Bray v. Wecare TLC, LLC
| Decision Date | 22 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:17-CV-37 JD |
| Parties | WILLIAM BRAY MD, Plaintiff, v. WECARE TLC, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
This case arises out of a dispute between Plaintiff Dr. William Bray ("Dr. Bray") and Defendant WeCare TLC, LLC ("WeCare") over the scope of Dr. Bray's employment and the salary he received. Dr. Bray filed this suit in May 2017 asserting a state wage payment claim and a discrimination claim due to his military service. Now before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on the state claim and WeCare's motion for summary judgment on the discrimination claim. As explained below, the Court denies all pending motions for summary judgment.
Dr. Bray is a physician and entered active duty service for the Air Force after obtaining his medical degree and completing his residency. After five years of active duty, Dr. Bray returned home and began serving in the Reserves, eventually settling in Lafayette, Indiana. WeCare is an onsite or near-site health center management company. It enters into provider agreements with doctors and medical staff to provide clinic hours where clients' (public and private employers) employee populations can receive medical services. In early 2012, WeCare recruited Dr. Bray and in February, offered him a position in a formal offer letter. [DE 23-3].
This February 2012 offer letter was for the position of Lead Physician at Subaru of Indiana Automotive Health Center ("Subaru").1 The letter also included, in part, the following terms: 1) annual salary of $275,000; 2) "[s]cheduled 'in clinic' patient care hours of 32 hours per week" with the understanding that "in order to give quality service to [Subaru] there maybe [sic] occasional extra hours needed, but 'in clinic hours will be limited to 32'"; 3) four weeks paid time off for vacation and sick leave; and 4) two weeks paid time off for military obligations. Id. Dr. Bray and WeCare's CEO, Lynn Jennings, both signed the offer letter. Id.
On February 2, 2012, the parties entered into a Provider Contract Employee Agreement between Dr. Bray and WeCare ("2012 Agreement"). The 2012 Agreement states that WeCare has contracted with Subaru to provide it a provider "to perform certain medical services to the employees [of Subaru] . . . for 32 hours per week." [DE 23-4 at 1]. Dr. Bray and Judy Garber, WeCare's President, executed the agreement on February 21, 2012. Id. at 6.
Over the next year and half, Dr. Bray made regular requests for schedule modifications and time off due to his military duties, which he was afforded. [See, e.g., DE 23-1 at 6; 26-5 at 2-4; 23-6]. In the summer of 2013, Dr. Bray was deployed overseas for approximately 90 days, and WeCare worked with Dr. Bray to ensure he met his military obligation and transitioned back to his regular duties upon returning. [DE 23-1 at 6-8; 26-5 at 2-4].
In late spring or early summer of 2014, Subaru notified WeCare that it was terminating its relationship with WeCare as its onsite healthcare provider. [DE 23-1 at 11-12; DE 23-21 at 4]. As a result, WeCare terminated the employment of some employees and reassigned others to different clinics. Id. Ms. Garber testified that when Subaru ended its contract, WeCare notified all its staff at the Subaru center, including Dr. Bray, and informed them that because of thistermination they would not continue with their employment in that clinic and should they be interested in further employment, WeCare would help them or place them at other clinics. [DE 23-21 at 4]. When Dr. Bray learned of this, he began to search for a job and took a few interviews. [DE 23-1 at 13].
WeCare sent Dr. Bray a letter dated June 25, 2014 ("June 2014 offer letter"), explaining "a few options for [his] continued employment with WeCare" and asking him his thoughts on those options. [DE 23-12]. In that letter, WeCare proposed that Dr. Bray work at a facility in Monticello for two days a week and at a facility in Plymouth for one day a week, with the other two days of the week spent "performing in [his] role as Medical Director" (interchangeably referred to as Chief Medical Officer ("CMO")). Id. He would also be called upon to travel to other clinics to conduct trainings. Id. This letter did not mention compensation. WeCare's CMO duties included participating in quarterly meetings, overseeing medical director meetings, helping review medical policies and procedures, reviewing any information that comes down from the CDC concerning airborne conditions or similar matters, communicating with other physicians regarding audit deficiencies, reviewing the charts of other medical providers, traveling to different WeCare clinics, training WeCare's healthcare providers, and assisting in opening new clinics. [DE 23-1 at 21; DE 23-21 at 3].
On July 9, 2014, Dr. Bray responded to WeCare's offer letter, stating, "[o]f course I am accepting of my new role, thank you." [DE 23-13 at 1]. He also indicated he had questions and listed some follow-up topics for discussion. Id. The parties did not execute a formal written agreement at this time, however, Dr. Bray assumed the CMO position and began his new clinic hours, while receiving the same annual salary and benefits as delineated in the 2012 Agreement. By January 2015, Dr. Bray's schedule was modified to two days a week at the Monticello clinic,one day at the Plymouth clinic, and a half-day at the Logansport clinic. [DE 23-1 at 15]. The Logansport clinic later requested that Dr. Bray become available for a full, 8-hour clinic day, but WeCare did not want to pull Dr. Bray away from his administrative work. Id. at. 16; [DE 23-14 at 2]. In May 2015, Dr. Bray requested additional compensation for his travel expenses and wear and tear on his car. WeCare agreed to pay him $200 a month for the wear and tear and provide him with a credit card for gas and oil changes. [DE 23-1 at 16; 23-15].
On November 23, 2016, Dr. Bray informed WeCare that he was resigning from his CMO position because he had accepted a position to be the next commander of the 181st Medical Group, which would increase his military obligations. [DE 23-17]. Dr. Bray explained he can continue to serve in this role as needed until December 31, 2016. Id. He also indicated that he was committed "to honor all aspects of my employment agreement, including present care to MASE and LCSC clients." Id. Ms. Garber followed up with Dr. Bray via telephone to clarify, and he explained to her he was not taking a general leave of absence, but rather his "increased responsibility in the military" meant he was "stepping aside as chief medical officer" but he would "continue to honor everything else." [DE 23-1 at 19; DE 23-21 at 8].
On January 6, 2017, WeCare notified Dr. Bray that his compensation and benefits would be altered due to his title and job duty change. [DE 23-18]. The email stated that Dr. Bray's hours have changed from 40 to 29, including 28 clinical hours and one hour of drive time. Additionally, because of his hourly rate, his salary has changed to $199,375 per year. Id. Dr. Bray responded to this email on January 20, 2017 objecting to the change in his salary. [DE 23-19]. In his response, he indicated that an "hourly rate" has never been discussed. Dr. Bray asserted that his 2012 Agreement with WeCare had never been modified, including the compensation terms, and it automatically renewed for successive years. Id. In support of this, Dr.Bray pointed to the contractual language that requires a written amendment signed by both parties and stated no such amendment had occurred. Id. Ultimately, Dr. Bray filed this action on May 5, 2017 [DE 1], and subsequently submitted his letter of resignation to WeCare on September 1, 2017 [DE 23-20].
On summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there "is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). That means that the Court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, making every legitimate inference and resolving every doubt in its favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Summary judgment is not a tool to decide legitimately contested issues, and it may not be granted unless no reasonable jury could decide in favor of the nonmoving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The party seeking summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying" the evidence which "demonstrate[s] the absence of [a] genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323. Once the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on allegations or denials in its own pleading but must set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 410 (7th Cir. 1988). The disputed facts must be material, which means that they "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Brown v. City of Lafayette, No. 4:08-CV-69, 2010 WL 1570805, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 16, 2010). And relevant to claims addressed in this opinion, "[i]f the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, one on which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, summaryjudgment must be granted to the moving party." Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996). Finally, in a case involving cross-motions for summary judgment, each party receives the benefit of all reasonable inferences when considering the opposing party's motion. Tegtmeier v. Midwest Operating Eng'rs Pension Tr. Fund, 390 F.3d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir. 2004).
Dr. Bray asserts claims against WeCare under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act of 1994 ("USERRA"), 38 U.S.C....
To continue reading
Request your trial