Brech v. Seacat

• Decision Date: 04 September 1969
• Docket Number: No. 10639,10639
• Citation: 170 N.W.2d 348,84 S.D. 264
• Parties: Mrs. Veronica BRECH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Walter SEACAT, Evelyn Conners, et al., Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 348

170 N.W.2d 348

84 S.D. 264

Mrs. Veronica BRECH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Walter SEACAT, Evelyn Conners, et al Defendants-Respondents.

No. 10639.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Sept. 4, 1969.

Richard R. Murphy, Santa Ana, Cal. and Bruce, S.D., for plaintiff-appellant.

Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, Ellsworth E. Evans, Sioux Falls, for Walter Seacat, defendants-respondents.

RENTTO, Judge.

In this action plaintiff seeks damages from a circuit judge for an alleged defamation. The judge moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that as to him it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. This was bottomed on the proposition that in the circumstances alleged he enjoyed absolute immunity. From a judgment granting the motion plaintiff appeals.

The defendant Walter Seacat is senior judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit Court, a court of general jurisdiction. On April 17, 1964, he sentenced the plaintiff's husband Doyle Brech, Sr. to imprisonment in the state penitentiary on his plea of guilty of the crime of manslaughter in the first degree, arising out of the death of their daughter Betty. A few days later on April 24th the Judge wrote a letter addressed to the State Board of Pardons, the Warden of the Penitentiary, and the Department of Pardons and Paroles which he transmitted to the warden by mail and the warden placed in the inmate's file. Plaintiff does not allege any other publication. This letter is the basis of plaintiff's claimed cause of action. In our opinion in State v. Brech, S.D., 169 N.W.2d 242, it is referred to as Exhibit 2.

Plaintiff's complaint alleges the statements contained in the letter of April 24th which she claims libeled her. It is her position that they were false and maliciously made. Whether they are libelous is not here presented. They were assumed to be such for the purpose of the motion to dismiss. All of them relate to circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime of which plaintiff's husband plead guilty and his habits, disposition and reputation. It was the kind of information that the Board of Pardons and Paroles could be expected to consider in discharging its statutory duties concerning any clemency to be afforded plaintiff's husband.

This observation is corroborated by pertinent provisions in our criminal code and the rules of the board. SDCL 1967 23--60--1 requires the warden to promptly furnish to the Director of the Board of Pardons and Paroles a case history of each inmate. This the director is required to enlarge and complete so that it contains a life history of the inmate. In discharging this function the director is authorized to enlist the services of the sentencing circuit judge and others. SDCL 1967 23--60--3. The rules of the board state that one purpose of the hearing which they hold in these matters is to enable it to review all available history, medical, social, psychological, past and present difficulties of the inmate involved.

Under its rules before any application for pardon, commutation of sentence, or remission of fines shall be considered by it, written notice shall be given to the sentencing judge and he is requested to comment thereon or make a recommendation, and submit any information that he might deem relevant and pertinent in the board's deliberations. Moreover, for a period of one year from the date of the judgment of conviction, SDCL 1967 23--57--8, he has jurisdiction to suspend the execution of sentence of the first felony offenders, which plaintiff's husband appears to be. SDCL 1967 23--57--5. If the judge suspends sentence he is required to furnish the director of the board all information available to him concerning the inmate involved. SDCL 1967 23--57--9.

When a person is convicted of a felony the judge is required to join with the state's attorney in an official statement of facts and circumstances concerning the crime involved and other facts and circumstances bearing on the question of whether the person sentenced is capable of again becoming a law-abiding citizen. SDCL 1967 23--48--37. This is furnished to the warden of the penitentiary when the convict is delivered there. The letter here involved, written a few days after the inmate was sentenced, is in the nature of an amendment of their official statement which they had prepared on April 19.

In her brief plaintiff states that 'whether or not this letter and its contents had any relevance to the said Judge's duties, authorities, or performance as to the subject matter at hand would seemingly be the crux in the entire case.' Her position is that in transmitting the letter in question Judge Seacat was not discharging an official duty. In support of this it is argued that his judicial function in the prosecution involving plaintiff's husband terminated with the passing of sentence and the execution of the official statement. This we think too narrow a view of the judge's official duties in a criminal matter.

The principle that a judge performing a judicial function enjoys absolute privilege when charged with defamation is well rooted in the common law. See Harper & James, Law of Torts, § 5.22; Prosser on Torts, 3d Ed., Ch. 21, § 109; 53 C.J.S. Libel and Slander § 104(d)(3); 33 Am.Jur., Libel and Slander, § 177; 42 A.L.R.2d, p. 825. Its foundation is public policy. The interests of society require that judges exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences.

With us this protection is included in the statutory grant of immunity to officials as a class. SDCL 1967 20--11--5, so far as here material, provides that: 'A privileged communication is one made: (1) In the proper discharge of an official duty.' This is the premise on which Judge Seacat based his motion to dismiss. As declared in SDCL 1967 2--14--12, concerning statutes generally, the privilege granted therein must be liberally construed to effect the legislative purposes.

In Restatement of the Law, Torts, § 585, from pages 225 to 229, it is written: "A judge or other officer performing a judicial function is absolutely privileged to publish false...