Brazil v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 23 July 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:20-cv-4030-NKL
• Parties: DUSTIN BRAZIL, Individually, and as Next Friend of J.B., and CONNIE WEYER, Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants, v. AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE CO. (MUTUAL), Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

DUSTIN BRAZIL, Individually, and as Next Friend of J.B.,andCONNIE WEYER, Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants, v. AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE CO. (MUTUAL), Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff.

Case No. 2:20-cv-4030-NKL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI CENTRAL DIVISION

July 23, 2020

ORDER

Auto-Owners Insurance Co. (Mutual) moves for summary judgment, and Plaintiffs cross-move for summary judgment, on Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory judgment against Auto-Owners and on Auto-Owners' counterclaim for declaratory judgment against Plaintiffs.

Each motion for summary judgment is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Uncontroverted Facts

A. The Vehicular Collision

On March 22, 2018, a vehicle driven by Amber Metcalf crossed the center lane of a road, striking head-on a vehicle driven by Jessica Brazil. Ms. Brazil and her minor child Malachi were killed. Ms. Brazil's minor child J.B. was injured. Amber Metcalf also was killed in the accident.

B. The Insurance Policy

The parties agree that Amber Metcalf was uninsured at the time of the collision.

The automobile that Ms. Brazil was driving was covered by an Auto-Owners' insurance policy (the "Policy") issued to named insured Advantage Marine. There is no dispute that Ms. Brazil, Malachi, and J.B were occupancy insureds under the Policy. The dispute between the parties concerns how much uninsured coverage the policy provides for the collision and those injured in it.

The Policy's Missouri Uninsured Motorist Coverage form states, in relevant part, as follows:

(1) Occupying means being in or on an auto as a passenger or operator, or being engaged in the immediate act of entering, boarding or alighting from an auto.

. . .

2. COVERAGE

a. We will pay compensatory damages, including but not limited to loss of consortium, that any person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto for bodily injury sustained while occupying an auto that is covered by SECTION II -LIABILITY COVERAGE of the policy.

. . .

4. LIMIT OF INSURANCE

We will pay compensatory damages, including but not limited to loss of consortium, for bodily injury up to the Limit of Insurance shown in the Declarations for Uninsured Motorist Coverage as follows:

a. The limit shown for "each person" is the amount of coverage and the most we will pay, subject to 4.b. below, for all compensatory damages, including but not limited to loss of consortium, because of or arising out of bodily injury to one person in any one occurrence.

b. The limit shown for "each occurrence" is the total amount of coverage and the most we will pay, subject to 4.a. above, for all compensatory damages, including but not limited to loss of consortium, because of or arising out of bodily injury to two or more persons in any one occurrence.¹c. If you are an individual and the policy insures more than one of your autos for Uninsured Motorist Coverage, our Limit of Insurance for only you or your relatives is as follows:²

(1) The Limit of Insurance for each person shall be the sum of the "each person" limits shown in the Declarations for each such auto.

(2) The Limit of Insurance for each occurrence shall be the sum of the "each occurrence" limits shown in the Declarations for each such auto.

d. Except as provided in 4.a., 4.b. and 4.c. above, the Limit of Insurance is not increased because of the number of:

(1) Autos shown or premiums charged in the Declarations;

(2) Claims made or suits brought;

(3) Persons injured; or

(4) Autos involved in the occurrence.

The Declarations of the Policy states that the "Uninsured Motorist" limits are "$1,000,000 each person / $1,000,000 each occurrence."

II. Summary Judgment Standard

"Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Durham D & M, LLC, 606 F.3d 513, 518 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court must enter summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "Summary judgment is proper if, after viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law." Higgins v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 931 F.3d 664, 669 (8th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. Discussion

The parties' disputes revolve around two questions of policy interpretation. The first question is whether the uninsured motorist "each person" and "each occurrence" provisions are ambiguous. The second question is whether the policy is ambiguous as to the amount of the uninsured motorist limit—as Auto Owners puts it, whether "stacking" is permitted. The Court considers these issues in turn.

A. Whether the Uninsured Motorist "Each Person" and "Each Occurrence" Provisions Are Ambiguous

The Policy's Missouri Uninsured Motorist Coverage form provides, in relevant part, as follows:

4. LIMIT OF INSURANCE

We will pay compensatory damages, including but not limited to loss of consortium, for bodily injury up to the Limit of Insurance shown in the Declarations for Uninsured Motorist Coverage as follows:

a. The limit shown for "each person" is the amount of coverage and the most we will pay, subject to 4.b. below, for all compensatory damages, including but not limited to loss of consortium, because of or arising out of bodily injury to one person in any one occurrence.

b. The limit shown for "each occurrence" is the total amount of coverage and the most we will pay, subject to 4.a. above, for all compensatory damages, including but not limited to loss of consortium, because of or arising out of bodily injury to two or more persons in any one occurrence.

Both the "each person" and "each occurrence" provisions cap recovery at $1 million.

Plaintiffs argue that the "each person" and "each occurrence" limits are ambiguous because each is "subject to" the other, and therefore it is not clear where "the music stops . . . ." Doc. 24, p. 15. Defendant argues that the "each person" and "each occurrence" limits are not ambiguous,that the "subject to" language merely reflects that the provisions "are indeed 'affected by or possibly affected by' one another . . . ." Doc. 20, p. 15.

Interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law. McCormack Baron Mgt. Services, Inc. v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 989 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Mo. banc 1999). "In construing the terms of an insurance policy, th[e] Court applies the meaning which would be attached by an ordinary person of average understanding if purchasing insurance, and resolves ambiguities in favor of the insured." Seeck v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 212 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Mo. banc 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Wolfe Auto. Grp., LLC v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 808 F.3d 729, 731-32 (8th Cir. 2015) ("Absent ambiguity, Missouri courts will interpret the language of a policy according to its plain meaning as understood by an ordinary insured of average understanding.") (citing Piatt v. Ind. Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 461 S.W.3d 788, 792 (Mo. banc 2015)). As with any contract,³ an insurance policy's terms "are read as a whole to determine the intention of the parties and are given their plain, ordinary, and usual meaning." Dunn Indus. Grp., Inc. v. City of Sugar Creek, 112 S.W.3d 421, 428 (Mo. banc 2003).

"Language is ambiguous if it is reasonably open to different constructions." Seeck, 212 S.W.3d at 132. For example, if "an . . . insurance clause appears to provide coverage but other clauses indicate that such coverage is not provided, then the policy is ambiguous, and the ambiguity will be resolved in favor of coverage for the insured." Chamness v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 226 S.W.3d 199, 204 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007).

Here, 4.a, the "each person" provision, provides that the most Auto-Owners will pay for damages for bodily injury to one person in any occurrence is $1 million, subject to 4.b. 4.b, the"each occurrence" provision, provides that the most Auto-Owners will pay for damages for bodily injury to two or more persons in any occurrence is $1 million, subject to 4.a.

Auto-Owners argues that the "subject to" language means only that the two provisions should be read together. Doc. 27, p. 10. Auto-Owners argues that "one addresses the available coverage available for any one claimant, and the other addresses the total available coverage for any one accident." Doc. 27, p. 9. Auto-Owners further argues that, "[w]hen an accident involves multiple claimants, each claimant may only collect up to the 'per person' limit, even if the 'per occurrence' limit makes the total coverage available for the accident higher than the 'per person' limit. Conversely, the 'per occurrence' limit sets the total amount of coverage available for any one accident, even when there are multiple claimants whose separate 'each person' limits would total more than the 'each occurrence' limit, if not otherwise limited by the terms of the 'per occurrence' limit." Id.; see also Doc. 20, p. 16 ("[E]ven in cases in which a policy's 'each occurrence' limit provides coverage in excess of the 'each person' UM limit, each individual claimant is still subject to the 'each person' limit, and cannot recover more than the per person limit."). In other words, Auto-Owners argues that the Limit of Insurance provisions merely mean that, "[i]n cases involving more than one claimant, . . . one person cannot recover more than the 'each person' limit, despite the 'each occurrence' limit, and multiple persons cannot recover more than the "each occurrence" limit despite the 'each person' limit." Doc. 27, p. 13.

The first problem with this argument is that it treats the terms "subject to" as synonymous with the...