Bray v. State
| Decision Date | 22 April 1980 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 43329 |
| Citation | 294 N.W.2d 236,97 Mich.App. 33 |
| Parties | Willie BRAY, Lorene David, Randolph Wiggins, Joan Colburn, Mary Roe, John Doe, and all other members of the Class, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE of Michigan, William G. Milliken, Governor of the State of Michigan; Michigan Department of State, Richard H. Austin, Secretary of State; Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Funds Division: Lawrence A. Carroll, Director of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund; Allison Green, State Treasurer; Department of Commerce Insurance Bureau: Daniel J. Demlow, Commissioner of Insurance, Defendants- Appellants. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Warren R. Snyder, Lansing, for defendants-appellants.
Harry Steven Ellman, Southfield, Donald E. Barris and Sharon Woods (co-counsel), Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before T. M. BURNS, P. J., and BASHARA and KAUFMAN, JJ.
This case makes its second appearance before our Court. Plaintiffs initiated the present class action to obtain a refund of one-half of the 1973 fee paid pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, M.C.L. § 257.1101 et seq.; M.S.A. § 9.2801 et seq. (hereinafter referred to as MVACA). Payment of the fee entitled plaintiffs, who were uninsured motorists, to drive for a twelve-month period ending April 1, 1974. However, as of October 1, 1973, all Michigan motorists were required to purchase no-fault automobile insurance. M.C.L. § 500.3101; M.S.A. § 24.13101. Plaintiffs claim that the No-Fault Act vitiated their rights under the MVACA.
Plaintiffs alleged both constitutional and nonconstitutional grounds for recovery. The trial court refused to consider the constitutional claims since, in its opinion, the case could be decided according to state law. The circuit court determined that the fee represented a license and that plaintiffs were entitled to a 50% refund. The court ordered an amount equal to the refund placed in escrow pending final resolution of the case.
This Court affirmed the lower court, but held that the fee was in the nature of an insurance premium rather than a license. Bray v. Dep't of State, 69 Mich.App. 172, 244 N.W.2d 619 (1976), lv. den. 397 Mich. 851 (1976). The Court further ruled that the class of individuals harmed by uninsured vehicles had priority in receiving payment from the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, M.C.L. § 257.1103; M.S.A. § 9.2803 (). The partial fee refunds to which plaintiffs were entitled were subordinated to the claims of that class.
The Court noted that at the time of the decision, the three-year statute of limitations of the MVACA (M.C.L. § 257.1118; M.S.A. § 9.2818) had not yet run. As such, the Court was unable to determine whether the fund's reserve was sufficient to satisfy the claims of both the plaintiffs and persons harmed by uninsured motorists. Accordingly, the case was "remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion". Bray, supra, at 182, 244 N.W.2d at 624.
On July 22, 1977, the circuit court entered an amended final order in compliance with this Court's opinion. The lower court further ordered that plaintiffs would be permitted to renew their constitutional claims, since they had not previously been considered. The constitutional issues were decided against defendants and an immediate refund ordered. The refund was to be paid from the State's general fund without regard to the solvency of the MVACF. Defendants appeal from this decision.
Defendants first argue that the circuit court was without power to decide the constitutional issues. It is claimed that the lower court disregarded the law of the case and violated the doctrine of res judicata.
A lower court on remand may "take such action as law and justice require so long as it is not inconsistent with the judgment of the appellate court". Sokel v. Nickoli, 356 Mich. 460, 464, 97 N.W.2d 1 (1959), Meyering v. Russell, 85 Mich.App. 547, 552, 272 N.W.2d 131 (1978).
Defendants contend that the trial court's order mandating an immediate refund is inconsistent with this Court's holding that the plaintiffs be subordinated to other claimants of the MVACF. This argument ignores the fact that the remedy provided by the Court of Appeals was based on a different cause of action. It is the cause of action and not the remedy which must not be inconsistent.
Plaintiffs' constitutional claims were expressly not considered by the trial court nor by this Court on appeal.
Defendants nevertheless maintain that res judicata acts as a bar to such consideration.
The doctrine of res judicata is defined in Curry v. Detroit, 394 Mich. 327, 332, 231 N.W.2d 57 (1975), quoting Tucker v. Rohrback, 13 Mich. 73 (1864), as follows:
"A judgment, to constitute a bar to a claim in a subsequent action, must be rendered upon the merits, upon the same matter in issue and between the same parties or their privies."
In determining the issue of whether a matter must have been actually litigated, the Curry Court, quoting Gursten v. Kenney, 375 Mich. 330, 134 N.W.2d 764 (1965), stated:
"The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time."
We find that the present action is not barred by res judicata. The constitutional claims which formed the basis of the present action were not litigated because there existed an independent state law ground for the holding. This is in conformity with the rule that a "court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of". Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J. concurring).
Having determined that the constitutional issues were properly before the court, we must next decide whether any of plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated.
Plaintiffs contend that the right to register and drive their vehicles between October 1, 1973, and April 1, 1974, was a property interest entitled to protection under both the "Due Process" and "Taking" clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. U.S.Const., Am. V, Am. XIV.
Specifically plaintiffs argue that the termination of their rights under the MVACA was a deprivation of property without due process of law, and a taking for public use without just compensation. U.S.Const., Am. V, Am. XIV.
In reviewing the No-Fault Act, our Supreme Court recently recognized that all motorists have a significant property interest in being able to register and operate a motor vehicle. Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 598, 267 N.W.2d 72, 87 (1978):
"In Michigan the independent mobility provided by an automobile is a crucial, practical necessity; it is undeniable that whether or not a person can obtain a driver's license or register and operate his motor vehicle profoundly affects important aspects of his day-to-day life."
Moreover, we are bound by our previous conclusions in Bray v. Dep't of State, supra, insofar as they affect our analysis of the issues then under consideration. Taines v. Munson, 42 Mich.App. 256, 259, 201 N.W.2d 685 (1972). In Bray, this Court after concluding that the $45 fee was neither a license fee nor tax said:
"The $45 fee thus could be said to represent an annual insurance premium paid by those who have not acquired private insurance policies." Bray, supra, at 178, 244 N.W.2d at 623.
An insurance policy is contractual in nature and contracts are certainly within the purview of the Fifth Amendment. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 54 S.Ct. 840, 78 L.Ed. 1434 (1934), Houston & Texas Central R. Co. v. Texas, 170 U.S. 243, 18 S.Ct. 610, 42 L.Ed. 1023 (1898).
The Lynch Court's analysis of the problem, applied to the Federal government, is closely akin to the issue presented in the present case:
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