Brazill v. State

• Citation: 845 So.2d 282
• Decision Date: 14 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. 4D01-3244.,4D01-3244.
• Parties: Nathaniel BRAZILL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

845 So.2d 282

Nathaniel BRAZILL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D01-3244.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

May 14, 2003.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and David John McPherrin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Melynda L. Melear, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

GROSS, J.

On the last day of the 1999-2000 school year, thirteen-year-old Nathaniel Brazill shot and killed a teacher at his middle school, Barry Grunow.

The state charged Brazill with first degree murder and aggravated assault with a firearm. The jury convicted him of second degree murder and aggravated assault with a firearm. The trial judge sentenced him to concurrent sentences: a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-eight years in prison on the murder charge and five years in prison, with a three year mandatory minimum, on the assault charge.

We affirm in all respects.

The evidence at trial

In the early afternoon of May 26, 2000, Brazill and Michelle Cordovaz were suspended for the remainder of the day as the result of a water balloon fight. School counselor Kevin Hinds escorted the two students off campus. Brazill asked Hinds what time he was going home. Hinds indicated that he was leaving around 4:15 to 4:30 p.m. and asked why Brazill wanted to know. Brazill shrugged and did not respond.

As he was walking away with Cordovaz, Brazill told her that he had a gun and was going to return to shoot Hinds. Cordovaz asked: "You wouldn't do that, Nate, would you?" Brazill answered: "Watch. I'm going to be all over the news."

On the way home, Brazill made several stops. Near his grandmother's house, Brazill spoke to Brandon Spann. He asked if Spann was part of a gang or had a gun. Spann asked him why he needed a gun. Brazill replied that he was "going to fuck up the school" because of the suspension.

At his home, Brazill retrieved a gun from his bedroom. The previous weekend, Brazill was at his grandfather's house and found the gun in a cookie jar in his grandfather's bureau. At that time, he loaded the gun, pulled the slide back, engaged the safety, and placed it in his overnight bag. When Brazill left his grandfather's house, he took the gun home with him; upon returning home he hid the gun in his room.

Taking the gun from his bedroom, Brazill rode his bike back to school. On the way, he stopped by his aunt's house and left a note.

Brazill entered the school grounds near the rear parking lot, a designated teachers' area. School security officer Matt Baxter saw him. Baxter followed him, but found only an abandoned bike. After leaving his bike, Brazill ran to the school building. On the way, he advised a student sitting outside to go home.

Once inside the school, Brazill went directly to Barry Grunow's classroom to speak with two friends, Dinora Rosales and Vonae Ware. He had once dated Ware for a time, and was romantically interested in Rosales. Earlier in the day, Brazill gave Rosales two cards and a bouquet of flowers.

When Brazill knocked on Grunow's door, the students in the class were already standing, because they were about to go outside. Brazill sternly asked to speak to Rosales and Ware, who were standing on either side of Grunow. The teacher did not allow the girls to leave the classroom, but said that Brazill could come inside. Brazill refused to enter the classroom. Three more times he asked to see the girls. Each time Grunow calmly declined and told him to go back to class.

Brazill then pulled out the gun and aimed it at Grunow's head. He was in the hallway, approximately an arm's length from Grunow. He backed up slightly and assumed a shooter's stance with his legs apart.

Grunow told Brazill to stop pointing the gun, but he continued to point the gun at the teacher's head. Brazill appeared to be angry but calm; he was not crying or shaking. Brazill pulled the slide back on the gun.¹

As Grunow attempted to close the classroom door, Brazill pulled the trigger and Grunow fell to the floor, with a gunshot wound between the eyes. A school surveillance videotape of the hallway revealed that Brazill had pointed the gun at Grunow for nine seconds before shooting. Brazill exclaimed: "Oh shit," and fled.

On the way out, Brazill used both hands to aim the gun at math teacher, John James, who was conducting class next door to Grunow. As Brazill aimed the gun, he told James not to bother him, that he was going to shoot. James immediately turned around and led his students back into his classroom.

Brazill ran out of the building. To one teacher, Brazill did not appear to be visibly upset. He was not sweating. He was not crying. Near the school, Officer Michael Mahoney observed Brazill walk into the street, put his hands on his head, and kneel. When the officer asked what he was doing, Brazill stated that he had shot someone at school and the gun was in his pocket. Brazill was then arrested. He acknowledged that he had shot Grunow. Brazill was taken to the police station, where he gave a videotaped statement.

A firearms expert with the FBI testified that the gun used in the shooting had a safety that functioned normally. The gun had a trigger pull that required five and one-half pounds of pressure to fire. It would not discharge unless the trigger was pulled.

Section 985.225, Florida Statutes (1999) is not unconstitutional

Brazill argues that section 985.225, Florida Statutes (1999), is unconstitutional as a violation of due process, equal protection, and separation of powers. In pertinent part, section 985.225 provides:

(1) A child of any age who is charged with a violation of state law punishable by death or by life imprisonment is subject to the jurisdiction of the court as set forth in s. 985.219(7)² unless and until an indictment on the charge is returned by the grand jury. When such indictment is returned, the petition for delinquency, if any, must be dismissed and the child must be tried and handled in every respect as an adult:

(a) On the offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment; and (b) On all other felonies or misdemeanors charged in the indictment which are based on the same act or transaction as the offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment or on one or more acts or transactions connected with the offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment.

. . .

(3) If the child is found to have committed the offense punishable by death or by life imprisonment, the child shall be sentenced as an adult. If the juvenile is not found to have committed the indictable offense but is found to have committed a lesser included offense or any other offense for which he or she was indicted as a part of the criminal episode, the court may sentence pursuant to s. 985.233.

. . .

§ 985.225 (emphasis added).

The constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo. See City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So.2d 143, 146 (Fla.2002)

; Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So.2d 1199, 1203 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Dickerson v. State, 783 So.2d 1144, 1146 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). There is a strong presumption that a statute is constitutionally valid. See McGrath, 824 So.2d at 146; In re Estate of Caldwell, 247 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1971); Dickerson, 783 So.2d at 1146. "It is well established that where reasonably possible and consistent with constitutional rights, a statute will be interpreted by the courts in a manner that resolves all doubt in favor of its validity." DuFresne v. State, 826 So.2d 272, 274 (Fla.2002); see also State v. Mitro, 700 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla.1997); McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So.2d 48, 51 (Fla.1974).

Brazill first contends that his due process rights were violated because he was denied the "rehabilitative aspect of juvenile court" solely because the state decided to procure an indictment.

However, there is no absolute right conferred by common law, constitution, or otherwise, requiring children to be treated in a special system for juvenile offenders. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)

; State v. Cain, 381 So.2d 1361, 1363 (Fla.1980); Johnson v. State, 314 So.2d 573, 576 (Fla.1975) (noting that it was within legislative authority pursuant to Article I, Section 15(b) of the Florida Constitution, to create an exception where children would be treated as adults).

Under Article I, Section 15(b), a "child," as defined by "law," may be charged "with a violation of law as an act of delinquency instead of [a] crime." Art. I, § 15(b), Fla. Const. As the supreme court has explained, this provision means that "a child has the right to be treated as a juvenile delinquent only to the extent provided by our legislature." Cain, 381 So.2d at 1363. The legislature has the power to determine who, if anyone, is entitled to treatment as a juvenile. Id.; see also Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 785 (5th Cir.1977)

(finding that "treatment as a juvenile is not an inherent right but one granted by the state legislature, therefore the legislature may restrict or qualify that right as it sees fit, as long as no arbitrary or discriminatory classification is involved").

Because section 985.225 implicates no fundamental constitutional right, the applicable test for reviewing a substantive due process challenge to the statute is the rational-basis standard of review. See Shapiro v. State, 696 So.2d 1321, 1326-27 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)

. Under this standard, a presumption of constitutionality attaches to a statute; the burden is on the party challenging the statute to establish that the statutory proscription lacks a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Butler, 770 So.2d 1210, 1214-15 (Fla. 2000) (challenging party must prove that the statute in question is discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive for there to be a violation of due process under the rational-basis standard); Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs. v....