverman commenced the divorce proceeding shortly after she suffered two physical attacks at the hands of Goldstein in October of 2009. See First Amended Complaint ¶ 12, at 3. The Honorable Sarah Singleton, State District Judge, is presiding over Braverman v. Goldstein. See No. D-0101-DM-2009-01009 (First Judicial District, Santa Fe County, State of New Mexico), First Amended Complaint ¶ 2, at 1. James Hall, former First Judicial District Judge, is the appointed Special Master in the divorce proceeding. See First Amended Complaint ¶ 3, at 1-2. Braverman has significant assets that she maintains in a separate account with LPL Financial, an institution which Braverman asserts is outside of New Mexico. See First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 11, 14, 18, at 3-4.

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As part of the divorce proceeding, Judge Singleton ruled that Braverman should have "unfettered control" over $1.5 million in assets in the LPL Financial account, and that the remaining $800,000.00 should be put in a "secondary IRA" that Judge Singleton and Special Master Hall control. First Amended Complaint ¶ 16, at 4. This transfer "deprived Plaintiff of $5,000.00 per month in income that those assets generated." First Amended Complaint ¶ 17, at 4. Braverman alleges that, on October 12, 2010, Judge Singleton granted Goldstein a veto power over transfer, investment, or expenditures of the secondary IRA, and Goldstein unreasonably exercised that power to veto several investment plans that Braverman proposed. See First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 21-23, at 5-6. She asserts that Special Master Hall threatened that he would transfer the assets in the secondary IRA to the court registry if Braverman did not herself transfer the assets to a financial institution within Special Master Hall's jurisdiction. See First Amended Complaint ¶ 24, at 6.

Braverman "suffers from moderate bi-polar disorder." First Amended Complaint, ¶ 8, at 2. Braverman asserts that Judge Singleton and Special Master Hall treat her differently on the basis of her disability, specifically by denying her motions and requests during the divorce proceedings. See First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 33, 37, 45 at 8-10, 12. Braverman asserts that Judge Singleton "was under a mistaken belief that a suspension of [Braverman's] rights was necessitated and justified by [her] bi-polar disorder." First Amended Complaint ¶ 27, at 7. During the divorce proceeding, Judge Singleton denied Braverman's requests for an order of protection against Goldstein, an order directing disclosure of Goldstein's address, and an order removing Goldstein's attorney, Richard S. Lees, from the case. See First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 33-34, 37, at 8-10. Braverman, anticipating that she would be without counsel at her second deposition, asked Special Master Hall to permit her an accommodation in her second deposition, that "her attorney-in-fact be permitted to attend to provide the support and protection she needed to cope with her disability during the

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deposition." First Amended Complaint ¶ 41, at 11. Special Master Hall denied the request. See First Amended Complaint ¶ 41, at 11. In April 2011, Special Master Hall issued Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, a report which included many findings and conclusions regarding Braverman's bi-polar disorder. See First Amended Complaint ¶ 45, at 12. On July 25, 2011, Judge Singleton adopted the entirety of the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. See First Amended Complaint ¶ 46, at 12. Braverman asserts that, "[b]y doing so, Singleton subjected Plaintiff to discrimination by a public entity on account of a disability protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act." First Amended Complaint ¶ 46, at 12.

Braverman asserts that Judge Singleton has applied one standard to her, and another to Goldstein and LPL Financial. See Second Motion ¶ 10, at 5. Braverman further alleges that Judge Singleton "has made it impossible for Plaintiff to realize any meaningful relief from her right to one appeal" "[b]y systematically destroying the assets from which Plaintiff might realize relief on appeal." Second Motion ¶ 7, at 3. In support of this allegation, Braverman points to Judge Singleton having entered a final decree in the divorce proceeding which makes a monetary award to Goldstein but does not award him spousal support. See Second Motion ¶ 3, at 2. Judge Singleton would not allow Braverman to withdraw separate funds to pay for her counsel until after the hearing on Braverman's motion to make such withdrawals, on October 12, 2011. On October 12, 2011, "[Judge] Singleton orally ruled that the secondary IRA that [she] had previously seized should be returned to Plaintiff's control to the extent that the value of the secondary IRA exceeded the amount of the award to Goldstein." Second Motion ¶ 3, at 2. Braverman alleges that, when she sought to exercise control over the assets in the secondary IRA pursuant to Judge Singleton's oral order, Goldstein and LPL Financial refused to comply with Judge Singleton's ruling. See Second Motion ¶ 4, at 2. Braverman asserts that she sought relief from Judge Singleton, and, in response, Judge

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Singleton "reversed her oral ruling and ordered that even the excess assets in the secondary IRA would not be available to [Braverman,] citing her 'post-decree motions practice' as the grounds for reversal." Second Motion ¶ 4, at 3. Braverman alleges that Judge Singleton's continued control of the secondary IRA is without a legal basis and, as such, "is a denial of [Braverman's] constitutional right to equal protection under the law, her constitutional property rights, and her right to equal treatment" under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12213 ("ADA"). Second Motion ¶ 6, at 3.

Braverman asserts that, after the entry of the Final Decree in the divorce proceeding, she sought to use her funds to pay her divorce proceeding counsel. See Second Motion ¶ 10, at 4. LPL Financial refused to comply, and Judge Singleton then sanctioned Braverman for the attempted withdrawal, because Judge Singleton found it "inconceivable" that Braverman could have believed that she was entitled to use her funds in that manner. Second Motion ¶ 10, at 4. Braverman alleges that, when LPL Financial distributed funds to Goldstein, Judge Singleton "did nothing," and when Goldstein tried to hold Braverman in contempt, Judge Singleton denied the request, yet "refused to sanction Goldstein." Second Motion ¶ 10, at 4. Braverman alleges that, although Judge Singleton informed the parties that she would not reconsider her rulings, Judge Singleton granted "a motion filed by Goldstein in direct contravention of her ruling." Second...

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