Breedin v. United States, 3741.

• Decision Date: 19 November 1934
• Docket Number: No. 3741.,3741.
• Citation: Breedin v. United States, 73 F.2d 778 (4th Cir. 1934)
• Parties: BREEDIN v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

73 F.2d 778 (1934)

BREEDIN v.UNITED STATES.

No. 3741.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

November 19, 1934.

A. H. Dagnall, of Anderson, S. C., for appellant.

C. C. Wyche, U. S. Atty., of Greenville, S. C.

Before PARKER, NORTHCOTT, and SOPER, Circuit Judges.

PARKER, Circuit Judge.

The appellant, a physician of Anderson, S. C., was convicted in the court below of charging and receiving compensation of $3,000, in violation of 38 USCA § 551, for collecting the amount due under a policy of war risk insurance.There was evidence on the part of the government that appellant charged this sum for his services and was paid it out of a sum of $8,682.50 collected under the policy.Appellant admitted the receipt of the $3,000, but contended that it was paid to him in satisfaction of a note given by the widow of the deceased soldier in renewal of notes which had been executed to appellant on account of medical services which he had rendered.The government showed, however, that appellant had been paid in full for these services by the mother of the deceased soldier and had issued receipts showing such payment; and it contended that the obtaining of the note for $3,000 was a mere device for covering up the unlawful charge made on account of services.The issue thus raised was fairly submitted to the jury in an able charge, as to which there is no exception.The questions presented by the appeal relate to the admission of testimony and to certain questions and comments by the United States Attorney of which appellant complains.

The first assignment of error relates to the admission in evidence, over appellant's objection, of a letter written by appellant to the widow of the deceased soldier, complaining because she had collected $130 from moneys which had been paid into the office of the probate judge as compensation due the soldier.The letter states that appellant was counting on receiving this $130, and that he was looking for the widow to bring or send it to him.It is clear, of course, that the letter had no relation to any money collected under the war risk insurance policy; but the crucial question in the case was as to the intent or purpose of appellant in the collection of the $3,000, and this letter, showing as it did the attitude of the appellant towards other moneys collected from the government about the same time, threw considerable light on the question.It is well settled that, as bearing upon the question of intent, purpose, design, or knowledge, evidence of similar transactions occurring at or about the same time is competent.Tincher v. U. S. (C. C. A. 4th)11 F.(2d) 18, 20;Lynch v. U. S. (C. C. A. 4th)12 F.(2d) 193;Samuels v. U. S. (C. C. A. 8th)232 F. 536, Ann. Cas. 1917A, 711;Shea v. U. S. (C. C. A. 6th)251 F. 440;Jones v. U. S. (C. C. A. 9th)179 F. 584, 585, 610;Williamson v. U. S., 207 U. S. 425, 451, 28 S. Ct. 163, 52 L. Ed. 278.

Assignments 7, 11, 12, and 13 complain of the admission in evidence of the record of certain mortgages together with the record of their release and entries by appellant declaring this release null and void.Without going into the complicated facts disclosed by these records, it is sufficient to say that they were a part of the proof adduced to show that the medical services rendered by appellant to the deceased soldier had been paid for in full by his mother, and that they were competent in rebuttal of appellant's testimony to the effect that the $3,000 collected by him was for these services.The fact that the records may have served as a basis for argument that appellant had been guilty of fraudulent conduct with relation thereto was no reason for their exclusion; for evidence having a...