Brechu v. Rapid Transit Co., 23787

• Decision Date: 02 January 1957
• Docket Number: No. 23787,23787
• Citation: 20 Conn.Supp. 209,131 A.2d 211
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Louis BRECHU v. RAPID TRANSIT COMPANY, Inc.

Page 211

131 A.2d 211

20 Conn.Supp. 209

Louis BRECHU v. RAPID TRANSIT COMPANY, Inc.

No. 23787.

Superior Court of Connecticut, New London County.

Jan. 2, 1957.

Norman Zolot, Hamden, for claimant.

William J. Cousins, New Haven, for defendant.

John J. Bracken, Atty. Gen., and Harry Silverstone, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act.

KING, Judge.

The claimant is a truck driver employed by the defendant trucking company. This employment was pursuant to the provisions of a so-called 'labor-management contract' which set forth, in considerable detail, the terms and conditions of employment. It was signed by the defendant, and, under date of October 13, 1953, by one Rice, as secretary, treasurer and business agent of General Teamsters Local Union 493, to which union the claimant belonged, and which covered the so-called New London area embracing Jewett City, where the defendant maintained its place of business.

The provisions here material appeared in Article 17 of § 6 of the contract, and in effect provided: (a) that the contract should run from April 11, 1953, for two years, and 'shall then and thereafter renew itself from year to year' unless written notice is given by either party to the other, not less than sixty days prior to any date of expiration, of a desire to change the terms and conditions; and (b) that 'during the course of negotiations for amendment of renewal of the agreement, the terms and conditions herein set forth shall continue in effect, and any changes finally agreed upon with respect to wages or money allowances shall be retroactive to the date of expiration [here April 11, 1955] and effective as of that date.'

The sixty-day notice was given by claimant's local union 493 to the defendant sometime prior to February, 1955, and thereafter negotiations as to a new contract continued between a negotiating committee of the employers and one representing the unions until June 26, 1955, when a new contract was orally agreed upon which was to run for three years from April 11, 1955. The actual contract with the defendant does not appear in the case. A contract generally similar is the contract between The Adley Express Company, hereinafter referred to as Adley, and the local union 443, to which Adley's drivers, but not the claimant, belonged. The commissioners found, upon proper evidence, that particular provisions were agreed upon, orally or in writing, between a given union and a given employer, over and above those set forth in the general contract, which except for such particular provisions was uniform and followed in its terms the Adley contract.

On June 14, 1955, while the claimant and his fellow employees were engaged in the duties of their employment, the defendant notified them that it was shutting down its operations because of 'fear of strike.' Thereafter no work was given the defendant's drivers, including the claimant, until June 26, 1955, although they reported for work, and were ready, willing and able to work, during the entire period.

The claimant claims unemployment benefits for the period during which the defendant's business was shut down. Three unemployment commissioners, acting as a panel, held hearings on this case at New Haven over a period of days during the early part of 1956. From their decision in favor of the claimant the defendant has appealed. It was agreed that the decision in this case should govern, and be dispositive of, a large number of other claims arising because of similar closings, effective during about the same period, on the part of other trucking concerns operating out of Connecticut.

The defendant's basic claim is that under the provisions of General Statutes, § 7508(3) the claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits.

With one exception, none of the subordinate facts set forth in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the motion to correct the findings of facts and which the commissioners refused to add was admitted or conceded. The single exception is that portion of subdivision (c) of paragraph 4 of the motion to correct which summarizes the provisions of the contract effective from April 11, 1953, to April 11, 1955. This addition is entirely unnecessary since this entire contract was incorporated in paragraph 11 of the finding and award as originally made. It follows that none of the additions to the finding sought in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the motion to correct can be added in this court. Practice Book, §§ 322, 312; Civitello v. Connecticut Savings Bank, 128 Conn. 621, 625, 25 A.2d 47.

None of the deletions from the finding sought in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the motion to correct and which the commissioners refused to eliminate was found without evidence. For example, the portion of paragraph 38 of the finding and award sought to be eliminated in paragraph 2 of the motion to correct is amply supported by the testimony of Rice on pages c-23 and c-24 of the transcript. It follows that none of these deletions can be made.

Actually, paragraphs 34, 35, 36 and 37 of the finding and award embraced ultimate facts and conclusions of law, and in no real sense of the phrase should it be said that they were 'not supported by the evidence.' Whether or not they should be stricken depended, as to ultimate conclusions of fact, upon whether they were supported by the subordinate facts properly found; and as to conclusions of law, on the governing law of the case. In so far as they were ultimate facts, they were amply supported by the subordinate facts and cannot be eliminated. In so far as they involve conclusions of law, they will hereinafter be considered.

Under the terms of the contract between the claimant's union and the defendant, previously quoted, it was the duty of labor and management to continue to maintain operations while negotiations for a new contract were in progress. When, on June 12, the union struck certain trucking companies, the union broke the contract as to such employers. And of course no unemployment benefits would be paid striking employees of such employers, since their unemployment was voluntary and due to a labor dispute.

But that is not this case. Here there was no strike against the defendant employer. It chose to cease operations. Negotiations for the new contract were proceeding. Indeed, a new contract was agreed upon on or about June 26, when the Adley contract was accepted by the representative negotiators, subject to ratification, which subsequently took place, between each individual employer, including the defendant, and the individual union, including local union 493, to which his drivers, including the claimant, belonged.

The claim of the defendant is, in essence, that since claimant's union struck Adley and certain other employers, key men in whose organizations were negotiating the provisions of the new general contract with a negotiating group from the unions, all other employers, including the defendant, had a right to shut down. This is a complete non sequitur.

It is a fundamental principle of our Unemployment Compensation Act that benefits may not be allowed persons whose unemployment is voluntary. This is true whether or not in any way connected with a labor dispute. Carper v. Administrator, 139 Conn. 515, 520, 95 A.2d 378. In pursuance of that policy, the act, § 7508(3), provides that an employee shall be ineligible for benefits if his unemployment 'is due to the existence of a labor dispute' at his place of employment.

There is considerable question as to whether there was any 'labor dispute' involving the defendant, either at its place of business or anywhere else. See General Motors Corporation v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 118, 130, 55 A.2d 732, and Alvarez v. Administrator, 139 Conn. 327, 333, 336, 93 A.2d 298. To be sure, there was argument and wrangling between the negotiators over the terms of the proposed new contract, as is generally the case in such situations. The union negotiators made divers 'demands' as to what should be in the new contract. The witness Adley, on the part of the employers, told the unions' negotiators that a certain proposal was the employers' 'final offer.' But he testified he did not literally mean it, and that he kept on negotiating until utlimately an accord was reached. On June 12 the unions struck Adley and some other trucking concerns. But as far as the remaining trucking companies were involved, including the defendant, negotiations continued and the trucks operated as usual until June 14, when the defendant shut down its operations and threw its drivers, including the claimant, out of work. In the court's view of the case, it is immaterial whether or not a 'labor dispute' was in existence at the defendant's plant in Jewett City, and it may be assumed, without being decided, that such was the case.

Ordinarily, when an employer shuts down his business, as was the case here, the resulting involuntary unemployment of his employees entitles them to benefits under § 7507. This is true regardless of the motive for shutting the plant down, and even though the doors of the establishment are locked so that in the physical and generic sense of the term there is a lockout. In other words, merely because there is a closing of his business by an employer, and, so, in a generic sense, a lockout, does not, in and of itself, disentitle...