Bredenderf v. State

Citation141 N.E. 610,193 Ind. 675
Decision Date05 December 1923
Docket NumberNo. 24228.,24228.
PartiesBREDENDERF v. STATE.
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Criminal Court, Lake County; Martin J. Smith, Judge.

George Bredenderf was convicted of grand larceny, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Wm. J. McAlear, Francis J. Dorsey, G. A. Gillett, and Perry R. Chapin, all of Hammond, for appellant.

U. S. Lesh, Atty. Gen., and Connor D. Ross, First Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.

MYERS, J.

Appellant, upon an affidavit filed in the court below, was tried and convicted of the crime of grand larceny, as defined by section 2269, Burns' 1914. Appellant's motion for a new trial was overruled, and judgment followed pronouncing sentence in the penalty as provided by statute. The only error assigned is the overruling of his motion for a new trial.

Appellant relies entirely upon alleged errors of the court in giving instructions Nos. 8 and 15 upon its own motion. Instruction No. 8 was upon the subject of reasonable doubt. and is as follows:

“By reasonable doubt is not meant a mere whim or speculative doubt. The jury is not at liberty to indulge in purely speculative doubt. A reasonable doubt may be generated by a lack of evidence as to some material fact or facts constituting the charge, as well as from the evidence in the case.

“A reasonable doubt is one that arises naturally and spontaneously in the mind after a fair and impartial consideration and weighing of all of the evidence in the case and a determination and application of the law of the case, and leaves the mind in such condition that you do not feel an abiding satisfaction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge, but there remains in the mind an uncertainty, which if interposed in the graver transactions of life, would check your final judgment (our italics) and cause you to pause and hesitate.

“Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is such proof as satisfies the judgment and conscience of each juror so that you can say from all of the evidence before you in the case that the crime charged was committed by the accused, and that you are satisfied thereof to such degree of certainty that you would feel safe to act thereon in a matter of the highest import, affecting your own dearest interests, and in a case where you would be free to act or not, as you might choose.”

Appellant has singled out the clause we have italicized and insists that it was harmful as a part of the definition of “reasonable doubt,” in that it excluded that character of uncertainty that would cause a juror to pause and hesitate in the ordinary and commonplace transactions of life. He makes the point that any doubt that would cause a juror to pause and hesitate, even though it arises out of a transaction that can in no wise be denominated one of the graver transactions of life, is such a reasonable doubt as forbids a conviction in a criminal case. In support of this contention he cites Brown v. State, 105 Ind. 385, 5 N. E. 900;Blue v. State, 86 Neb. 189, 125 N. W. 136; State v. Reed, 62 Me. 129; Commonwealth v. Miller, 139 Pa. 77, 21 Atl. 138, 23 Am. St. Rep. 170; and Boughan v. State (Ind. Sup.) 138 N. E. 87.

The instruction in the Brown Case was criticized, but the only error in it pointed out was that it was liable to mislead the jury into the belief “that, in order to justify an acquittal, the doubt of the defendant's guilt must arise out of the evidence,” when the want of evidence might be just as effective in authorizing an acquittal. It was then said:

“In order to justify a conviction the evidence must be such as to produce in the minds of prudent men such certainty that they would act upon the conviction produced without hesitation in their own most important affairs.”

In the Blue Case, the jury was told that “a reasonable doubt is such a doubt as you are able to give a reason for.” This instruction was held bad for the reason that a juror would thereby understand that if called on to give a reason for such doubt he would feel bound by this instruction to do so or to abandon his convictions.”

In the Reed Case, an instruction purporting to tell the jury what constituted a reasonable doubt was assailed upon the theory that it left out “an important element necessary to give the jury a full understanding of their duties in this respect; namely, the moral certainty of the truth of the charge to authorize conviction.” The court, after analyzing the challenged instruction, held that it fully covered the objection urged against it.

The trial court, in the Miller Case, on the question of reasonable doubt, said: “It is such a doubt as would influence or control you in your actions in any of the important transactions of life.” On appeal, this instruction was condemned for the reason-

“that a doubt that would cause one to pause and hesitate, was, if fairly derived from the evidence, a reasonable one within the meaning of the criminal law. *** A doubt that would control our actions in the important transactions of life, would be one that was so strong as not to be overcome by the balancing process. Such a doubt would be practically an unconquerable one. If would lead us, not simply to refrain from acting, but to act.”

[1] The questioned instruction in the case at bar was given word for word in the Boughan Case, where it was held erroneous, and the judgment therein reversed and a new trial ordered. The one sentence of the instruction is technically inaccurate and might be regarded as harmful only in a case of bare possibility of evidence to sustain a conviction, as was pointed out in the Boughan Case. However, the courts should not and will not seize upon every erroneous or inaccurate statement in an instruction to reverse a judgment. They must not only be erroneous or inaccurate, but from the record, the reviewing court must be satisfied that the alleged erroneous language, when considered as a part of the entire charge was harmful to the complaining party. Eacock v. State, 169 Ind. 488, 82 N. E. 1039;Hiatt v. State, 189 Ind. 524, 127 N. E. 277;Weigand v. State, 178 Ind. 623, 99 N. E. 999;Rollins v. State, 62 Ind. 46, 51;Commonwealth v. Webb, 252 Pa. 187, 194, 97 Atl. 189.

Text-writers and courts of review have given the expression “reasonable doubt” much thought and space in reaching the conclusion that no very satisfactory definition of the phrase can be given. Nevertheless, an examination of the many decided cases in this jurisdiction will furnish abundant proof of numerous attempts on the part of our nisi prius courts to coin a more improved definition of the words “reasonable doubt” than the one given by Chief Justice Shaw in his charge to the jury in Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295, 52 Am. Dec. 711, or as expressed by this court in Bradley v. State, 31 Ind. 492, wherein the definition of these words, as defined in Arnold v. State, 23 Ind. 170, was condemned because the standard of certainty therein fixed was too low. In the Bradley Case, after quoting from Starkie on Evidence (10th American Ed.) *p. 865, and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases
  • Cherry v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • April 7, 1972
    ...matter should be called to the attention of the trier of facts in considering the weight to be given such evidence. Bredenderf v. State (1923), 193 Ind. 675, 141 N.E. 610; Kleihege v. State (1934), 206 Ind. 206, 188 N.E. 786; Green v. State (1960), 241 Ind. 96, 168 N.E.2d 345. In Bredenderf......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT