Breeden v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 26 June 1909 |
| Parties | BREEDEN v. ÆTNA LIFE INS. CO. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Hughes County.
Action by James K. Breeden against the Ætna Life Insurance Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Goodner & Goodner, for appellant.
Chas E. De Land and James K. Breeden, for respondent.
From the record in this case it appears that in March, 1904, the defendant, Ætna Life Insurance Company, issued to plaintiff James K. Breeden, its policy of accident insurance, and that thereafter while said policy was in force, on the 11th day of November, 1904, the plaintiff met with an accident, being thrown from his buggy and injured, and rendering plaintiff wholly helpless for the space of eight weeks, from November 11, 1904, to January 6, 1905, and that from the 7th day of January, 1905, to July 7, 1905, plaintiff for a period of 26 weeks was partially disabled, and, under the provisions of said policy, plaintiff became entitled to indemnity in such stated sums per week as were therein provided. On February 26, 1906, plaintiff made and furnished to defendant written proofs of his disability and the duration thereof. Clause 16 of said policy provides as follows: "Immediate notice in writing of any accident or injury shall be given to said company at Hartford, Conn., with full particulars and name and address of the insured, and unless affirmative proof of the partial or total disability, and that the same was the result of external violence or accidental means, is so furnished within two months from the termination of total or partial disability, the said company shall be released from all liability for the payment of any claim based on said insurance policy." The defendant contends that, by reason of the plaintiff having failed to furnish proof of disability within the time specified in said clause 16, it has become released from all obligation to pay plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that, under the evidence in this case defendant should be held to have waived the time limit provision of said clause 16.
It appears in the evidence: That one James Door at the time of the issuance of said policy, and up until April, 1906, was acting as the general managing agent of defendant, and that one Gleckler during the years 1904, 1905, and 1906 was acting as local agent of defendant at Pierre, where plaintiff resided. That the policy was solicited by and the premiums paid to Gleckler, and that the policy was issued by defendant and countersigned by Door, general agent. It appears that Door and defendant were duly notified in writing of the accident immediately after its occurrence. It also appears that plaintiff wrote to Door prior to August 14, 1905, and again on that date for blanks on which to make proof of claim, thus indicating to defendant that he intended to present his claim under this policy, and that Door immediately sent the blanks, and that on February 26, 1906 plaintiff furnished to defendant formal written proofs, which were retained by defendant without objection, and that, immediately after the receipt of such proofs, Door wrote Gleckler to further investigate plaintiff's disability, and the duration thereof, and inclosed to Gleckler, with the letter, a blank proof filled out, except as to length of time of disability, and requested Gleckler to ascertain the length of time of the disability and fill in the blank, and Gleckler, upon receipt of this letter, immediately saw plaintiff and ascertained the length of time, and also procured from the attending physician a certificate as to the duration of plaintiff's disability, and forwarded the same to Door during the month of March, 1906. The position is not tenable that the writing of this letter by Door to Gleckler immediately after the furnishing of proofs by plaintiff was independent investigation on the part of defendant. About April 7, 1906, defendant through its...
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