Brawley v. United States
Decision Date | 01 October 1877 |
Parties | BRAWLEY v. UNITED STATES |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
APPEAL from the Court of Claims.
This is a petition by Brawley to recover the amount of eight hundred and forty cords of wood, at $3.99 per cord which the claimant alleges that he was prepared and ready to furnish, under a contract entered into by the claimant with Lieutenant-Colonel Holabird, Deputy Quartermaster-General United States Army, in May, 1871. The principal article, and that on which the present controversy arises, was in the following words:
It appears by the findings of the Court of Claims that said contract was entered into in pursuance of an estimate made by the proper officer of the quartermaster's department, and after an advertisement for proposals, upon which the claimant made a bid which was accepted,—the quantity named being eight hundred and eighty cords of wood or more. The bids were opened April 15, 1871. The contract was awarded to the claimant May 6, 1871, but, although dated on that day, it was not executed until about the 14th of June. About the 18th of the latter month, the post-commander of Fort Pembina first learned of it, and informed the claimant that but forty cords of wood would be required thereon, and forbade his hauling any more to the government yard. On the 1st of July, written notice was given to him to the same effect.
But 'before the contract was signed, the claimant had cut the eight hundred and eighty cords of wood, had taken ten oxteams, with teamsters, wood-haulers, and supplies from Saint Cloud and Sauk Centre, Minnesota, a distance of three hundred and sixty miles, to Pembina, for the purpose of hauling the wood; and fifty-five cords thereof had been hauled to the fort by permission, and with the understanding that the claimant assumed all risk regarding the acceptance of the same. And twenty cords more were hauled there by him, upon the same understanding, before he received any notice that only forty cords would be received on the contract. Subsequently he hauled eight hundred cords to within about twenty-five rods of the fort, and left the same on the land of Mr. Myrick, because the wood, if left in the forest where it was cut, was in danger of being destroyed by the fires which annually run through that region.
'Forty cords of wood only were received and accepted by the post-commander, and for that the claimant has been paid according to the contract.
'The balance of the wood cut and hauled by the claimant remained where it was deposited by him until the autumn of 1873, when it was sold by said Myrick to one Stiles, a government contractor, for $3.62 1/2 a cord.
'The post of Fort Pembina did not in fact need for the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1871, more than the forty cords of wood which were accepted by the defendant.'
The Court of Claims dismissed the petition, and the claimant appealed.
Mr. John B. Sandborn for the appellant.
The negotiations between the parties preceding the execution of the contract should be considered in connection with it, in order to ascertain their precise intention at the time of making it. 1 Greenl. Evid., p. 128, sect. 8; id., pp. 129, 130, and authorities cited; Robinson v. Fiske, 25 Me. 401; Higgins v. Wasgalt, 34 id. 305; Metcalf v. Taylor, 36 id. 28; Wilson v. Troup, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 196.
In a contract of this character, a specific quantity, if not designed to be furnished, should not be mentioned. Fair dealing prohibits it; and the United States, above all others, should deal openly and fairly.
Where the words 'more or less' are used in an executory contract in connection with a definite quantity, the law gives them only such force as may be necessary to relieve the par ties from the precise quantity. A fixed quantity, with these words added in such a contract, can in no case have the force of the words, 'so much as may be required.' Benj. Sales, 569-571, and authorities cited.
All contracts for supplies for the army are required by law...
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